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The present study revolves around a series of related questions that connect 
one of the central arguments in Foucault’s work. Foucault argues that the self 
(or the ‘I’) that contemplates is indeed only a fold of outside. Consequently, 
thinking itself is essentially folding of the outside. It is the distancing of itself 
from itself, through folding thought as it arrives from the outside. Man, The 
Order of Things suggests, is compressed and withheld in a hollowed out space 
formed at the middle of the folds of life, language and labour. Still, these 
respective folds, Foucault insists, can unfold themselves in him that is, only in 
man (Foucault, 1994, p. 313). These folds that are prior to his own birth and, 
for that very reason, having an existence ontologically independent of his 
own, do not actually carry the truth of his own being, and still it can only be 
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through his life, labour and language that he (man) can evaluate himself and 
the world. What unfolds at the very heart of this field of movement is a 
recurring absence – a signal of the presence of an absolute other. The inner 
most inside of all thoughts is a recurring absence – an absence that incessantly 
splits the very instance that releases them. “A Preface to Transgression,” for 
instance, proposes that “the interior is an empty skull, a central absence” 
(Foucault, 1980, p. 49).      
Consequently, it is the very recurring of a central absence, (an absolute limit) 
that infinitely unfolds the folds of life, labour and language in man. No 
absolute truth, nothing in man is stable enough (and that means, not even the 
material body) to hold the truth of both himself and the world. The very 
absence of a univocal truth, in contrast, establishes a differential relationship 
between the space of the body and the time of the culture. In the modern 
discourse on man, Foucault suggests, the recurring of the absolute absence – a 
radical finitude that hollows out the instance by splitting it, relentlessly 
fibrillates the time that presences thought to itself through differentiating and 
repeating of the empirical (the space of the body) and the transcendental (the 
time of the culture) contents within that thought. It, then, establishes a field of 
forces between these contents of thought, given thought a nocturnal dimension. 
Man, consequently, is constituted as an empirico-transcendental doublet. He 
is always in a ceaseless unfolding within a field of temporal becoming, within 
a play of repetition, where repetition will always repeat itself with difference. 
What, then, itself repeats as the same is nothing but the model of movement – 
and Deleuze would call it: the repetition of pure difference.  
The present study poses to itself: if thinking comes from the outside, then 
under what condition thinking can encounter itself – its colour, texture and 
topography? That is, under what condition can man encounter himself and the 
world? If put differently: the present study, essentially, takes the form of time 
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meditating upon the condition of its own origin, in order to make sense of its 
own space and movements. Since this problem does not have its origin in 
Foucault’s work, this work does not arrive at any conclusion, merely by 
analysing and evaluating his work alone. Rather, it aims to explore how 
Foucault has incorporated Kant and Nietzsche into his thinking, on the one 
hand, and contextualises him within the Western tradition in general and his 
responses to contemporaries Deleuze and Derrida, in particular, on the other. 
Consequently, this study is limited by the sheer weight of its own 
problematisation. 
It is important to make sense of Foucault’s work not just with an academic 
interest, but also to make sense of our own present. Through a broad 
comparison (and that is just to make sense of the implications of his work), 
one could suggest that if Deleuze is a giant in building a new system of 
thought, Foucault is a warrior who prefers to position himself strategically at 
the threshold, at the very frontiers that divide the interior from the outside of 
Western sensibilities. In The Order of Things, while going through Borges’ 
Chinese encyclopaedia, one, for instance, finds him showing the audacity to 
laugh at himself – at the very limits of his own sensibilities (Foucault, 1994, 
pp. xviii – xix). In him, one encounters a modern-day Samurai at war. His 
campaign, however, is not directed against the outside and, for that reason, is 
anti-expansionistic. It is a war directed against oneself, against the interiority 
of one’s own culture. Still, like the flash of reflected light on a swinging sword 
in mid-air, he hides more than what he reveals of himself. He is a master 
strategist and a tactician, who uses them like weapons and tools to subvert 
systems of normalised practices. His genealogical critique of the present 
explores the possibilities for the creation a new man. At the very heart of the 
Foucauldian endeavour is empiricism, and a concern with the everyday life.  
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To Foucault, the place of man reveals to himself when language recovered its 
lost consistency that would thicken it into words that can be deciphered. He 
appears to himself as a private concern, when language lost its transparency 
that shaped Classical world, and transformed itself into a reality with its own 
density. In the modern age, man appears to himself as compressed and 
withheld in a hollowed out space formed at the middle of the folds of life, 
labour and language, and still it can only be within him that these respective 
folds can unfold themselves. For that reason, Foucault in his work on Kant’s 
Anthropology suggests that it can only be in man that a synthesis of the world 
(known) and the God (unknown) is possible. Since these folds are prescribed 
to him in advance, and have their own modes of being independent of his 
own, their folding towards themselves allows him to constitute a self that is 
external to them and yet, in relation to them, in a state of ceaseless becoming.  
Consequently, Foucault defines modernity as an attitude. It is a mode of 
relating to contemporary reality, a voluntary choice made by certain people 
and played out against the attitudes of counter-modernity. In the end, it is, 
according to Foucault, a way of thinking and feeling, and a way, too, of acting 
and behaving. It is a way of constituting oneself, through ceaseless active and 
passive syntheses, as a man who is responsible for his own actions. Unlike the 
Cartesian cogito with innate qualities and the Leibnizian monad that is folded 
towards itself, the self, according to Foucault, is only a fold of the outside, and 
it is so, due to the changed relation between being and representation in the 
modern age. 
When language regained its lost opacity and became a reality with its own 
density, a new form of discourse came into being whose internal tension 
would keep separate the empirical and the transcendental, while being 
directed at both, and with its birth, it became possible to analyse man as a 
subject. With the emergence of the tension within a new form of discourse 
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that keeps the space of the body and the time of the culture separated from 
each other, man quickly appears to himself as an object of analysis. One 
encounters three forms of ontology in Foucault’s work: the first analyses man 
as the subject of truth; the second takes up man as the subject of power; and 
the third analyses man as an ethical being. Though Foucault has developed 
these ontologies in the above-given order at different stages of his career, the 
present study reverses the order and examines his work in its totality from the 
standpoint of his later writings that deal with the problem of truth and ethics, 
and tries to connect two questions that pop up at different stages of Foucault’s 
work. The Order of Things, for instance, asks the question ‘what is man?’ and in 
his later writings, he labours with the question ‘how should I live my life?’  
From a philosophical standpoint, these questions, however, are 
interconnected. One would be immediately forced to ask to oneself the 
question “What is man?,” when following the question, “How should I live 
my life?.” And still, Foucault poses these questions at different stages of his 
career.   
In his later writings, Foucault differentiates the ancient Greek ethics from the 
Christian experience of the flesh. According to him, if the Christian experience 
of the flesh revolves around the decipherment of the hidden truth, then the 
Greek developed a mode of being that is based on the ontology of force. In the 
Greek experience of the aphrodisia, act, desire, and pleasure formed an 
ensemble whose elements, though closely bound to one another, were 
actually distinguishable. The ethical question that the Greeks raised was not: 
which desires?, which acts?, which pleasures? But rather, with what force is 
one transported by the pleasures and desires. Since forces, by nature, are 
excessive, they demand a play of differential relation, an agonistic relation 
between oneself and oneself. To check the passive forces that would transport 
one by pleasures and desires, they aim to build a counter force. Consequently, 
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freedom is essentially the freedom to choose and control one’s own actions, 
and, for that reason, as free men, the ancient Greeks subjected both the body 
and the soul to practical reason and trained and controlled them through 
techniques that they could practice on an everyday basis.  
II 
Any act of production that involves a sense of value is, essentially, played out 
ritualistically, that is, they involve a play of seduction and deception. Writing 
is not an exception, as signs, by their nature, are modular1 and, therefore, they 
are only symptoms of immanent signs. Writing as an act, then, is becoming in 
its most immanent play that involves signs and self in the very material 
presence of the body. It is such an act that at once inflames interpretation (in 
space) and evaluation (in time), which means an author is at once the writer 
and reader of his own work; in other words, he has to follow both himself and 
the marks that he makes on the sheet of paper, as he has to think, evaluate 
and rework both his own attitude towards the marks and the marks 
themselves. Since this act, or else a sequence of acts, actually unfolds within 
an always-already functioning field of temporality, that is, within a swarm of 
undifferentiated difference, they are backed by (and are built upon) an endless 
                                                          
1 Saussure in Course in General Linguistics, for instance, points out the dual essence of language, that is 
language in itself is composed of more than one element and, for that reason, it has no essence of its 
own. A linguistic sign, consequently, is nothing but a combination of a concept (which is generally an 
abstract) and a sound-image (Saussure, 1959, pp. 66 – 67), a sign, then, is a unity of sense and sound 
(Foucault and Deleuze, from a Nietzschean point of view would rather argue that both the sense and 
the sound-image take form, or are assembled within a field of undifferentiated forces. See, Deleuze’s 
theory of assemblages in A Thousand Plateaus that explains the notion of the relations of exteriority). 
Saussure writes, “Language is speechless speaking” (Saussure, 1959, p. 77) and, for that reason, “by 
himself the individual is incapable of fixing a single value” (Saussure, 1959, p. 113). According to him, 
language then is “a depository, a thing received from without” (Saussure, 1959, p. 66). Wittgenstein in 
Philosophical Investigations suggests that we do not actually encounter ourselves and the world through 
the absolute authority of an evidence, rather through our involved act; like in the case of games, we 
learn the rules neither through detached observation nor through contemplating their various 
nuances, but unconsciously through participation (Wittgenstein, 1986, p. 3‘‘). In his response to 
Sartre’s 1945 lecture titled “Existentialism as Humanism,” one finds Heidegger suggesting in the 
“Letter on Humanism” that “Thus language is at once the home of being and the home of human 
essence.” Online source: Heidegger (19 Nov, 2013), “Letter on Humanism:” 
http://pacificinstitute.org/pdf/Letter_on_%20Humanism.pdf .     
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series of active and passive syntheses. It is the doubling and redoubling of 
both the self and the signs within a field of forces that lead to the at once 
becoming of both the self and the sign in an act of writing. For that reason, 
like any act of writing, this present study also unfolds from such a play 
involving signs, self and body.  
The present study is not organised around a preconceived plan (in other 
words, it does not try to prove a preconceived idea), but rather both its 
structure and content have taken form along with the act of writing, and this 
work is, actually, written with the spirit and curiosity of a solo traveller, who 
has never before been this far into a terrain so foreign. It is divided into four 
chapters. The first chapter identifies two a priories – light and language – in 
Foucault’s thinking, which the second and third chapters develop further and 
the fourth chapter initiates a fresh and a finer analysis, based on the insights 
and suggestions that the first three chapters have brought along with them.  
The Foucauldian ‘ontology of the present’ aims a recession into a future. As 
the past itself cedes back in an act of recession, it unfolds a future that clings 
little to its own past. The ontology of the present, then, traces the potentials 
within the present, the living present, to produce a radical new. The first 
chapter, therefore, opens itself by tracing the Heraclitean traces in Foucault’s 
thought. For Heraclitus, it is only the un-presupposed that is able to trace and 
expropriate if anything at all from that which is yet to become knowledge. To 
trace the traces within itself, thinking has to approach itself from the vantage 
point of a distance. In other words, to establish a relationship between the self 
and itself, it is imperative that it approaches itself from outside, that is, it has 
to place and see itself as other. It has to engage itself with a certain 
detachment. The chapter explores the condition under which such a 
relationship with oneself becomes possible.  
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In the modern age, the cogito appears to itself as an object of analysis, when a 
grave (internal) tension surfaces within a new form of discourse that keeps 
the transcendental and the empirical separated while relating them to each 
other. In such a form of discourse, “thought bridles and mutilates life, making 
it sensible, and life takes revenge and drives thought mad, losing itself along 
the way” (Deleuze, 2001, pp. 66 – 7). When the space of the body and the time 
of the culture establish between them an antagonistic relationship, there 
forms a field of flux between them – a field of forces. Knowledge, 
consequently, belongs neither to the object nor to the subject, causing a grid of 
knowledge a possibility. Object and subject, here, actually become mere 
reversible within this field of knowledge and power. Thus, once again, it 
becomes possible for man to start following closely both himself and his 
world, as their present themselves before him. The first chapter consequently 
establishes the presents of two apriori – that is, two “there is” – in Foucault’s 
thinking: the visible and the articulable. Put differently, they are visibilities 
and statements. They are formed, when language regained that lost 
consistency that would inspissate from within itself to become words to be 
deciphered. When it recovers its lost opacity and materialises itself into a 
reality with a density of its own, it starts refracting light, and establishes a 
differential relationship between light and darkness. It is this play of the light 
(known) and the darkness (unknown) that unfolds reality in us. The following 
two chapters develop an analysis of the mode of being of light and language 
in Foucault’s work. 
The second chapter deals with the fold of light. In Foucault’s work, beings do 
not become more beingful (in a Heideggerian sense, unhidden more unhidden) 
towards light, that is, they do not reveal their essence in light. Things do not 
reveal their essence under its transparency. Rather, light essentially is reflected 
and refracted light. In Foucault’s work, the flood of light fills the space 
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through invisible windows and inaccessible corridors. It does not actually 
reveal anything vital, but rather it either merely signals its own presence or 
illuminates the surface on which it strikes. Even at a time, when light appears 
from the depth (the practice of the care of the self in antiquity that Foucault 
examined in the later stage of his career is such a case), it only initiates self-
examination by establishing reciprocity of gaze between friends or 
correspondents. Writing correspondences at that time, according to Foucault, 
was that possibility that can “project oneself into view, to make one’s own 
face appear” in the presence of the other (Foucault, 1997, p. 216). Still, light is 
necessity that neither belongs to the subject nor the object. What Foucault 
introduces into the play here is the very idea that light can be folded. 
According to him, the self itself is a fold of the outside that means: it is 
through folding the outside towards itself that a self can indeed be created. 
The chapter opens with a reading of Plato’s cave allegory and his 
differentiation of two distinctive worlds – the world of the senses and the 
world of pure forms, and progresses through Foucault’s reading of Stoic 
philosophy and his attempts, through the Stoics, to develop a philosophy that 
could identify itself with the divine within the mundane. The Stoic thought is 
marked by the presence of an addressee and involves the establishment of 
reciprocity of gaze and examination. Foucault suggests, it flourished once in 
antiquity, under a culture of listening, where they (the Stoics) reconciled their 
minds to wait (without any purpose), like a tranquil lake under the blue sky. 
Their soothing minds, like the serenity of a grand theatre that gently fans 
breath into the unfolding scenes, sense without ever disturbing the scenes 
unfolding before and within them. The missives that the Stoics circulated 
among them mainly demand a detached engagement with the soul, the 
principle of one’s own life.     
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The third chapter explores the play of the outside, the field of undifferentiated 
forces, in Foucault’s thinking. It is the tension between the empirical and the 
transcendental within a new form of discourse that causes the field of force to 
activate itself. The ‘I’ or the self, then, is formed through ceaseless (active and 
passive) syntheses. It is formed from without, and yet within a field of force 
that would open a network of connections between it and an always-already 
functioning system of signs – the language. The ‘I’ or the self, consequently, is 
produced through a series of internal coupes that ceaselessly transform it 
from within. It is formed through ceaseless affecting and being affectedness 
within a field of forces. The third chapter opens with a reading of Philippe 
Delerm’s short-fiction, in which he tries to show how a knife from the 
childhood produces incorporeal effects on its holder. The very use of this 
particular knife produces on the holder, he suggests, a series of incorporeal 
transformation, even when you are not a child anymore. The chapter 
progresses through juxtaposing and repeating Foucault and Derrida. 
Language, according to Foucault, is strictly spatial. It resides out there in the 
void that separates the subject from the object (Foucault, 1990). Foucault, for 
instance, in The Order of Things poses the question: “what is language, how 
can we find a way round it in order to make it appear in itself, in all its 
plenitude?” (Foucault, 1994, p. 306). In the modern age, language, Foucault 
suggests, has regained its lost consistency to form a material reality, a word to 
be deciphered, that is, it has become a reality, with its own density. The 
spatial existence of language suggests, for Foucault, the opening of an outside. 
Against the objectivity of language that Foucault advocates, Derrida, on the 
other hand, develops the idea of a self-deconstructive “text.” For him, our 
very encounter with ourselves and the world actually takes place in iterable 
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graphemes of experience.2 By juxtaposing and repeating these two thinkers (each 
time with a difference), the chapter also invites the readers to consider for 
reflection the temporal movement that such a playful juxtaposition can effect 
on them. One of the significant differences their thoughts vehemently guard 
                                                          
2 Derrida develops a deconstructive reading of one of the central binary oppositions in Western thought 
that Saussure repeats uncritically. The privileging of the phonic signifier – essentially gains force from 
other similar binary pairings (Plato’s preference of) Idea over being, soul over body, essence over 
appearance etc. The entire uncritical tradition that Saussure evokes here, according to Derrida, 
suggests that “there would be first a natural bond of sense to the senses and it is this that passes from 
sense to sound: “the natural bond,” Saussure says, “the only true bond, the bound of sound”” 
(Derrida, 2002, p. 35). Thus, by privileging the phonic signifier, Derrida suggests, Saussure has 
constituted an interior that is close to nature, against which the exteriority of the written-image has to 
be considered. In Phaedrus, Plato claims that the evil of writing comes from outside. Derrida writes: 
“writing would thus have the exteriority that one attributes to utensils” (Ibid, p. 34). It is merely a 
double of a double. What this tradition fears then is usurpation – a double overthrowing what is pure 
and innocent. “What is intolerable and fascinating is indeed the intimacy intertwining image and 
thing, graph, i.e., and phone, to the speculum of writing, which “manages to usurp the main role.” 
Representation mingles with what it represents, to the point where one speaks as one writes, one 
thinks as if the represented were nothing more than the shadow or reflection of the representer. A 
dangerous promiscuity and a nefarious complicity between the reflection and the reflected which lets 
itself be seduced narcissistically. In this play of representation, the point of origin becomes 
ungraspable. There are things like reflecting pools, and images, an infinite reference from one to the 
other, but no longer a source, a spring. There is no longer a simple origin. For what is reflected is split 
in itself and not only as an addition to itself of its image. The reflection, the image, the double, splits 
what it doubles. The origin of the speculation becomes a difference. What can look at itself is not one; 
and the law of the addition of the origin to its representation, of the thing to its image, is that one plus 
one makes at least three” (Ibid, p. 36). Then, writing, a mnemotechnic means, here supplants good 
memory, spontaneous memory, signifies forgetfulness (Ibid, p. 37). It is largely usurpation into nature, 
and consequently, a deviation from nature. Spontaneous life, the traditionalist suggests, must be 
protected. Derrida, however, insists that language is first writing and consequently “there is [yet] an 
originary violence of writing. Writing cannot be reduced to the exteriority of the written-image, 
besides the phoneme itself is unimaginable and, therefore, no visibility can resemble it. However, he 
writes: “now we must think that writing is at the same time more exterior to speech, not being its 
“image” or its “symbol,” and more interior to speech, which is already in itself a writing. Even before 
it is linked to incision, engraving, drawing, or the letter, to a signifier referring in general to a signifier 
signified by it, the concept of the graphie [unit of a possible graphic system] implies the framework of 
the instituted trace, as the possibility common to all systems of signification” (Ibid, 46). Trace, for 
Derrida, is self-occultation, as it always produces itself as self-occultation, and still, it is instituted, and 
therefore, firmly within culture. It then cannot be nature. It is in the trace that the relationship with the 
other is marked, and is the very structure of the arbitrariness of the sign. He writes: “the instituted 
trace cannot be thought without thinking the retention of difference within a structure of reference 
where difference appears as such and thus permits a certain liberty of variations among the full terms. 
The absence of another here-and-now, of another transcendental present, of another origin of the world 
appearing as such, presenting itself as irreducible absence within the presence of the trace, is not a 
metaphysical formula substituted for a scientific concept of writing. This formula, beside the fact that 
it is the questioning of metaphysics itself, describes the structure implied by the arbitrariness of the 
sign,” from the moment that one thinks of its possibility short of the derived opposition between 
nature and convention, symbol and sign, etc. These oppositions have meaning only after the 
possibility of the trace. The “unmotivatedness” of the sign requires a synthesis in which the 
completely other is announced as such – without any simplicity, any identity, any resemblance or 
continuity – within what is not it” (Ibid, pp. 46 – 7).                  
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and juxtapose to each other is in Foucault the self, which unfolds outside but 
in relation to an always-already functioning system of signs – the language – 
and, on the other hand, in Derrida’s work, the self or the ‘I’ essentially unfolds 
from within iterable graphemes of experience.     
The fourth chapter tries to link (though interrelated) two questions that 
Foucault poses at different stages of his career: “what is man?” and “how 
should I live my life?” It explores the condition under which man encounters 
himself and the world. The chapter opens with a reading of Hamlet. One finds 
Hamlet, in that play, is kept suspended between the reality of the king and 
the time of the revenge by a combination of fear and fury. His peculiar form 
of relationship to the time, on the other hand, allows us to examine other 
forms of relationships to time, and later enables us to contextualise and 
evaluate Foucault’s non-metaphysical thinking better than it would have been 
evaluated otherwise. The section titled ‘Form and the Play of the Outside’ in 
the chapter traces the Nietzschean influence, by examining the play of form 
and force in shaping reality. The section titled ‘Foucault, Kant and 
Pragmatism’ traces the Kantian influence in Foucault’s thinking, especially 
Foucault’s take of Kantian Anthropology, and the section titled ‘Philosophy as 
a Life-form and a Way of Life’ further develops the stress on the everyday-life 
by examining Foucault’s journey into antiquity, exploring the Socratic idea of 
the care of the self, that first appears in Plato and later became a culture with 
the Stoics and the Epicureans. 
The fourth chapter tries to understand Foucault’s conceptualisation of the 
everyday. The everyday, or else the realm of the mundane, is precisely what it 
reveals as it is, because what splits ceaselessly the living present into past and 
future is a repeating central absence. In the “Preface to Transgression,” one 
finds being (which is essentially pure movement and, therefore, it has no 
existence outside movement) transgressing the Limit (that is, the mask of an 
already consolidated force) around a central absence, an empty skull. It is 
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actually the same model of movement around a central absence that would 
produce a tension between the empirical and the transcendental within a 
newly formed discourse in modern age. The same model repeats again in The 
Order of Things when Foucault suggests that man is kept suspended at a 
hollowed out space formed at the middle of the folds of language, labour and 
life, and yet it is within him that these folds can unfold themselves.  
In his journey to the antiquity in the later stage of his career, he differentiates 
the ancient Greek ethics from the Christian experience of the flesh, and 
disapproves the Christian methods of deciphering the truth beneath one’s 
actions. Unlike the Christians, the trouble the Greeks took was not to choose 
what desire, what act or what pleasure they could follow, but rather how to 
control them. For them, forces by nature are excess, and therefore, they aimed 
to control the passive forces that swirl them around desire, pleasure and acts 
by building counter force through techniques of life. For that reason, the 
Greek ethics, Foucault suggests, revolves around an ontology of forces. Rather 
than trying to decipher the hidden truth beneath everyday acts, they thought 
it would be much more useful if one could identify the forces that carry and 
transform them from desire to act, act to pleasure and pleasure to desire. For 
the ancients, there is nothing hidden beneath (and therefore, no absolute 
truth) to decipher. The everyday is exactly what it presences. Hence the 
everyday rather unfolds alone with the studied movement of understanding. 
The Greeks subjected both the body and the soul to techniques of life that are 
governed by practical reason. Foucault developed the ‘aesthetics of existence’ 
that he advocated in the later writings modelled on Greek ethics.                     
The important theme that the present work follows till the end is a concern with 
the everyday life and tries to develop theoretical and practical insights that can 
transform the otherwise mundane into a journey, involving joy and pain – the 
joy of frequently encountering the new and the pain of departure and loss.  
................................................ 
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Subject, Power and Method: What is Thinking? 
I 
“But other men are oblivious of what they do awake, just 
as they are forgetful of what they do asleep” 
Heraclitus, 1979, p. 29 
“Not comprehending, they hear like the deaf. The saying 
is their witness: absent while present” 
Heraclitus, 1979, p. 291 
This idiosyncratic and poetic usage of language is a typical Heraclitean style. 
Because of this peculiar usage of language, where language confronts itself 
and thought strives to transgress its own boundaries, Heraclitean Fragments 
may not suggest much to an unrefined eye, and even some of the finest minds 
of antiquity couldn’t gather their truth.2 They quite evidently rebel against 
any casual interpretation. It is a use of language that is organised around a 
                                                          
1 Cited in Charles H Kahn, The Art and Thought of Heraclitus: An Edition of the Fragments with Translation 
and Commentary   
2 Heraclitus has been a theorist of universal flux, for Plato. Ignoring the importance of Heraclitus’ style of 
writings, which is remarkably personal and poetic and the kind of fragmentary sensibilities it 
generates, both Aristotle and his successor, Theophrastus, classified Heraclitus along with other pre-
Socratic philosophers. When Aristotle has preferred to refer Heraclitus as a material monist, 
Theophrastus has preferred to call him as natural philosopher.    
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rigorous self-critical method of philosophical inquiry. What do then these 
aforesaid statements suggest to us? One can quite clearly decipher an advice 
of caution in them – but then from what kind of possible threats?   
Here the thinker is not exactly worried with the mode of existence of “other 
men,” when he refers to them as “sleepwalkers.” One should not even 
decipher a troubled thinker – a man who is trying to convey his vision of 
truth in a world in which his thought is in danger of an “almost pathetic 
epistemic isolation”(Kahn, 1979, p. 99). Though it is quite obvious that 
Heraclitus is trying to distance himself from Ionian science, especially from 
men like Pythagoras and Xenophanes, and the popular tradition dominated 
by poets and the early sages, particularly the culture of Homer, as suggested 
by Kahn, his concern, rather, here is of a very different kind. The aforesaid 
statements explicitly concern the problem of thought – the repeated failure of 
thought to comprehend the immediate truth. What is actually suggested is 
that one has to be alert on the very nature of the plinth on which thought 
unfolds.  
At the very heart of thought, Heraclitus deciphers a violent, yet often 
unapparent, scuffle between antagonistic forces: that which fixes the very 
nature of thought itself, a war of rational and irrational forces, often eludes 
our attention. Thus an inadequate understanding of the conditions within 
which thought unfolds itself leads to faulty thinking. The question that 
preoccupies Heraclitus here is not of an epistemological nature, that is, he is 
not primarily concerned with the problem of deciphering the exact meaning 
of any specific phenomenon or to understand the reality as a whole. Neither is 
he even concerned with the meaning of Being – that is, to decipher the truth 
of Being as an ontological priority. The problem he is concerned with is rather 
a much more humble one. It is a problem essentially of a methodological 
nature.  
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What is at the core of Heraclitean problematic is: how can one enable oneself 
to understand the reality in a relatively better way? It is an enquiry into the 
very structure of one’s own cognition, and, therefore, is directed towards 
oneself. It is in this context that Heraclitus cautions particularly against the 
risks that are linked to expectations, which are anchored around certain 
presuppositions. If anchored on the certainty of presupposition, thought can 
ultimately become the regular displacement of mere presuppositions. 
Heraclitus, therefore, insists that only the unpresupposed is able to 
expropriate if anything at all from that which has not become one’s own.  
Heraclitus suggests elsewhere that it is only through a rigorous examination 
of one’s own method that one becomes skilled to ‘expect the unexpected’ – the 
pure alterity that has already become one’s own – and subsequently embrace 
the unexpected with an open mind (O’Connell, 2006, pp. 47 – 48).3 The sense 
of alert against the lack of rigor and care in the attention to how and what that 
usually defines thought evolves precisely from Heraclitus’ understanding of 
the ontological condition under which radical thought activates itself. The 
rigor and care in the attention to how and what, Heraclitus advises, can 
significantly ease the difficulties in cognition that arise from either directions, 
that is, both from the subject and the object, which are clearly in a state of flux. 
What is Enlightenment? When the periodical, Berlinische Monatschrift posed 
this as an open question to its readers in 1784, Kant wasn’t addressing a 
subject about which everyone already has an opinion, neither the periodical 
was intending an opinion collection, when it posed the question to its readers. 
                                                          
3 Heraclitus has written, though in a different context, in the same work Fragments that “nature loves to 
[tends to] hide,” suggesting that one should always expect the unexpected, the call of the Other, in 
nature. The pure alterity of the Other can only be identified and reconciled with the self, if not 
entirely, only if one is modest enough to constantly re-examine one’s own structure of understanding, 
the logos of understanding. However, it is quite interesting here to note that, under what conditions 
one is able to judge, as suggested by Heraclitus, one’s own logos of understanding? What is the 
condition that evokes such modesty in oneself?     
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Rather all its readers, including Kant, were caught by the mere novelty of the 
question itself, that is, its very clear resistance to what was, at that time, very 
obvious to knowledge. It is precisely the reason why, it was not just Kant, but 
readers belonging to very different philosophical traditions, such as Moses 
Mendelssohn, responded to the very same question (Margarel C Jacob, 2001, 
pp. 208 – 219). 
According to Foucault, it was a question, posed to the public, with a “problem 
that did not yet have solutions” (Foucault, 1984, pp. 303 – 319). It was a 
question with a problem, that is, never was it addressed with such a similar 
rigor and care. It was a question that is radically new, when it was posed to 
the present; yet it was a question that actually springs out from that particular 
present, the particular present that includes Kant and other readers of the 
periodical, and Mendelssohn’s response too is directed (Ibid).4 
It is interesting to note that here the present is also the present of the radically 
new. It is the locus of discontinuity, of becoming. Foucault writes, it is neither 
on the basis of a totality nor of a future achievement that Kant has intended to 
comprehend the present, rather what concerned him the most is the question 
of difference – ‘the difference today introduces with respect to yesterday’ 
(Ibid). Therefore, present, for him, is an “exit,” a release from one’s fidelity to a 
self-imposed status of immaturity (Kant, 1983). How is this “exit” of the 
present possible? Does power always mimic exactly the prior procedure – or 
with a difference – that leads to the duplication of itself? Does power always 
reproduce itself with a difference? What is that power, which is closer to the 
present that can free one, at least temporarily, from the grip of yesterday?     
                                                          
4 For Mendelssohn, this particular present is charged with forces that can declare a religious 
enlightenment.   
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Why reason, time and again, fails to recognise the unexpected, the call of 
alterity? Quite clearly, at the heart of the issue there is a judgment of reason 
itself. Heraclitus writes “he who does not expect will not find out the 
unexpected, for it is trackless and unexplored” (Kahn, 1979, p. 31). Hence to 
track the untrackable demands not just a mere declaration but also an intense 
engagement. Foucault traces a quite similar concern in Kant when he notes that 
“man himself is responsible for his immature status” (Foucault, 1984, p. 306). It 
is he, who is answerable if the process, finally, has limited his own freedom. 
Inadequacies in the process, which lead to the restriction on the use of freedom, 
are hence only a direct result of an inadequate role of agency. Men then “are at 
once elements and agents of a single process.” Kant suggests, therefore, one can 
escape one’s immature status only by ‘a change that he himself will bring about 
in himself’ (Ibid). The central problem of Enlightenment here, for Foucault, is 
not the question of the liberation of man in his own being, but the demand on 
man to face the task of continually producing himself.      
Rather than a program of deciphering the truth or uncovering the being of an 
entity, it is, therefore, a program for the creation of a new man. It is a program 
that demands the reactivation of a permanent historico-critical attitude in 
oneself, an attitude that is intended to undertake a critical ontology of 
ourselves, and to examine the limits of our contemporary experience. 
Apparently, a permanent reactivation of such a critical attitude in oneself 
demands and, therefore, invokes questions concerning an apt mode of being. 
In his writings on fearless speech and the care of the self, Foucault strongly 
supports a mode of existence that he refers to as aesthetics of existence.  
If aesthetics of existence is a mode of critical ontology of ourselves, then what 
condition of possibilities can constitute such a mode in ourselves? How can one 
detach oneself from the extensive relations of power within our own society? Is 
it an effect of a final reckoning that the world around us is actually meaningless 
and suffocatingly banal? Is aesthetics of existence really an effect of a mood of 
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anxiety, a mood that Heidegger considered to be rare and subtle? What is the 
mode of being that surfaces itself with a methodological function in Foucault’s 
writings, especially in his later writings – that is, that which detaches Foucault 
from the order of things that is, of knowledge itself and the power relations, so 
that he was able to constitute himself as a moral subject of his own actions? 
What is the nature of asceticism that Foucault demands from us?   
II 
It seems a study, like the present one, of a major thinker, such as Foucault, to 
attain its goals, should launch itself by clarifying and critically examining 
precisely that vital force, that central goal that which has guided that thinker’s 
thought. The question, obviously, to start with is: what exactly is the core of 
Foucault’s concern? Is it actually the phenomenon of power, its foundations and 
its particular form of functioning? Foucault himself has suggested several times 
that his early works are not aimed actually to analyse the phenomenon of power. 
Has he rather concerned with the deciphering of the fundamental nature of 
human kind? No, he says. In his “Human Nature: Justice versus Power” debate 
with Chomsky, telecast on Dutch television, Foucault, for instance, has firmly 
positioned himself against Chomsky’s Cartesian logic. Citing the individual’s 
ability to learn not only languages, through partial and fragmentary sets of 
experiences, but also to creatively use them at will, like tools, Chomsky has 
stressed the importance of uncovering the basic structures of mind, the need for 
a theory of mind. Chomsky has argued that his aim has been to develop a 
testable mathematical theory of mind (Chomsky and Foucault, 2006, pp. 9 - 14).5  
                                                          
5 At this stage of their debate, when one finds Chomsky developing his argument by combining the 
seventeenth-century rationalism with notions of freedom and creativity, Foucault delimits 
seventeenth-century rationalism and wonders whether Chomsky does transpose to Descartes ideas 
that are actually found elsewhere. Mind in itself, for Descartes, is not essentially very creative. To 
perceive and then to illuminate by evidence, in themselves, are not creativity. Besides Descartes, 
according to Foucault, is not much concerned with how one could pass from one intuition to another, 
and what status the evidence has in this passage.          
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Is Foucault actually concerned in giving a definitive answer to the question: 
what is man? No, seems to be the reply. The Order of Things through an 
analysis of the mutations at the level of discursive formations and its 
ramifications at the level of episteme, for instance, traces the difference 
between man represented in classical thought and modern thought. In 
classical thought “man, as a primary reality with its own density, has no place 
in nature” (Foucault, 1994, p. 310). Consequently, human nature was 
completely interwoven with nature. Foucault writes: “the modern themes of 
an individual who lives, speaks, and works in accordance with the laws of an 
economics, a philology, a biology, but who also, by a sort of internal torsion 
and overlapping, has acquired the right, through the interplay of those very 
laws, to knew them and to subject them to total clarification – all these themes 
so familiar to us today and linked to the existence of the ‘human sciences’ are 
excluded by classical thought: it was not possible at that time that there 
should arise, on the boundary of the world, the strange stature of a being 
whose nature (that which determines it, contains it, and has traversed it from 
the beginning of time) is to know nature, and itself, in consequence, as a 
natural being” (Ibid, 1994, p. 310).  
This historical analysis, here, is driven to recognise differences from a 
distance. After examining and evaluating the relation between representation 
and things in modern thought against classical thought, Foucault, for 
instance, suggests that modern man is essentially an empirico-transcendental 
doublet (Foucault, 1994, pp. 318 – 19). In his work on the question of 
enlightenment, Foucault defines modernity as an “attitude.” This later shift 
towards the study of the self is actually a change in the point of view. It is 
actually a change of position within a field of forces. If the analysis of 
discursive formations in The Order of Things is directed to bring to light their 
discontinuities and their ramifications at the epistemic levels, then the work on 
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Kant’s problematisation of the enlightenment project is driven to analyse the 
condition for the possibility of the new. It is mainly a project for the creation 
of a new man. However, neither The Order of Things nor his work on Kant 
attempts to define man in any definite terms. In both these works, man 
essentially is a subject. It is only in the light and force of his own history that 
he could become an illumination even for his own eyes to see.   
Foucault’s reading of Alcibiades’ case in Plato’s Alcibiades quite clearly 
suggests the futility of any such projects to define man. When Socrates 
encounters the young Alcibiades, who wishes to become the ruler of Athens, 
he tests his character, through questioning. At one stage of their conversation, 
Alcibiades suggests that if a government can maintain a state of harmony 
amongst parties it can be considered to be good, but here he fails to define 
harmony. Subsequently, the dialogue advances, with Socrates revealing 
Alcibiades’ pedagogical weakness and suggests him to consider the need to 
take care of oneself in order to enable oneself to properly govern others. Here 
when Alcibiades enquires about the nature of this ‘care’ and the structure of 
this ‘oneself,’ Foucault’s reading emphasises the Platonic dialogue’s stress on 
not to develop a general theory of man. Instead, he engages himself with an 
analysis of the shift of the meaning of the word ‘use,’ each time a relation is 
established between a disembodied subject and the tool he uses (Foucault, 
2005, p. 56). As a set of positions that uses the thing as a tool, the ‘I,’ therefore, 
rebels against any universality. He argues that neither Socrates nor Plato 
would wish to establish an instrumental relation with the soul, through a 
general theory of the care of the self.   
If not the question of power, nor the question of human nature or a theory of 
man, then what is at the heart of the Foucauldian problematic? Quite 
evidently, it is only the problem of subject itself. Foucault suggests, “my 
objective, instead, has been to create a history of the different modes by 
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which, in our culture, human beings are made subjects” (Foucault, 1982, p. 
208). In one of his late interviews, Foucault tries to re-imagine the 
genealogical studies that he has undertaken over the years on science, politics 
and ethics in the light of his turn towards ethics and in the same line his 
arguments on ethics have developed: to find a new ethics is to wish to 
recreate ourselves.  
Foucault suggests that it is possible to identify three domains of genealogy: 
“first, a historical ontology of ourselves in relation to truth through which we 
constitute ourselves as the subject of knowledge” (Foucault, 1997, p. 262). In 
this domain of the genealogical, one, for instance, objectifies oneself in 
relation to philology and linguistics to elevate oneself to the statures of 
science. Second, “a historical ontology of ourselves in relation to a field of 
power through which we constitute ourselves as the subject acting on others” 
(Ibid, p. 262). This is what Foucault refers to as a “dividing practices,” that is, 
here the subject is divided either within himself or divided from others, along 
discursive structures, such as, the mad and the sane, the criminals and the 
good boys etc. Third, “a historical ontology in relation to ethics through 
which we constitute ourselves as moral agents” (Ibid). It is the third 
possibility of genealogy that deals with the realm of ethics. It addresses the 
mode of subjectivation by which the subject brings himself to obey or disobey a 
set of moral codes. The History of Sexuality, for instance, examines how men, in 
relation to ethics, have learned to recognise themselves as subjects in a 
domain of sexuality.  
Foucault himself suggests that though he has been, at times, quite involved 
with the problem of power, it is not the central concern of his research. It is 
rather only an integral part of a larger concern. It is the concern for subject, 
the modes of objectification that transform human beings into subjects that 
are at the heart of the Foucauldian problematic. In the conversation with 
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Chomsky on human nature, Foucault clarifies his position on the question of 
subject. Unlike Chomsky’s stress on creativity, that is the creative aspect of 
human nature, Foucault focuses on things that have been destroyed just before 
its birth. Innate capacities, qualities that are akin to Descartes’ innate ideas, for 
Chomsky, qualify human nature. Foucault, on the other hand, is rather 
concerned with the effect of power on normal human creativity. When 
Chomsky stresses on the spoken, the uttered, Foucault sympathises with the 
unspoken, the silenced. He focuses on the field of forces, on the system of 
rules and regularities that differentiates and constitutes the one who speaks, 
and governs the speech-act, and stresses that of the many possibilities that are 
before human beings, only a very few can actually be realised.  
Thus the question of ‘subjugation’ or to make one subjected to a form of 
power is at the very heart of Foucault’s idea of subject. Elsewhere, Foucault 
has considered two meanings for the word subject: One can be a subject either 
by control of or through his dependence on someone else. He can also be a 
subject if he, through self-knowledge or by conscience, denies to change 
himself, and ties himself to his own identity (Foucault, 1982, p. 212). Foucault 
leaves here an impression that the forces that are at play, the forces that 
transform human beings into subjects, are actually beyond their intelligence. 
It is actually within a historically formed field of forces that human beings 
become subjects. Having said that, one still finds Foucault outlining different 
theories of power at different stages of its intellectual endeavour. Since ethics 
and the question of truth that he has developed in his later works are the 
points of departure of the present study, the following section will try to 
examine some of the features of the theory of power that appeared in his later 
works, by juxtaposing and comparing it with the theory of power that 
Foucault has developed in Discipline and Punish, particularly his reading of 
Bentham’s panopticon.       
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If nothing is exterior to the economy of power, any scope of resistance to 
power is also always-already framed in it. One is left with not much choice, 
but to adjust oneself to the fact that nobody is exterior to power, therefore, 
nobody can escape it, even if he or she wishes to do so. The panopticon that 
Foucault examines in Discipline and Punish is such a system. The panoptic 
institution by introducing dissymmetry, disequilibrium and difference into 
play, through organising gazes, spatialises power, and transforms it to a form 
of device that anyone can deploy and use. The panoptic institution, through 
organising space, regulates a field of visibility. Foucault writes: “In order to 
make the presence or absence of the inspector unverifiable, so that the 
prisoners, in the cells, cannot even see a shadow, Bentham envisaged not only 
venetian blinds on the window of the central observation hall, but, on the 
inside, partitions that intersected the hall at right angles and, in order to pass 
from one quarter to the other, not doors but zig-zag openings; for the slightest 
noise, a gleam of light, a brightness in a half-opened door would betray the 
presence of the guardian. The Panopticon is a machine for dissociating the 
see/being seen dyad: in the peripheric ring, one is totally seen, without ever 
seeing; in the central tower, one sees everything without ever being seen” 
(Foucault, 1995, pp. 201 – 2).  
Quite clearly, the Foucauldian subject here displays a kind of helplessness, 
even when his intentions – as expressed in the debate with Chomsky – are to 
resist power. One can find similar dispositions at work in some of his early 
writings; at times he even seems to be speaking from the side of power. In 
Discipline and Punish, Foucault writes: “A real subjection is born mechanically 
from a fictitious relation. So it is not necessary to use force to constrain the 
convict to good behaviour, the madman to calm, the worker to work, the 
schoolboy to application, the patient to the observation of the regulations. 
Bentham was surprised that panoptic institutions could be so light: there were 
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no more bars, no more chains, no more heavy locks; all that was needed was 
that the separations should be clear and the openings well arranged. The 
heaviness of the old ‘houses of security,’ with their fortress-like architecture, 
could be replaced by the simple, economic geometry of a ‘house of certainty.’ 
The efficiency of power, its constraining force has, in a sense, passed over to 
the other side – to the side of its surface of application. He who is subjected to 
a field of visibility, and who knows it, assumes responsibility for the 
constraints of power; he makes them play spontaneously upon himself; he 
inscribes in himself the power relation in which he simultaneously plays both 
roles; he becomes the principle of his own subjection. By this very fact, the 
external power may throw off its physical weight; it tends to the non-
corporal; and, the more it approaches this limit, the more constant, profound 
and permanent are it effects: it is a perpetual victory that avoids any physical 
confrontation and which is always decided in advance” (Ibid, 1995, p. 202).  
Power is subtle, all-inclusive and is attached to space, and it is power that 
opens up the field of visibility.6 Power is strictly spatial, and therefore, like a 
device. The panopticon is such a device, as it ‘automatises’ and 
‘disindividualizes’ power. Foucault writes, “power has its principle not so 
much in a person as in a certain concerted distribution of bodies, surfaces, 
lights, gazes; in an arrangement whose internal mechanisms produce the 
relation in which individuals are caught up” (Foucault, 1995, p. 202). Power, 
therefore, is not dependent on any particular person, rather like a device, 
anyone can operate it. It is power that not only decides who is good and who 
is bad, and who is mad and who is sane, but also marks and guards the 
                                                          
6 The elocutive content, Foucault suggests, can only be assembled precisely in a system of elocutive 
forces, that is, the assertion “I swear” can no longer have a fixed content anymore. It rather transforms 
itself internally with the change in space. The “I swear,” that is asserted before a teacher, in a 
classroom, can no longer resemble a similar assertion in a family or between two lovers; they all are 
fundamentally different from a similar assertion in a courtroom. For a postcolonial critique of 
Foucault’s spatial analysis of modernity, see: The Location of Culture (Bhabha, 2004, pp. 355 – 57). 
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boundary between them. Power is such a machinery that assures 
‘dissymmetry’, ‘disequilibrium’ and ‘difference.’ The problem that 
panopticon, actually, addresses is surveillance, and power here functions 
quite like an organ of control and repression. The spatial and device-like 
nature of power with real effects that Foucault is portraying here actually 
leaves a strong impression that it can hardly be reversed. For instance, in the 
collection of writing and interviews titled Power, Politics and Culture, Edward 
Said, for instance, has argued that Foucault, at various stages of his career, has 
displayed a kind of quietism (Said, 2002, p. 53). He there cites ‘a lack of 
temperament’ in Foucault’s thought (Said, 2002, p. 170).7  
However, to properly understand the theoretical concepts of subject, power 
and the relationship that develops between them, one has to examine their 
functions at various stages of Foucault’s thought. The first stage of the 
encounter between subject and power, in Foucault’s thought, is shaped by the 
centrality of, what Foucault calls, an event. The early studies on madness and 
discipline that look at the evolution and functioning of institutions, such as, 
asylum and prison in Western culture, problematises the events that lead to the 
objectification of the mad and the criminal in discourse. Power is a self-
sustained field, a system with a population in its totality, as its object (Foucault, 
1980, p. 151). Since the individual has no other choice but to engage in an 
always-already functioning net of relations, in a system that is comprised of 
institutions, men and things, he cannot escape being in the position of subject. 
Everyone here is a subject of relationship with other people, of instrumental 
action, of behaviour and of his attitudes (Foucault, 2005, p. 57).  
                                                          
7 Said here locates a fundamental difference between Foucault and Gramsci in their readings of power 
and differentiates his own reading of power from the former. According to him, Gramsci’s conception 
of “knowing thyself” is a consequence of a historical process that has deposited an infinity of traces in 
the self. Therefore, ‘it is imperative at the outset to compile such an inventory.’ Compiling one’s own 
inventory is nothing but a political act, since it opens a space of an ‘eternal return,’ a becoming. It 
enables one to confront oneself and to radically transform oneself.      
30 | P a g e   C h a p t e r  I  
 
Event, however, is singular and, therefore, it has nothing to do with the 
existing order of things and the nature of relations that this order establishes 
between man and things, man and man, and oneself and oneself. An event, 
for that reason, “is not a decision, a treaty, a reign, or a battle, but the reversal 
of a relationship of forces, the usurpation of power, the appropriation of a 
vocabulary turned against those who had once used it, a feeble domination 
that poisons itself as it grows lax, the entry of a masked ‘other’” (Foucault, 
1980, p. 154). Event then is that which instigates discontinuity into the 
relations of forces and the related play of true and false that Foucault calls 
thought (Foucault, 2003, p. 23).       
The concepts of subject and power, and their relationship with each other, 
radically change, when Foucault defines power as a network of relationships 
and, linked power to the immediacy of everyday life. Such a shift in approach 
has demanded further qualifications to the omnipresence of power. Power 
here is fundamentally different from that which is attached to panopticon, it is 
not a self-sustained system. It is omnipresent, not because of its privileged 
position, not even because it consolidates everything under its unconquerable 
unity. It is omnipresent, because it is in every relation, from one point to 
another, at every point. It does not embrace everything, but comes from 
everything (Foucault, 1982). It is the ‘moving substrate’ of force relations 
(Foucault, 1976, p. 93).  
Foucault here defines power as the ‘multiplicity of force of relations 
immanent in the sphere in which they operate and constitute their own 
organisation’ (Ibid). Through perpetual struggles and confrontations, between 
them, at every point, this force of relations transforms, strengthens, and even 
reverses power. Through the support that they find in one another, they can 
form a chain or a system, or even contradict and isolate from one another. The 
strategies in which such struggles take effect are embodied in the various 
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social hegemonies, in the formulation of the law, and in the state apparatus 
(Ibid). What sets forces into motion is difference, and what unfold at each of 
the points where they intersect each other are events. Consequently, the 
subject is constituted out of hundreds of such minute events.   
What makes this new formulation different from the concept of power one 
would encounter in Discipline & Punish is that power here is the moving 
substrate of domination and struggle. It is neither a self-sustained machine, 
nor an organ of surveillance. It is produced in a field of struggle. What is 
actually striking here is that even though the individual is one of the prime 
effects of power, it is actually his interactions with institutions, men and 
things that produce the very field of power. Power, therefore, is neither an 
institution, nor a structure, or even a quality of a person, like strength. It is not 
even a phenomenon of one dominating the rest of others; rather it is a 
complex strategic situation that grows out of the exchanges within a 
multiplicity of force of relations. Power then, for Foucault, is a field of 
multiplicity of force relations that “categorizes the individual, marks him by 
his own individuality, attaches him to his own identity, imposes a law of 
truth on him that he must recognize and others must recognise in him” 
(Foucault, 1982, p. 212). Such is the pastoral power that Foucault examines in 
The Subject and Power (Ibid). 
Power, Foucault suggests, activates itself through establishing subtle 
networks, networks through which it circulates and links from point to point. 
And with each contact between points, power reproduces itself, with a 
difference. It distributes itself, without localising here or there, without 
clinging to anyone’s body. It penetrates and flows through bodies, without 
hindrance. If Foucault is right, then power should pass through human body 
without leaving any trace, without becoming an experience.  
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If such is the nature of power, why should we be actually worried about 
power? Does matter transmit energy through it without any loss? Does it 
gather energy in capillaries, capillaries that are within it, when energy flows 
through it? Do bodies, such as our own, really lack power? It seems that if 
Discipline and Punish leaves a slight impression that Foucault, out of 
helplessness, is speaking from the side of power, then his writings in the mid 
seventies seem to suggest an unrest, at the very heart of his thought, vis-à-vis´ 
power. Yet Foucault decides to stop himself just before entering the labyrinth. 
He has ruled out an analysis of power from its internal point of view and 
seems satisfied to diagnose power from a vantage point of an absolute 
distance, from where he can avoid a direct encounter.   
Power does not travel in a linear path. The multitude of folds that the 
curvature of matter and the inclinations of the soul have created circulates 
power in all direction, when it passes through the body. What is it that guides 
the one who exercises power? What has he in mind? Or what is the aim of 
someone who is seeking power? Questions, such as these, questions that are 
not strictly spatial by nature, seem to be ruled out and Foucault strives to find 
solutions along a strictly spatial analysis. This leaves an impression that the 
body is that blind spot in the entire field of power, which is inaccessible and, 
therefore, cannot be studied. This actually reflects a Kantian twist, which 
asserts that what is hidden from the activity of knowing is precisely the 
structure of the knowing. Or, in other words, the activity of knowing has 
inherent limitations and, therefore, it is incapable of knowing the knowing-
subject (Kemp, 2003, pp. xlviii – xlix). Foucault writes, “what is needed is a 
study of power in its external [my italic] visage, at the point where it is in 
direct and immediate relationship with that which we can provisionally call 
its object, its target, its field of application, there – that is to say – where it 
installs itself and produces its real effects” (Foucault, 1980, p. 97). Both these 
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different stages are characterised by a strictly spatial explanation of power, 
subject and the relationship between them. 
It is in the last stage of the development of the concepts of subject and power 
that Foucault is actually concerned with the internal point of view of power, 
its self-awareness. What exactly concerns him here is the temporal dimension 
of power – the self’s relation to itself when it exercises power on others. It is 
the government’s consciousness of itself (Foucault, 2008). An enquiry on: 
“how to govern oneself, how to be governed, how to govern others, by whom 
the people will accept being governed, how to become the best possible 
governor” (Foucault, 1994). These are actually problems concerning only the 
subject; subject who is constituted within a field of power relation. When 
power passes through the body, the curvature of the matter and the 
inclinations of the soul fold and redirect it to all directions, constituting one’s 
behaviours, attitudes and desires. The art of government is actually the art of 
governing oneself as a prerequisite for governing others (Foucault, 1994).  
It also concerns what transformations the subject has to undertake upon 
himself to assure the access to the truth. Or what price he has to pay for saying 
the truth. Such a concern is actually anchored around a sustained practice of 
care, both for oneself and the other. Foucault, for instance, in a sequence of 
lectures titled, The Hermeneutics of the Subject given at College de France has 
offered a genealogy of an ancient spiritual practice, which first appeared in a 
Socratic-Platonic moment and later became a cultural phenomenon among the 
Stoics: the art of the care of the self (Foucault, 2005, p. 30). 
The care of the self, Foucault argues, is actually a pre-philosophical theme, and 
a quite popular Lacedaemonian maxim (Foucault, 2005, p. 31). However, it is 
only in Plato’s Alcibiades that it first becomes a coherent philosophical 
argument. It is impossible to attain truth, Plato argues, if the subject is not 
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willing to transform himself. Since subject is subject to his own desires, 
behaviours, attitudes and certain instrumental thinking, he is practically denied 
access to the truth, both of himself and of the reality. Subject, therefore, has to 
transform his mode of being. He has to assert the liberty to modify himself, by 
constantly transfiguring himself to guarantee the access to the truth of himself 
and of the reality. Here one encounters the ascendance of a new form of subject, 
a subject that is disembodied and is willing to encounter power. It is here one 
finds a new subject that is capable of examining the representations that power 
leaves in his mind; a subject that folds power back to itself in such a way that 
power encounters itself and forces encounter themselves. Here we have a 
subject who is capable of exercising his freedom. 
    III 
Before moving to the next section, which is a detailed study of the question of 
method, the prerequisites for the subject to access the truth of himself and of 
the reality, it is important to explore, in theory, how the passivity of the 
subject has lost its importance, over time, and subject becomes, subject that is 
concerned with himself and the other. A whole lot of writings have been 
dedicated to Foucault’s commitments to Nietzsche’s philosophy and 
particularly, his genealogical approach. Studies have also been dedicated to 
Foucault’s occasional comments on Heidegger’s thought. Yet it is quite certain 
that Kant has been a central figure, for Foucault, in his intellectual 
development. Foucault, for instance, has written a fine introductory 
monograph for the translation of Kant’s lectures on anthropology.8 Comments 
on Kant can be found both in Foucault’s early and later works (Foucault, 1972, 
pp. 203 – 04; Foucault 1994, pp. 322 – 28; 341). In an interview with George 
Steiner in 1971, Foucault even associated his works with the Kantian ontology 
                                                          
8 Michel Foucault, “Introduction to Kant’s Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View,” 
http://www.generation-online.org/p/fpfoucault1.htm   
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of the present. His text on enlightenment is an obvious testament of 
Foucault’s encounter with Kant. Foucault there explores the condition under 
which “new” can arrive.  
Here it is helpful to investigate certain points in Kant’s thought that might 
have attracted Foucault towards him. Kant developed his theory on space and 
time against the debates between Leibniz and Newton’s supporters, and his 
own critique of Berkeleyan idealism. Newton’s proposition of an absolute 
space and time, that is space and time as two actual entities in their own 
rights, was challenged by Leibniz, in a series of correspondence with Samuel 
Clarke, an English supporter of Newton. In the correspondence, Leibniz 
proposed, against the Newtonian theory, a relativist theory of space and time, 
and argued that one must think of space and time, not in absolute terms but, 
as inherent in objects and their relations. However, both Newton and Leibniz 
considered space and time to be entities independent of intuition, and 
therefore, belonging to transcendental realism. In Critique of Pure Reason, Kant 
defines his project by implicitly suggesting that Newtonian physics and 
Leibnizian metaphysics that dominated intellectual landscape belongs to the 
mathematics of nature and the metaphysics of nature, respectively (Kant, 
1998, pp. 42 – 3).   
Berkeley, on the other hand, argues that both space and time are dependent of 
intuition (Kemp, 2003, pp. 153 – 60). Just like any appearances in space, space, 
to him, is also an empirical representation. It means one can understand space 
by means of experience or perception. In his assumption on space and time in 
Critique of Pure reason, Kant, on the contrary, argues that space is neither 
objective nor real; it is neither substance nor a relation, but space is subjective 
and ideal. And space rather originates, in accord with a stable law as a 
scheme, from the nature of the mind (Kemp, 2003, pp. 88 – 122). However, 
where Kant differs from Berkeleyan analytic is, in that for him, space and time 
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are a priori representations, which means, it is a pre-condition for all possible 
appearances in space. Space and time are, therefore, beyond the grasp of any 
empirical intuition. It is in space that our outer sense represents to ourselves 
every object that is outside us; it is only in space that those objects that affect 
our mind have shapes, sizes and relationships. On the other hand, the inner 
state, the way mind intuits itself, does not have any parallels with the way our 
outer sense operates. The inner sense that is mind intuits on itself does not 
place itself as an object. The inner sense is temporal, and the form of such an 
intuition is, what Kant calls, time. Time, therefore, cannot be intuited 
externally (Kant, 1998).  
Space and time are two a priori; two immutable forms that firmly deny 
themselves for any empirical intuition (Kemp, 2003, pp. lvi – lvii).9 However, 
they themselves constitute the a priori condition for every possible intuition. 
Consequently, the form of affirmation – I think – does not rest on an 
undetermined element – I am – rather it rests on those pure constitutive 
elements – space and time. Hence, for Kant, only the a priori pure forms of 
time and space can determine the affirmation, I think. One actually will find a 
‘transformed version’ of this problem in Foucault – a play of two forms with 
distinct nature. One will find in him a play of two distinctive “there is,” a 
forceful tango of light and language, of determinable visibilities and 
determining statements (Deleuze, 1988, p. 61). Foucault, from the beginning, 
has been stressing on a difference in quality between the visible and the 
articulable; that is, even though discursive and non-discursive forces 
frequently overlap each another, constituting forms of knowledge, they are 
essentially different. When words cease to intersect with representation, when 
a void sharply splits the articulable and the visible, it provides a spontaneous 
                                                          
9 Unique and with an infinite existence, they stand apart by themselves. They strictly are not mere ways 
of thinking, but modes of existence.   
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grid for the knowledge of things.10 Speaking is not seeing. That is, what one 
sees never resides in what one says and vice versa. The ‘space where they 
achieve their splendour is not that deployed by our eyes but that defined by 
the sequential elements of syntax’ (Foucault, 1994, p. 9).  
The non-relation, which defines the articulable and the visible, is a regular 
theme in Foucault. The commentary on Magritte’s famous surrealist painting, 
This is not a Pipe, for instance, draws our attention to the non-relation between 
the drawing of the pipe and the sentence that ought to name the painting. 
Neither the drawing, nor sentence or the ‘this’ in the sentence represent the 
reality of pipe (Foucault, 1981). Here the relation between painting (light) and 
language (sentence), that is, the visible and the articulable, is an infinite 
relation. It is a state of war, fought between antagonistic forces, with a whole 
series of crisscrossings, moves and counter-moves; quite similar to a state of 
Heraclitean flux. The visibilities and the articulable exist as two preliminary 
distributions of historically conditioned plurality, a plurality that is not 
merely historical, but continuously changes itself along with history; since 
visibilities and statements can only exit in a multiplicity of their own kinds, in 
a multiplicity of discursive and non discursive, respectively, they open a field 
for a multiplicity of forces (Deleuze, 1988, p. 83).  
Consequently, there are three ontologies in Foucault. The knowledge-being is 
determined within a relationship that is formed between the light and the 
language, between the visibilities and the articulable. However, the rift 
between light and language here introduces a field of forces into play, turning 
epistemology into strategy. The power-being is constituted in a field of 
relations of forces. Since forces are directed from outside; they themselves will 
not become folds. Since forces can only attach themselves to forces, that is, 
                                                          
10 Kant in Critique of Pure Reason defines representation as the outcome of objects’ affect on our mind. 
Representation, therefore, is linked to the capacity of sensibility. 
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forces of the outside, then it is only the outside that can explain the exteriority 
of forms, both for themselves and for their relations. Hence a fold of being can 
be created only if the forces could be folded in such a way that they become 
self-affected and only when the outside itself leads to the constitution of an 
inside. Only the folding of the outside, therefore, can constitute a self, while 
the outside itself has formed a coextensive inside.  
The self-being thus is linked to a process, that Foucault calls, subjectivation 
(Ibid, pp. 114 – 115). Subjectivation is a mode of reflexivity, that is specific to 
this or that type of care of the self, through which one brings oneself to obey 
or disobey a set of moral codes. As a mode of reflexivity, it changes itself with 
history. Here the ‘I’ that which folds forces from the outside and constitute 
the self is neither universal nor ahistorical. It is neither directed towards 
objects and its relationships nor is engaged in a search of the truth of its own 
being. The ‘I’ rather here is a set of positions occupied within a One speaks-
one sees, One confronts, and One lives. Like all signs, the I that leaps out of an 
immanent field of temporality signals nothing but its own becoming. In 
“Introduction to Kant’s Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View,” 
Foucault, for instance, suggests that the I can never be an object but only the 
form of a synthesis. If the Critique located the I as an a priori in the order of 
knowledge, then the Anthropology considered the I as the passage of feeling to 
thought. The I marks this passage, but neither as an active agent nor as the 
coming-to-conscious of this passage. It rather presences itself only within a 
multiplicity of temporal sensibility. And yet Kant’s Anthropology, Foucault 
suggests, does not actually offer the I as an apriori given according to this 
temporal multiplicity, rather it is presented as the mark of passage through a 
series of active and passive syntheses.11   
                                                          
11 Online source: Michel Foucault, Introduction to Kant’s Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View 
(trans. Arianne Bove), http://www.generation-online.org/p/fpfoucault1.htm (12/6/2013).         
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Consequently, history, according to Foucault, has a totally different function. 
In “Nietzsche, Genealogy and History,” Foucault examines three possible 
uses of historic sense: firstly, the parodic that is directed against reality, 
opposes the theme of history as reminiscence or recognition; secondly, the 
dissociative that is directed against identity, challenges the idea of history 
given as continuity or representative of a tradition; thirdly, the sacrificial that 
is directed against truth and challenges history as knowledge. In the first 
sense, “genealogy is history in the form of a concerted carnival” (Foucault, 
1980, p. 161). In the second use, “the purpose of history, guided by genealogy, 
is not to discover the roots of our identity, but to commit itself to its 
dissipation. It does not seek to define our unique threshold of emergence, the 
homeland to which metaphysicians promise a return; it seeks to make visible 
all of those discontinuities that cross us” (Ibid, 1980, p. 162). It, then, discards 
the search along the vertical axis, that is, its search for the pure form, the 
origin that lies at a very distant past, and starts carefully diagnosing all that 
lie closest. In the third use of the historic sense, it is the sacrifice of the subject 
of knowledge. Foucault writes: “in appearance, or rather, according to the 
mask it bears, historical consciousness is neutral, devoid of passions, and 
committed solely to truth. But if it examines itself and if, more generally, it 
interrogates the various forms of scientific consciousness in its history, it finds 
that all these forms and transformations are aspects of the will to knowledge: 
instinct, passion, the inquisitor’s devotion, cruel subtlety, and malice” (Ibid, 
1980, p. 162).                          
History, then, becomes nothing but interpretations; and denied of any facts, it 
essentially is interpretations. It is a field of conflicting interests, and therefore, 
a true battlefield. Thinking unfolds itself by offending or reconciling, 
attracting or repelling, breaking, dissociating, uniting or reuniting that which 
has already unfolded. Consequently, reality is essentially non-Aristotelian. It 
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doesn’t exist independently of our mind, but of the content of our mind. 
Reality, in other word, is a social construct, and therefore, our understanding 
of it can also be wrong. When Foucault sympathises with Kantian project, it 
only suggests that he is not a realist. The “ontology of the present” that 
Foucault undertook in his work of the Kantian text on enlightenment analyses 
the attitude of modernity and counter-modernity, rather than spatially 
categorising them into periods, such as, modern, pre-modern or post-modern 
is in itself driven by an attitude towards time. It is a project that aims to 
explore the unconscious of the consolidated systems of knowledge; it 
consequently will only reverse perceptions. It is a project that is directed 
against time, in order to unyoke time from its joints.12 It is basically a project 
rooted in a living present.  
Modernity, Foucault suggests, is “a mode of relating to contemporary reality; 
a voluntary choice made by certain people; in the end, a way of thinking and 
feeling; a way, too, of acting and behaving” (Foucault, 1984, p. 309). It is a 
mode of being that would enable one to access the condition under which the 
reality is presented to us as truth, than determining the very truth of our own 
beings. That is, if thought essentially comes from the outside (through the 
synthesis of the world and the God in man, in other words, through the 
synthesis of the known and the unknown), then Foucault’s ontology of the 
present allows one to distance oneself from oneself, that is to distance 
thinking from itself. It enables thinking to approach itself from a distance, so 
that its own topography and the condition of birth are revealed to itself. It is 
essentially thinking approaching itself from a distance.  
However, thinking can approach itself with such openness only if it is able to 
consider the pain, sorrow, joy and thoughts that the life affirms as necessary, 
                                                          
12 Historical ontology rebels against the certainty of the successive time, and explores the probability of an 
untimely.   
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and for that reason, innocent. In other words, thinking must engage with itself 
without any prejudice or presupposition, and wilfully choose from life’s own 
affirmations. For that very reason, Foucault’s “ontology of present,” like the 
Greek ethics that he examines in History of Sexuality II (Foucault, 1988, p. 43), 
is temporal, as it in itself is an ontology of force. Rather than deciphering the 
hidden truth behind an act, it is an ontology of forces that link together acts, 
pleasures and desires. What it affirms is becoming itself. In the work on 
Kant’s Anthropology Foucault suggests that each affirmation of the ‘I’ from the 
density of becoming are only mark of discontinuity. Then, the ‘I’ is, 
essentially, a mark of the passage from the feeling to thought. It actually is 
that very unity of an endless passive and active synthesises that “turns an 
anecdote of life into an aphorism of thought, and an evaluation of thought 
into a new perspective on life” (Deleuze, 2001, p. 67). In “What is 
Enlightenment?,” Foucault writes: “and consequently, rather than seeking to 
distinguish the “modern era” from the “pre-modern” or “postmodern,” I 
think it would be more useful to try to find out how the attitude of modernity, 
ever since its formation, has found itself struggling with attitudes of “counter-
modernity” (Foucault, 1984, pp. 309 – 10).   
The analysis of man in The Order of Things is worth mentioning here. In “Man 
and his Doubles,” Foucault, for instance, traces the transition from the man of 
classical thought to the man of modern thought. One of the striking features 
of this analysis is its absolved objectivity, and yet this objectivity is not of a 
positivist order. It is rather a detached engagement. The gaze that observes, 
analyses and differentiates the discontinuities that mark discursive 
formations is, essentially, outside them and yet refining itself in relation to 
them. Here the playful objectivity of the analysis spatialises and reorganises 
thought in relation to relentlessly reconstituting attitudes of an I that 
contemplate and vice verse. And still the analysis is done from a distance. The 
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point of view of the analysis that Foucault undertook there is strictly external 
to the object of its analysis. It rather cannot truly be otherwise – that is, to 
encounter itself, the thought has to approach itself from a distance. The 
analysis itself is its own testimony.   
Foucault differentiates the modern from the classical thought by tracing the 
change in the relation between representation and being. For Classical 
thought, man, according to Foucault, does not occupy a place in nature. The 
“modern themes of an individual who lives, speaks, and works in accordance 
with the laws of  economics,  philology, and  biology, but who also, by a sort 
of internal torsion and overlapping, has acquired the right, through the 
interplay of those very laws, to know them and to subject them to total 
clarification – all these themes so familiar to us today and linked to the 
existence of the ‘human sciences’ are excluded by Classical thought: it was not 
possible at that time that there should arise, on the boundary of the world, the 
strange stature of a being whose nature (that which determines it, contains it, 
and has traversed it from the beginning of time) is to know nature, and itself, 
in consequence, as a natural being” (Foucault, 1994, 310).  
He continues: “at the meeting-point between representation and being, at the 
point where nature and human nature intersect – at the place in which we 
believe nowadays that we can recognize the primary, irrefutable, and 
enigmatic existence of man – what Classical thought reveals is the power of 
discourse. In other words, language in so far as it represents – language that 
names, patterns, combines, and connects and disconnects things as it makes 
them visible in the transparency of words. In this role, language transforms 
the sequence of perceptions into a table, and cuts up the continuum of beings 
into a pattern of characters. Where there is discourse, representations are laid 
out and juxtaposed; and things are grouped together and articulated. The 
profound vocation of Classical language has always been to create a table – a 
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‘picture:’ whether it be in the form of natural discourse, the accumulation of 
truth, description of things, a body of exact knowledge, or an encyclopaedic 
dictionary. It exists, therefore, only in order to be transparent; it has lost that 
secret consistency which, in the sixteenth century, inspissated it into a word to 
be deciphered, and interwove it with all the things of the world; it has not yet 
acquired the multiple existence about which we question ourselves today; in 
the Classical age, discourse is that translucent necessity through which 
representation and beings must pass – as beings are represented to the mind’s 
eye, and as representation renders beings visible in their truth. The possibility 
of knowing things and their order passes, in the Classical experience, through 
the sovereignty of words: words are, in fact, neither marks to be deciphered 
(as in the Renaissance period) nor more or less faithful and masterable 
instruments (as in the positivist period); they form rather a colourless 
network on the basis of which beings manifest themselves and 
representations are ordered” (Ibid, 1994, pp. 310 – 311). 
In the Classical age, language, according to Foucault’s analysis, exists only in 
order to be transparent. Like light, it is that translucent necessity through 
which representation and beings must pass. Consequently, as a common 
discourse of representation and things, the Classical language, “as a place 
within which nature and human nature intersect, absolutely excludes 
anything that could be a ‘sciences of man.’ As long as that language was 
spoken in Western culture it was not possible for human existence to be called 
in question on its own account, since it contained the nexus of representation 
and being. The discourse that, in the seventeenth century, provided the link 
between the ‘I think’ and the ‘I am’ of the being undertaking it – that very 
discourse remained, in a visible form, the very essence of Classical language, 
for what was being linked together in it was representation and being. The 
transition from the ‘I think’ to the ‘I am’ was accomplished in the light of 
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evidence, within a discourse whose whole domain and functioning consisted 
in articulating one upon the other what one represents to oneself and what is. 
It cannot, therefore, be objected to this transition either that being in general is 
not contained in thought, or that the singular being as designated by the ‘I 
am’ has not been interrogated or analysed on his own account” (Ibid, 1994, 
pp. 311 – 12).  
Then, the place of man surfaces itself, when language recovers the lost 
consistency that would thicken it into a word to be deciphered, when 
language loses its transparency and gains a material form and existence of its 
own. Man appears to himself as a primary reality with his own density only 
when language recovers its lost opacity. Consequently, the very 
materialisation of the words into a reality with their own density has 
consequences. When words regained their material density, they started 
reflecting, refracting and dispersing light according to their texture, thickness 
and opacity – discharging a play of light and shadow. It is within a field of 
refracted light and darkness produced when light encounters matter that the 
play of light and language unfolds in man.  
Man is kept suspended at that very threshold that marks and differentiates 
the known from the unknown, and vice verse. He is actually kept suspended 
at the very threshold where a field of forces (that which he can only feel) 
intersects with a play of forms (the order of knowledge). It is through this 
play of light and darkness that the world unfolds within man in all its colours. 
It is actually at the boundary between light and darkness that the colours 
arise. For the question: is colour simply a matter of light? No, says Goethe. To 
present itself as a ray, a ray (of darkness or light) needs to be surrounded 
either by darkness or by light. Then, according to Goethe, reality presents 
itself only within the play of light and darkness; they are, for that very reason, 
equals.  
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According to science, light is electromagnetic wave – bundles of energy, and 
yet light presences itself only when it strikes something – matter for instance. 
It is only when light encounters something that it reveals itself; that means, 
light in itself is actually invisible. It is only in the presence of something other 
than itself that light forms a differential relation with darkness. In the absence 
of matter, it will at once fade into (and become one with) darkness. Reality, 
therefore, is that state of fluidity, that very music that accompanies the play of 
Dionysian and Apollonian forces – dispersed light, thought, darkness and life 
(as a vital force). When matter disperses light and establishes a play of 
differential relation between a divine light and darkness, reality unfolds itself. 
The play of this differential relation is essentially that which at once spatialises 
time and temporalises space. In other words, it is coexistence (space) becoming 
succession (time) and vice versa. Could, then, this be the reason why Foucault 
insists that man “is a being such that knowledge will be attained in him of 
what renders all knowledge possible” (Ibid, 1994, p. 318)?  
Foucault argues, in the modern age, man appears to himself as compressed 
and withheld in a hollowed out space formed at the middle of the folds of life, 
labour and language, and yet it is only within him that these respective folds 
can unfold themselves and, for that reason, “man, in the analytic of finitude, 
is a strange empirico-transcendental doublet, since he is a being such that 
knowledge will be attained in him of what renders all knowledge possible” 
(Ibid, 1994, p. 318). Knowledge, as a consequence, becomes the prime object of 
its own analysis. It becomes so when an internal tension within a new form of 
discourse keeps separating the empirical and the transcendental. When the 
space of the body and the time of the culture are kept separated due to an 
internal tension within a new form of discourse, it deploys, between them, a 
field of active and passive connections – a field of forces. Knowledge, 
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essentially, exists detached both from the subject and the object.13 When the 
mutations that turn the words into transparency and opacity intensify and 
become frequent in the modern age, both the object and subject become mere 
reversible positions within a field of forces.  
All human faculties – imagination, understanding or intuition – depend upon 
this field of temporality, that is from within the very density of becoming to 
activate themselves. Imagination, for instance, is auto-affection. In other 
words, it is pure temporality. In Bergsonism, Deleuze shows that even 
intuition involves more than one meditation, because it actually surfaces from 
the very depth of a virtual (simulated) field, like a flash of light on a dark sky. 
It is the flash of sensibility that the material presence of the body produces, 
when it spatialises time, and vice versa. It surfaces itself, when the spatial 
presence of the body churns knowledge (sensibilities) from that which man 
can only feel (a field of forces) and those gathered sensibilities stimulate and 
intensify a fresh series of spurs. 
                                                          
13 In the “Introduction to Kant’s Anthropology,” one finds Foucault arguing that though Kant’s 
Anthropology, as a collection of empirical observation, is different from the Critique that reflects upon 
the conditions of experience, this difference is not of the order of a non-relation. According to him, 
through a certain analogy, one can always half-see in the Anthropology a kind of (photo) negative of 
the Critique. Besides, it is in the question of “what is man?” towards which the enquires of 
anthropology ought to be directed that the three questions (what can I know?; what must I do? and; 
what can one hope for?) that surface in the Critique acquires meaning. Still Kant poses the question of 
‘what is man?’ not in Anthropology, but much later in the Logic and in the Opus postumum. According to 
Foucault, the Opus postumum poses this question in the relation between God, World and the man. The 
God and the world attain unity in man, only because man exercises his sovereignty as a thinking-
subject. Here man is like the verb ’to be’ of the judgement of the universe. In Foucault’s reading of 
Anthropology, time and space that appears as apriori in the Critique become temporal, that is, words 
and things can be illuminated only within the density of becoming. The empirical and the 
transcendental that the Anthropology and the Critique posed respectively, that is the question of ‘what 
is man?’ and the three questions of the Critiques actually unfolds within the same field of temporality, 
within the density of becoming. It then becomes a tension within the very form of a discourse rooted 
in everyday practice – “a discourse,” Foucault writes, “whose tension would keep separate the 
empirical and the transcendental, while being directed at both; a discourse that would make it 
possible to analyse man as a subject, that is, as a locus of knowledge which has been empirically 
acquired but referred back as closely as possible to what makes it possible...” (Foucault, 1994, p. 320). 
See, figure I.   
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Figure I: Foucauldian Ontology 
The above reading has profound ethical ramification. If Foucault’s analysis is 
correct (that is, if man, as he claims to be, is indeed compressed and withheld 
at a hollowed out space formed at the centre of his own reality and still it is 
only within him that the reality can unfold), then it must indeed be in man 
that the colours that mark and differentiate the reality have its effects. In other 
words, it is in man that the reality is assumed as coloured (and that does 
actually mean that reality in itself is colourless. Rather it is in man that a 
synthesis of the known and the unknown – the world and the God – becomes 
possible). In that case, one could deduce through a finer abstraction that the 
luminosity of matter itself is the very source of light; whether it is the sun, a 
lantern or a glow of wisdom in a refined eye, all forms of light have their 
source in (pre-ontological) matter. Then, the materialisation of language into 
word, or else as a form to decipher, opens before thinking a new possibility 
and it can follow itself, and that means, it can now illuminate for itself its own 
ethical, aesthetical or logical limits, and even take itself to its own absolute 
Limit. And still, the word will gain the required mutability within itself to 
oscillate between transparency and opacity, only if they are always already in 
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a temporal field, that is within the realm of culture, the prime carrier of 
history. It can only reveal itself within a field of temporality.        
IV 
One of the central concerns of Foucault’s work is the analytics of the modes of 
reflexivity, or the conditional forms of experience that tie together the subject 
and the truth. The individual is constituted as subject only through forms of 
reflexivity. Foucault’s ontologies of the present, for instance, have opened up 
three major forms of reflexivity – memory, meditation, method. The first form 
of reflexivity – reflexivity through memory – is rooted in Foucault’s insistence 
on light and language as two a priori forms with fundamental differences – 
that is a difference in quality. We have already seen the state of affairs 
between the discursive and the non discursive; divided and in constant 
confrontation, they terminate any form of reflexivity anchored in objects and 
their relationships. It is exactly the reason why Foucault, following Blanchot, 
is able to say ‘speaking is not seeing.’ The rift – between speaking and seeing 
– impulsively opens up a grid of knowledge (savoir), a kind of knowledge, 
which is embodied in empiricism. Knowledge (savoir), as the social practice of 
knowledge, can, however, cross an epistemological threshold or create a 
particular corpus of knowledge, that is, a particular discipline of knowledge 
(connaissance).  
It is savoir - the historical a priori of both subjects and objects – that gives 
subject to connaissance, the conceptual and the theoretical knowledge. Savoir is 
at once grounded in memory that it activates and in the modalities of 
regulation. Since light and language are two distinct forms, subject is denied 
of any synthesising functions. And the mode of reflexivity, therefore, is 
neither regulated by words nor by things, that is, neither by language nor by 
light. Discourse thus is not the loyally unfolding expression of the subject, 
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who is thinking, knowing and speaking. It rather merely indicates the 
dispersion of the subject and his repeated inconsistency with himself within a 
totality. The second form of reflexivity, on the other hand, is linked to the 
outside, in a field of forces. The rift between the language and light initiates a 
war between the two, leading to the deployment of a field of forces.  
The second form of reflexivity, which one finds in Foucault’s ontology of the 
present, is mediated through power. The pastoral power, for instance, is such 
a form of reflexivity. It essentially eliminates the singular and the contingent 
through downplaying the significance of self-examination. Self rather is 
constituted through the confession to and the examination by agencies, in a 
field of forces. The ascendance of professionals moreover has disseminated 
the pastoral power within societies. It is a form of power that objectifies and 
categorises individuals along ‘the mad and the sane, the sick and the healthy, 
the criminals and the “good boys”’ (Foucault, 2002, p. 326). It is for this reason 
that enlightenment for Foucault becomes a permanent possibility of 
questioning, with the actual point being the denial of what we are (Gordon, 
1993, pp. 23 – 24).          
The third form of reflexivity that appears in the work of Foucault is that of a 
mode of reflexivity through an event of method, a set of spiritual practices as 
method to access truth, both of oneself and of the reality. The event of method 
is actually rooted in Foucault’s ontology of the present – the contemporary. 
Since the visible and the articulable are divided apart, when seeing and 
speaking differs in form, the subject loses his position as the synthesiser, and 
the knowledge that he gains is also a kind of knowledge, which is without an 
object. The act of knowledge (connaissance) itself cannot enable a subject to 
access the truth; that is, knowledge (connaissance) as such has nothing to do 
with the truth of the reality. Knowledge as truth, therefore, can only be 
attained through practices. The absence of both subject and object in the social 
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practice of thought, that is, in the discourse, however, suggests, for Foucault, 
that both the visible and the articulable can be folded back to itself at will, if 
engaged with proper method. The outside, if folded towards itself, will create 
a self that consistently transforms itself in relation to the knowledge (savoir) 
that it acquires in itself. This is the function of the domain of asceticism in 
Foucault. 
Truth is not given to anyone by right. It is given only at a price. Spirituality 
asserts that the individual, as he is always a subject to his attitudes, behaviour 
and instrumental reasoning, has no rights, on his own, to access the truth. 
Foucault’s reading of the Socratic tradition that is passed onto us through the 
work of Plato stresses the demand for a specific mode of being to enable one 
to access truth. The Greeks called it an ethos. For that reason, a distinction is 
drawn between philosophy and spirituality, in such a way that it becomes 
quite clear, once and for all, that it is only through some forms of spirituality, 
that philosophy can activate itself. Foucault suggests, philosophy never asks 
questions such as ‘what is true and what is false’ rather it explores the 
conditions and limits under which a certain statement is determined as either 
true or false. Philosophy enquires into the ‘what’ that enables the subject to 
access the truth. On the other hand, spirituality refers to the necessary 
transformation of the subject that can ensure his access to the truth. It is “the 
set of these researches, practices, and experiences, which may be purifications, 
ascetic exercises, renunciations, conversions of looking, modifications of 
existence,” etc., which are, as such, not for knowledge, but for the subject 
(Foucault, 2005, p. 15). 
The antiquity, in quite different modalities, had always related to the 
philosophical question of “how to have access to the truth” with a set of 
researches and practices of spirituality. Pythagoreans, for instance, never 
draw a line between them; for Socrates and Plato, the question of the care of 
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the self (epimeleia heautou) is truly a spiritual question – a set of conditions of 
spirituality, for transforming the self, to enable the subject to access the truth. 
The Stoics, the Cynics, the Epicureans, and the Neo-Platonists all were 
practitioners of one or another form of care of the self. However, the conflicts 
and debates within Christianity, from the end of the fifth century broke this 
link and drew a strict line between philosophy and spirituality. The conflicts 
here were not between spirituality and science, rather between spirituality 
and theology. Thus the disengagement between philosophy and spirituality is 
not rooted in the appearance of modern science. Theology, as a rational 
subject, has overruled any set of spiritual practices intended to modify the 
subject’s being to enable him to access God. With the Cartesian moment, it 
reached its final stage, with a further widening of the rift, moving spirituality 
further from philosophy (Ibid, p. 27). Foucault writes: 
Now, leaping over several centuries, we can say that we enter the 
modern age (I mean, the history of truth enters its modern period) 
when it is assumed that what gives access to the truth, the condition 
for the subject’s access to the truth, is knowledge (connaissance) and 
knowledge alone (Ibid, p. 17).  
If Aristotle is an exception from the antiquity, then Spinoza is an exception in 
the modern time. Thus Spinoza, according to Foucault, is the last philosopher, 
who explored the connection between spirituality and philosophy. 
Conclusion  
The present chapter has attempted to see Foucault’s work as a unified corpus 
to examine the development of the concepts of power and subject and, the 
relation that Foucault envisaged between them, in relation to other concepts, 
at various stages of his intellectual trajectory. It is intended to liberate the 
subject from the general perception that visualizes it as passive, without 
temperament and often docile. The chapter also revives the question of the 
subject, by locating it within the problems of power and the self, and presents 
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it as an active force that is willing to use its freedom. Here thought rather than 
an act of a synthesising subject is a succession of events. Rather than anchored 
in the real objects and their relationships, thought is an effect of a 
constellation of forces. It is an event. Consequently, knowledge (connaissance) 
alone will not guide a thinking-subject to access truth. To access truth, 

















Optics and the Folding of Light 
I 
The bewilderments of the eyes are of two kinds, and arise from 
two causes, either from coming out of the light or from going 
into the light, which is true of the mind’s eye, quite as much as of 
the bodily eye; and he who remembers this when he sees any one 
whose vision is perplexed and weak, will not be too ready to 
laugh; he will first ask whether that soul of man has come out of 
the brighter life, and is unable to see because unaccustomed to 
the dark, or having turned from darkness to the day is dazzled 
by excess of light (Plato, 2010, p. 270). 
The cavemen and the Platonic allegory of the cave can be a point of departure 
to examine some of the central concerns of Foucault. The allegory of the cave 
explores questions central to the nature of reality, the condition of human 
being, and the ways to attain enlightenment. Intrinsic to it is also an 
exploration into the reality of light and a problematic of seeing, which are also 
central for Foucault. The study, through its reading of Plato, locates Foucault 
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in the general context of Western thought, particularly his leaning towards 
Stoic philosophy. Such an undertaking, however, can be sincere to its stated 
goals only if the Platonic allegory is seen in perspective. The allegory of the 
cave is intrinsically linked to Plato’s metaphysical and epistemological claims, 
especially, the dualism that he introduces in the realm of experience. 
According to Plato, the realms of experience are fundamentally of two kinds – 
the physical world and the world of forms. The physical world, that is, the 
world we perceive through our senses, is undoubtedly in a state of constant 
change. It is the realm of objects, images and shadows, and therefore, always 
an infinite puzzle. Here Plato clearly resembles the Heraclitean flux or even 
the Foucauldian economy of forces and their effects on one another. On the 
other hand, the world of forms is stable and unchangeable. It is the world of 
pure forms and, therefore, it is more than one. Since it is stable, pure and real, 
the world of forms, in the allegory of the cave, constitutes the upper world, 
the outside of the cave – and for that matter, inaccessible to the ordinary life – 
and the world of senses, on the other hand, is the inside of the cave. 
In the opening of the seventh book of the Republic, in a dialogue between 
Socrates and Glaucon, Plato introduces the allegory of the cave. It explicates 
the general condition of human beings, trapped in the depth of ignorance and 
even unaware of the limitations of their own perspective. Socrates himself has 
suggested that the allegory of the cave is intended to illustrate the need of 
education. Socrates says, “Behold,” a number of men living in an underground 
den that has a mouth opening toward the daylight. The cave is deep, and 
there, they have been in bonds since their childhood. Legs and necks fastened, 
they are unable to move and can only see before them. Imagine a fire blazing, 
at a distance, above and behind them and at an elevation, between this fire 
and the prisoners, there is a roadway. Then “you will see, if you look, a low 
wall built along the way, like the screen with marionette players have in front 
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of them, over which they show the puppets” (Plato, 2010, p. 265). “I see,” 
replies Glaucon. And along that low wall, men pass, carrying all sorts of 
vessels, statues and figures of animals made of wood, stone and various 
materials, which appear over the wall casting shadows on the wall in front of 
the prisoners by the light of the fire behind. Some of those men normally talk 
and others silent, creating echoes in the cave. The simultaneous appearance of 
both shadows and echoes can only strengthen the prisoners’ belief that the 
sounds belong to the shadows. Here the prisoners see shadows not as 
shadows, rather as unhidden. Anything unhidden is nothing but being and, 
therefore, the truth (Heidegger, 2002, p. 19).      
Now imagine, what if one of those prisoners is released and compelled to 
stand up and immediately turns his neck around and walks and looks 
towards the light. The glare of course is going to disturb him – suffering from 
sharp pains, the reality, at first, would not be accessible to him. Socrates asks, 
“will he not fancy that the shadows which he formerly saw are truer than the 
objects which are now shown to him?” “Far truer,” replies Glaucon (Plato, 
2010, p. 267). Suppose he is reluctantly held fast until he is forced to see the 
sun itself, after dragging him up the steep and the rugged ascent of the cave. 
Would it be painful and irritating to him? It seems, very certain! Socrates 
suggests here that it actually requires time and patience to get accustomed to 
the sight of the upper world. The prisoner who overcomes the limitations of 
the cave, through a long and painful intellectual journey, finally, discovers a 
higher realm and a true reality, through an awareness of goodness. Such a 
person, who could easily be mistaken by any of those folks, who hasn’t left 
the cave yet, is actually the better equipped one, according to Plato, to govern 
the rest of the prisoners and, probably, rest of the society.  
Before engaging ourselves in an agreeable analysis of the cave allegory, for 
the specific needs of the present study, it is helpful to identify, and 
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differentiate ourselves from those few important concerns that Plato himself 
and Heidegger, in a later interpretation of the same allegory, have 
emphasised. Plato’s concern is that of education and the possible role of the 
educated in the society. Education is nothing but learning how to hold oneself 
in relation to objects, in the light of the ideas. Plato differentiates two distinct 
forms of experiences, and their respective spatial orders – the order of senses 
and that of ideas, the pure forms. The inside of the cave, for instance, is filled 
with fire-light and echoes, the lower forms, while the outside of the cave is 
shaped by the pure forms, sun-light and language, respectively. Plato through 
the allegory of the cave explicates an intellectual trajectory, one that is long 
and seriously painful, one that ultimately involves the movement of the soul 
from the world of senses to the world of forms. The allegory of cave, from this 
standpoint, celebrates the primacy of the idea over any kind of practical 
knowledge.  
Heidegger understands education in a purely Platonic sense. Educating 
oneself is precisely to comport oneself to the unhidden, the thing that which 
directly shows itself to us, without our effort. Heidegger, therefore, uses the 
allegory of the cave as a clue to understand the essence of unhiddenness – an 
enquiry into the being of the object. What is unhidden there? It is one 
question, according to Heidegger, that actually appears itself as the most 
simple and straightforward one. Yet, it is a question that demands the most 
dedicated scholars. Heidegger’s reading of the allegory of the cave progresses 
through tracking the more truthful and more beingful unhidden. Hence, the 
objects that appear along the lower wall behind the prisoners in the cave are 
more beingful than their shadows on the wall in front of them, and the sun, 
outside the cave, is more truthful than the fire in the cave. The process of 
comporting oneself to the unhidden then is inevitably a search for the degree 
of unhiddenness in objects. For that reason, Heidegger writes that what 
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happens in the second stage of the cave allegory, when one of those prisoners 
is unshackled, is a failure, as “he who has been unshackled fails to encounter 
unhiddenness as such. He does not come to it” (Heidegger, 2002, p. 28). Here 
the prisoner desires ‘to go back to the shackles, away from the light’ – the light 
which is actually the true symbol of his liberation. It is towards the light that 
the “beings are to become more beingful, the unhidden more unhidden” 
(Heidegger, 2002, p. 29) Heidegger’s ontology is, therefore, directed towards a 
search for the essence of the unhidden, the beings, and the meaning of Being. 
Thus one finds Heidegger focusing on the unhidden, the degree of 
unhiddenness, and the object in itself. But what has exactly revealed itself in 
light, before the prisoner, who had been unshackled. Is it the object itself? 
Plato suggests, and last of all, the most unhidden, the sun, reveals itself, and 
he continues, the unshackled prisoner then will “proceed to argue that this is 
he [the sun] who gives the season and the years, and is the guardian of all that 
is in the visible world, and in a way the cause of all things which he and his 
fellows [prisoners] have been accustomed to behold” (Plato, 2010, p. 267). 
What is then exactly revealed to the prisoner is not the sun as the more true, 
unhiddenness – the object in itself – rather, it is the priori condition of his own 
thought that is revealed to him. Once dragged out of the cave, into the sun 
light, the prisoner suddenly becomes aware of the play of light (shadows) and 
language (echoes) in the cave that ultimately resulted in his false synthesis. 
The prisoners in the cave have believed that the echoes belong to the shadows 
and, therefore, they are one, and thought them as only one and, consequently, 
they tend to imagine shadows as true unhiddenness. The important point 
here is – and this is the reason why one needs to go through the Platonic 
allegory in a different light – the prisoner with such awareness of the 
ambiguity of the visible, rather than comforting himself to the unhidden, can 
only be careful to the visible. He will be reluctant to give up himself easily to 
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the unhidden; he ought to be one of the early Spinozaians walked on earth - a 
rare optician.1  
The passing shadows on the wall, in front of the shackled prisoners, normally 
would have encouraged them to talk about shadows. Plato confirms that they 
have compared the shadows, judged them and this often developed 
competition amongst the prisoners on how to judge them better and come up 
with superior conclusion. Time, for the shackled prisoners, essentially is 
succession. Only the ongoing fleet of shadows on the wall, in front of them, can 
leave in them a sense of time. Time, therefore, is linked to space, to the objects 
and their movement, however, the prisoners shackled in the cave totally lack 
any knowledge of that space – the space that produces those shadows. For 
them the shadows are the only unhidden, therefore, they are nothing but 
objects themselves and any discourse of them is necessarily true. Since time is 
pure succession and non problematic, it is external to the shackled prisoners. 
Hence, at this stage of the allegory, the prisoners, essentially, lack the self; that 
is, the very experience of I-myself or you-yourself. They, consequently, learn 
to believe whatever is perceived as truth. Even in the second stage, when one 
of the prisoners is released and the unshackled is provided with the necessary 
information related to the space that produced the shadows on the wall, he 
fails to grasp the truth and tends to go back to his former state of being – he 
prefers to be shackled. The glare from the fire in the cave, to him, is disturbing 
                                                          
1 The present work, from the very beginning, eliminates all claims of an unrestricted progression of time 
from past to future. Consequently, history can never be a linear succession of distinctive events. The 
thesis rather stresses on the trans-temporality and the ontological singularity of events. The “grammar of 
the meaning-event,” Foucault writes, “revolves around two asymmetrical and insecure poles: the 
infinitive mode and the present tense” (Foucault, 1977, p: 174).    
   For Spinoza, philosophy does not revolve around the problem of the essence of unhiddenness. The 
unhidden is necessarily infinite and prior to its affections. The unhidden – the substance in itself – is 
characterized by its quality of affecting and being affected. The unhiddenness of a substance not 
necessarily directs straightaway to its essence, but only to any of its infinite attributes; to the predicate 
of one of the possible proposition. Each attribute, however, expresses ‘a certain infinite and eternal 
essence’ (Deleuze, 1992, p: 13).         
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and painful to his eye. He struggles to look at the fire and pathetically fails in 
making any sense of it.  
It is only in the third stage that a true struggle occurs in him between the two 
concepts of truth. At this stage, the unshackled prisoner is forcefully dragged 
out of the cave and compelled to face the sun. The alterity of the outside, the 
upper world, compels him to rethink about the reality in the cave. Time 
consequently has become a problem to him; and it then moves into him, 
distinguishing the Ego from the I. Time here becomes internal to him. 
Relentlessly dividing him from within, splitting him from himself, the eternal 
time ultimately becomes an unavoidable experience to the unshackled 
prisoner, and here space that has been defined as coexistence becomes a form 
of exteriority. The prisoner, who has been unshackled, finally, develops the 
self. It is his own self that he has constituted only through the folding of the 
forces, the forces of the exterior. Hence the unshackled prisoner, once 
liberated, would not be comforting himself to the objects, as Heidegger has 
suggested, rather would be interested in folding – the folding of the outside, 
in Foucauldian terms. Plato is himself convinced that, once liberated, the 
unshackled prisoner would not be interested any more in accepting the 
challenges of his fellow prisoners in judging the shadows on the wall in front 
of them.  
The cave allegory – the way we have read it – has given us some important 
points. Time is eternal, yet it is internal to the subject. For that reason, it is no 
more a mere succession of moments, rather time itself is an experience, 
constantly splitting the subject from within, differentiating the Ego from an 
always altering another – the I in “I think.” Foucault writes, “to be modern is 
not to accept oneself as one is in the flux of the passing moments; it is to take 
oneself as object of a complex and difficult elaboration: what Baudelaire, in 
the vocabulary of his day, calls dandysme” (Foucault, 1994, p. 50). One can, 
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therefore, notice that the concern here is not anymore of comporting oneself 
to the objects. Rather than posing the question, “what is there?” here one is 
inclined to ask “what am I?”  
It is interesting, however, to note that, both these questions stem out of 
responses to Plato, his emphasis of the ideas – the forms – as the higher 
beings. The ideas belong to the upper world, and therefore, in a more general 
and abstract sense, they are the good. The temporal presence is always 
anchored in the atemporal, eternal presence – the presence of the Platonic 
forms. Hence the chair, in the context of everyday life, can only be a chair, if 
only there exists the very idea of a chair. Heidegger, in contrast, argues that 
Plato, by establishing the beyond-ordinary as the sole responsible for the 
ordinary, has in fact covered up lichtung, the clearing, an understanding of 
being. One’s understanding of things is shaped in the background of those 
shared practices into which he is socialised. The craftsman is neither 
responding to the grain of the wood nor to the pure form, rather he is 
responding to the very need of the community itself.  Since Plato, Heidegger 
claims, philosophy has overlooked the clearing that can both limit and open 
up beings – the clearing that decides the degree of unhiddenness of being. 
What, therefore, has concerned Heidegger the most is the question of being of 
things – how things become objects in modern world. On the other hand, 
Foucault reworks Heidegger, and alters his focus. The things consequently 
have lost the podium, and the focus is shifted to the selves.2 Foucault writes, 
“Plato is said to have opposed essence to appearance, a higher world to this 
terrestrial world, the sun of truth to the shadows of the cave (and it becomes 
our duty to bring essences back into the world, to glorify the world, and to 
place the sun of truth within man)” (Foucault, 1977, p. 167).    
                                                          
2 In one of his last interviews, Foucault, for instance, has confirmed that for him, “Heidegger has always 
been the essential philosopher” (Michel Foucault, 1990).    
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II   
Foucault’s writing carries with it an extraordinarily sensual visual. It is a 
world that hides as much as it reveals, constantly shaped by the tango of 
brightness and shadow; it is a world of depth and flows, where light floods in 
through invisible windows and inaccessible corridors. It is nearly a labyrinth. 
The flood of light that fills the space, spreading consistently across the surface 
of things and selves, illuminating them and presenting them as either 
transparent or opaque, is however the only common locus of representation. 
Hence one will confront a ‘there is’ of light, – just as there is a ‘there is’ of 
language – an irreducible being of light that illuminates and opens up the 
outside for sight. The panopticon of Discipline and Punish, the ‘virtual 
visibility’ of The Birth of the Clinic, the ‘pastoral power’ all are conditioned by 
such a ‘there is’ of light. Light is absolute, yet it is not ahistorical, the form and 
structure of sight are historically determined. Like language, it is the a priori of 
every possibility, the a priori that, in combination with the stimulus from other 
senses, positions the outside open to thought (Deleuze, 1988, pp. 57 – 60). 
The Las Meninas, the painting by Velasquez, for instance, is described, in one 
of the celebrated chapters of The Order of Things, as a system of light; a flood of 
light from an invisible window, at the right-hand side within the painting, 
opens up an entire space of classical representation. The light, here, by 
distributing both the objects and the models as either perceivable or non-
perceivable, establishes among them a network of reflections and exchanges 
that consistently draw and redraw the line, which divides the outside of the 
painting from its inside. On the left-hand side within the painting, one finds 
Velasquez, the painter himself, working on a canvas. He is ‘standing a little 
back from his canvas’ and glancing at his models. The arm that holds the 
brush bent towards the palette, and Foucault describes, between the canvas 
and the palette his skilled hand, for an instant, is motionless. It is “suspended 
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in mid-air, arrested in rapt attention on the painter’s gaze; and the gaze, in 
return, waits upon the arrested gesture. Between the fine point of the brush 
and the steely gaze, the scene is about to yield up its volume.” (Foucault, 
1994, p. 3) Here the painter – as he is made visible in his own painting – is 
entirely illuminated by the same source of light, which has opened up an 
entire representation before him – the light from the window. The first 
proposition, therefore, is: since illuminated by the very brightness – the light – 
that grants him access to the outside, one can only sense brightness from its 
internal point of view. In other words, seeing, in itself, can never be an 
objective act. Since the subject is always internal to the very system of light 
that illuminates and thereby opens up the outside before him, it demands 
from his part a considerable intellectual and spiritual strength to overcome 
that very structure of his seeing and to find a vantage point from where he is 
able to examine the very conditions that grant him access to the outside. 
It is neither the painter’s corporeal eye nor his models or even the spectator – 
of the painting Las Meninas itself – at present, who is observing the painter at 
work, is the actual locus of brightness. Rather every possibility – the 
directedness of the painter’s gaze, the possible exchanges that connect the 
spectator and the space that is represented within the painting, etc. – unfolds 
within the condition of light. The second proposition, therefore, is: light is 
neither anchored in the subject, who perceives, nor in the objects, which are 
perceived. It is rather the a priori condition of every possibility. For instance, 
in “Self Writing,” one finds Foucault reading Seneca and the culture of 
writing personal notebook (hupomnemata) and correspondences in the light of 
Greek practice of the care of the self. Seneca writes “I thank you for writing to 
me so often; for you are revealing yourself to me [te mihi ostendis] in the only 
way you can. I never receive a letter from you without being in your company 
forthwith. If the pictures of our absent friend are pleasing us…how much 
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more pleasant is a letter, which brings us real traces, real evidence of an 
absent friend! For that which is sweetest when we meet face to face is 
afforded by the impress of a friend’s hand upon his letter – recognition” 
(Foucault, 1997, p. 216). Writing, in the light of the care of the self, then is that 
possibility that can ‘project oneself into view, to make one’s own face appear’ 
in the presence of the other (Foucault, 1997, p. 216). Light then is that through 
which one sees; it not only penetrates through, but also permits penetration. 
Light then is not just mere visibility, that is the opening and spreading out of 
the open, rather it is also that which lets-through, and therefore, according to 
Heidegger, its essence is to be transparent (Heidegger, 2002, p. 41).          
Matter can be neither transparent nor opaque in darkness. It is the very 
condition of light that gifts matter its character. By consistently spreading 
across its surface, light, at times, may only reveal the texture and colour of 
matter. Matter here folds light and creates within it a void, which is actually 
inaccessible to light. It opens up capillaries of the outside within the inside, that 
is, within the system of light itself. The huge canvas on which Velasquez 
works in the painting, Las Meninas, is particularly of this kind. Since the 
canvas is placed precisely against the light and the standing spectator, it is 
inaccessible to his corporeal eye, and for that reason, it hides more than it 
reveals, initiating a succession of reflections and exchanges between the 
interior and the outside of the painting. However, at times, light may come 
from the depth of matter, revealing its very soul – such is the light that 
Foucault has identified in Seneca’s correspondences.  
Light, according to Foucault, is deeply divided, and is divided into domains 
that are not at all related. One will encounter, on the one hand, a sovereign 
white light that spreads and delivers the being of things; on the other hand, 
there is a different kind of light that is never from the depth of things. It 
“spreads over each thing in rapid bursts. …in sharp surface bursts, in a 
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fleeting plan, lightning falls on the surface of things, forming a sudden stroke, 
transitory, quickly darkened, etching an angle or a bulge, but leaving intact, 
obstinately in place, in their earlier presence, the things that it illuminates – 
without ever penetrating them. …“Rare and slender illuminations run on the 
water”…on a boat at sea a man is leaning on a railing, his left hand holding 
the metal rail which runs along the deck; on the first knuckle of his third 
finger he wears a ring “which in its present position flashes lightning”” 
(Foucault, 1986, pp. 108 – 109). Contrary to the light that spreads and delivers 
the being of things, light here contracts and focuses on a particular point on 
the surface. It is, therefore, not a kind of light that lets-through; rather a kind 
that only signals the existence of itself and the surface on which it focuses.  
Light is divided into domains and, therefore, is inherently ambiguous. It 
inclines to hide more that it reveals. Only the wicked eye of the uninitiated 
will consider light as the element in which vision unfolds itself. The truth of 
light is concealed; as a result, it has an esoteric structure. The normal never 
holds the truth; underneath the normal, beyond the delusion of the 
illuminated world, there lies the truth. Here, one will finally encounter the 
surfacing of the oriental subtext, in Foucault, from beneath the thickness of his 
narration. However, this should be read against his reading of the Stoics, 
where he tries to undo the Platonic divide – the world of the senses and the 
world of the pure forms – and tries to see essence in what is mundane. Still, 
when replying the question that is posed to him on the rising fashions of 
“mind expansion,” the “new sensibility,” and oriental philosophy among the 
French youth, during the aftermath of the May 1968 student revolt, Foucault 
scornfully rejected any link between Western individualism and Oriental 
spirituality. The mind expansion in Oriental spirituality is directed 
particularly to ‘destroy the madness of normality and to regain true reality,’ 
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however; in Western individualism it is directed ‘to attain an individual 
madness beyond the rationality of the world.’3  
The Occidental mind sees itself and the surrounding reality as something 
knowable through reason; therefore, it lacks that strive for detaching itself 
from reality. Hence mind expansion is never directed towards the 
annihilation of the self, rather towards the heightening of individual 
experience: a heightened egoism. In the same interview, Foucault addresses 
some of the major themes of Indian philosophies: ‘the marked distinction 
between a delusive world of appearances (maya, samsara) and a true reality 
beyond it (moksha, nirvana); the striving for attainment of nirvana through 
detachment from delusive reality, including the delusion of a separate and 
continuous self’ (Schaub, 1989, p. 308). The preface to the first edition of Folie 
et Deraison (madness and civilization), which appeared in 1961 – though the 
entire preface is removed from all later editions – has situated the Orient as 
the unmitigated Other of the Occident. Foucault writes, “within the 
universality of Occidental ratio there is to be found the dividing line that is the 
Orient: the Orient that one imagines to be the origin, the vertiginous point at 
which nostalgia and the promises of return originate; the Orient that is 
presented to the expansionist rationality of the Occident but that remains 
eternally inaccessible because it always remains the limit” (Schaub, 1989, p. 
308). 
The Orient is the dividing line within the universality of the Occident and, 
therefore, it is the inaccessible limit of the expansionist rationality of the 
Occident. It is that immaterial point zero, the vertiginous point of origin and, 
therefore, it couldn’t be a space. In Foucault’s geometrical metaphor, Orient is 
a presence without any spatial extension – it is essentially an absent-presence. 
                                                          
3 Paolo Caruso, Conversazione con Levi-Strauss, Foucault, Lacan (Milan: V Mursia and Co, 1969) cited in 
“Foucault’s Oriental Subtext,” (Schaub, 1989, p: 308).   
66 | P a g e   C h a p t e r  I I  
 
The Orient is not in the delusive world of appearances, but is completely 
detached from it. However, the expansionist forces do not know limits – 
when they expand, the Orient retreats and recoils, and it thereby dodges the 
penetration and conquest. For Foucault, the Orient essentially is that eternal 
Other that endlessly challenges and frustrates Western rationality (Schaub, 
1989, p. 309). In Discourse on Language, one finds Foucault, in the light of 
oriental transmission of a monopolized and secret knowledge, rejecting the 
great Western myths of the universal communication of knowledge and 
stressing on the ritualistic aspects, which primarily exclude and select, in 
Western education and claims of knowledge (Foucault, 1972, p. 225). It is only 
after Kant that the very ‘question of the condition under which true 
knowledge is possible’ has become a concern to Occidental thought (Foucault, 
2007, p. 99). Foucault’s belated journey to the antiquity is rightly a journey to 
an Orientalised Hellenism, marked by “the return of gods,” and a “patient 
reconstruction of a common myth, of a hope” (Schaub, 1989, p. 306). It 
introduces an image of a guru or a Zen-master, into the Western horizon, who 
“transmits knowledge like “secret wisdom hidden from the profane eyes of 
the uninitiated”” (Schaub, 1989, p. 307). 
Stoic thought, especially with Seneca, is marked by the presence of an 
addressee. It is in response to him, who is pledged by a “sickness of the soul” 
that thought develops in itself. For instance, in Of Peace of Mind, the self 
diagnosis of the state of mind by Serenus, the addressee, is followed by the 
insightful analysis of Seneca.4 The true knowledge, nevertheless, is anchored 
neither in the one who addresses, Seneca, nor in the addressee, Serenus. 
Rather the true knowledge that has been concealed at the beginning from 
both of them surfaces itself eventually with the progression of the dialogue. 
Seneca himself claims that “the process is mutual; for men learn while they 
                                                          
4 L Annaeus Seneca, “Of Peace of Mind,”  http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Of_Peace_of_Mind  
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teach” (Foucault, 1997, p. 215). Yet Serenus writes, “I will tell you what befalls 
me, you must find out the name of the disease.”5 According to Seneca, what 
worries Serenus the most is the state of endless oscillation that disturbs the 
calm steadiness of mind – he lacks exactly that which can elevate a man 
almost to the level of a god! The splendour and brilliant luxury that surround 
him though never could alter his principles; they all disturb him very deeply, 
and consequently, what he actually lacks is peace of mind. Serenus continues 
“I beg you, therefore, if you have any remedy by which you could stop this 
vacillation of mine, to deem me worthy to owe my peace of mind to you” 
(Ibid). A diagnosis such as these, Seneca argues, demands a certain level of 
transparency. For its success, the entire disease has to be dragged to light that 
is, his vices that have regularly eluded Serenus’ self-examination are to be 
dragged to light; and it is only in light that such vices that Serenus fears and 
hates the most can be penetrated and resolved for ever (Ibid). The above 
reading of Seneca’s Of Peace of Mind suggests that the practice of the self is 
essentially not a solitary activity; either as guidance or as an example, it 
demands the help of others. Nevertheless, one is inclined to ask what is the 
condition that can open up the incorporeal – here the implanted vices in 
Serenus’ soul – to visibility, and enables one to access the true knowledge? 
What is the condition that actually opens up the very space for such a 
diagnosis at the first place? 
Since a correspondence such as this, essentially, demands the objectification 
of soul, according to Foucault, it establishes reciprocity of gaze and 
examination. It revolves around the philosophical principle: since god dwells 
in soul, nothing of ourselves is truly inaccessible to him. Through the missive, 
one authorizes oneself to be transparent before the other, who is placed as an 
inner god, within oneself, and thereby opening oneself to the gaze of the other 
                                                          
5 Seneca, op., cit. 
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for examination (Foucault, 1997, p. 217). The reciprocity of gaze can only be 
established if only the Self is compassionate to the outside reality, and to time; 
if only, it folds the outside within itself. Sense in itself is folding. Missives 
dealing with the account of ordinary day, the detailed presentation of oneself 
to one’s correspondent as the day unfolds in itself, is quite common in Seneca. 
Lucilius, for instance, is quite comfortable in asking Seneca to ““give [him] an 
account of each separate day, and of the whole day too”” (Foucault, 1997, p. 
219). Reviewing one’s day, even if it is like all the others (short of a chain of 
extraordinary events), is exclusively directed towards self-examination and 
memorisation. The culture of living under the gaze of others revolves around 
such practices that constitute oneself as the inspector of oneself in one’s own 
daily activities. Stoicism, therefore, is marked by its fascination with the 
ordinary, the everyday, the terrestrial. It occupies precisely the opposite side 
of Platonism (Foucault, 1977, p. 172). 
The internal time, for the Stoics, is essentially divided; and it is directed along 
corporeal causes and incorporeal effects. Time that is linked to the corporeal 
causes ‘must be grasped as a living present in bodies which act and are acted 
upon;’ that is, time must be grasped along the chain of causes that present the 
corporeal unity of bodies in space and time.6 It is the encasing of past and 
future into a vast present in accordance with the pre-existing economy of 
power; an endless reconstituting of the thinking “I” in relation to a vast 
present that includes the past and the future. Present is the presence mounted 
by past and future, that is, it is established by a living memory and a concept 
of future. Here each point in time is numerically distinct. On the other hand, 
time alone the chain of incorporeal effects – effects that result from bodies, 
their actions and their passions – is ontologically singular and, therefore, one 
Event; time here continuously eludes the present by flying towards both past 
                                                          
6 For further reading on Stoicism and time see The Logic of Sense, (Deleuze, 1990, p. 5).        
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and future at once (Deleuze, 1990, p. 4 – 11). On the line of the incorporeal 
effect, time, in its purity, infinitely eludes the “Ego.” Neither anchored in 
habits nor in memories, time in itself is unrepresentable. The present, 
therefore, lacks corporeal extension.  
On the line of effects, the correspondent in Seneca’s missive is doubled up to a 
pure expression in a virtual-transcendental field. He is folded within the Self, 
and is elevated to the statues of an inner god, the certain source of a secret 
wisdom. It is under his eternal gaze that one finally examines one’s own soul. 
The splitting of time into corporeal causes and incorporeal effects, the 
moment of self-reflection, is dependent on the terrestrial order. It involves the 
doubling up of the earthly signs and symbols within oneself and the 
subsequent self-analysis. However, the relations between the events, on the 
line of incorporeal effects, operate as a kind of quasi-cause. Events actualise 
themselves in individuals and states of affairs, yet they are not completely 
manifested in those actualisations, rather they merely subsist in them. A pure 
event cannot be considered without a metaphysical basis.7 However, this 
“cannot be the metaphysic of substances, which can serve as a foundation for 
accidents; nor can it be a metaphysical coherence, which situates these 
accidents in the entangled nexus of cause and effects” (Foucault, 1977, pp. 172 
– 73). It must necessarily be a metaphysics with an open structure.8 The “event 
– a wound, a victory-defeat, death – is always an effect produced entirely by 
                                                          
7 Kant has defined metaphysics as the study of the a priori. In Foucault and Deleuze, it deals with the 
materiality of the incorporeal.  
8 The movement of transcendence, an excess over the totality, determines metaphysics in terms of a 
structural ‘closure.’ Metaphysics then strictly has no ‘outside,’ and there is only immanence within 
metaphysics. Consequently, overcoming it becomes an impossibility. Derrida locates his project of 
deconstruction at the limit of philosophical discourse, at the boundary line between the immanent 
totality of metaphysics and that which exceeds that totality. Deleuze and Foucault, on the other hand, 
have conceived metaphysics as fundamentally open, with active exchanges with the outside. 
According to Foucault, what has failed deconstruction and textual analysis is the inability to think the 
outside of philosophy. Jacques Derrida, “Cogito and the History of Madness,” Writing and Difference, 
(London and New York: Routledge Classics, 1978); for Foucault’s reply on the topic: Michel Foucault, 
“My Body, This Paper, This Fire,” Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason, 
(New York: Vintage Books, 1988).           
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bodies colliding, mingling, or separating, but this effect is never of a corporeal 
nature; it is the intangible, inaccessible battle that turns and repeats itself a 
thousand times around Fabricius, above the wounded Prince Andrew. The 
weapons that tear the bodies form an endless incorporeal battle. Physics 
concerns causes, but events, which arise as its effects, no longer belong to it” 
(Foucault, 1977, p. 173).9        
Stoic thought revolves around an object of thought. Here the object of thought 
is action itself and soul is that principle that uses accessories as tools. Taking 
care of the body does not involve taking care of the self. For instance, Plato in 
Alcibiades conceived the self as a reflexive pronoun. The self, in this 
proposition, not just means “the same,” but also conveys a notion of identity. 
The second meaning in effect shifts the question from ‘what is the self?’ to 
‘departing from what ground shall I find my identity?’ (Foucault, 1997, p. 
230). The “self is not clothing, tools, or possessions; it is to be found in the 
principle that uses these tools, a principle not of the body but of the soul” 
(Foucault, 1997, p. 230). Soul then can never be a substance. It in itself 
becomes the core principle that governs one’s activities. Here the care of the 
self is essentially the care of one’s own activities. The stress on action is at the 
core of Seneca’s thought. His missives meticulously deal not only with the 
details of daily life, but also with the movements of the spirit and with the 
self-analysis (Foucault, 1997, p. 233).          
                                                          
9 Deleuze, in his reading of Stoicism, gives a considerable importance to the Stoic splitting of time. The 
appeal of an empty time – Aion, a time out of joint; freed from the moralities of good will and common 
sense, it is the time of ill will, a nonsense or a madness – takes Deleuze to the spontaneous and the 
instinctive. However, Foucault, in his reading of Stoicism, gives much emphasis on habit, memories, 
desires and self-examination under the eternal gaze of the other. Hence even though the event of 
thought is detached from the mixtures of bodies and the state of affairs of the material world, it does 
not unfold itself in an absolutely unrepresentable time, rather under the eternal gaze of an inner god, 
the double of the other within oneself.      
The Stoic aspect of Deleuzian thought, according to Foucault, relates to the incorporeal, where 
thought unfolds itself in relation to the object of thought and his Freudian aspect deals with the 
phantasm. Freud teaches us that ‘thought is itself capable of thought’ (Foucault, 1977, p: 179). 
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The heart of the problem, however, is actually not an examination of one’s own 
conscience. The question of the care of the self rather takes shape only with 
one’s access to a certain secret wisdom, an ontological knowledge of the self 
that is inherent to a particular mode of experience of the self, and certainly not 
with a psychological form of contemplation. The deciphering of a truth hidden 
inside the self was never part of the Stoic experience of the self. The Stoic 
experience of the self rather was an attempt to determine the limit of one’s own 
action, the ethical use of freedom. In Alcibiades, Plato, for instance, invokes the 
metaphor of the eye and asks: “how can the eye see itself?” According to him, it 
is impossible to look at oneself, like in a mirror. One can only look into another 
eye. That means, “one in oneself, however in oneself in the shape of the eye of 
the other...in the other pupil, one will see oneself: the pupil serves as a mirror” 
(Foucault, 1997, p. 275). Similarly the soul contemplates itself under the eternal 
gaze of the other. It is only in the divine element of the other soul that it 
recognizes the divinity in itself. Hence the care of the self inevitably involves 
the recognition of the divine element of one’s own soul. The care of the self, 
then, is to undertake a certain work upon oneself and to equip oneself to access 
to truth. It is to equip oneself with a certain ontological truth that takes shape 
with a particular mode of experience of the self. In the Socratic-Platonic 
tradition, it involves attaining certain ontological knowledge, certain truth 
principles on the self and the world (Foucault, 1997, p. 285).  
III 
Gustave Courbet’s painting, The Studio of the Painter: A Real Allegory, appeared 
at a time when French art was seen internally divided into camps. The culture 
of high art that the idealists celebrated was facing challenge from a new force, 
realism. The realist, in the 19th century, explored the forces of the everyday 
sense and introduced direct painting from life. It was a period marked by a 
struggle between artists who lived in the realm of imagination and those who 
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lived in the realm of vision. A Real Allegory is one such painting that appeared 
at a decisive stage in the history of modern art, a stage that is marked by the 
transition from the idealist-realist battle to an age influenced by Baudelaire – 
and the arrival of the impressionists. Inspired by Velazquez’s Las Meninas, 
this work even has influenced some of the impressionist masterpieces. 
Edouard Manet, for instance, has drawn inspiration from it, while working on 
two of his early works: The Old Musician and La Musique aux Tuileries. It is a 
picture that is packed with forms and external life. It represents the condition 
of the modern artist. 
 
Gustave Courbet, The Studio of the Painter: A Real Allegory 
A Real Allegory is a painting of Courbet himself, in the company of his friends, 
working at his Paris studio. It is painted with a lot of detail, yet the most 
brightly coloured objects are at the centre of the painting. The painting hardly 
authorizes any eye movement from one side to the other, leaving the centre of 
the painting as the only focal point. At the centre, behind the painter one finds 
a woman. She is exposed, yet seems relaxed and quite indifferent to her 
nakedness. She seems still and her head is slightly tilted towards the canvas 
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on which the painter is working. She seems to be carefully reading the 
painting. In the painting, the naked woman represents the progression of 
time. At the centre of the painting, before the naked woman, the painter is 
making the last strokes on his work. He is actually not painting the naked 
woman; rather he is painting the countryside. Next to his chain one finds his 
pet and a small boy. The boy, dressed in peasant dress, appears to be totally 
occupied by the painting. Possibly from the same countryside, which is 
painted on the canvas, he appears to be daydreaming. Behind the canvas on 
which the painter works, on the wall, one finds a mural of a naked man in a 
gesture of crucifixion.  
The whole seen actually unfolds around the central figure, Courbet himself, 
who is at the centre of the painting. On the left hand side of the painting, the 
working class, and the men from the everyday life, share space. There are 
priests, street-musicians, beggars, street vendors; they are people from the 
street and people, who have no place in 19th century Paris. Their actions and 
gestures in effect suggest the real condition of the working class. One finds 
them exhausted and tired by their work and poverty. On the right hand side of 
the painting, one finds the old Parisian bourgeoisie. There are friends and 
associates of Courbet; some are writers, some are novelists. At the far right of 
the painting, Baudelaire himself is portrayed; there he seems to be lost in one of 
his books. Contrasted to the working class, on the left hand side of the painting, 
the old bourgeoisie is marked by luxury and leisure. While the crowd that 
gathered at Courbet’s studio represents a cross-section of the 19th century 
Parisian society, its inequality and class division, the figures at the centre of the 
painting suggest the real message of the painting. The image of a painter, as the 
creator of his creation, essentially invokes the function of the painter in the 
society. It is he, who organises the entire scene that unfolds in the painting. He 
is, therefore, elevated to the status of the creator of the painting.  
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The painting, on the other hand, also leaves traces of a much deeper thought. 
At the centre of the painting, the painter juxtaposes images; one finds Courbet 
painting a landscape that has absolutely nothing to do with the figures 
depicted in the painting. Here images overlap and cancel each other, opening 
a space of dreams. The little boy, who is seemed to have lost himself before 
the painting of the landscape, symbolises such an opening. He symbolises an 
ontological lack at the very heart of being, a yearning for a different time. That 
yearning for a different time is essentially rooted in the distrust to a 
continuum, the successive time. In dreams, the present is not strictly framed 
by the past and future. It is rather an individable present, that is, it neither has 
a beginning to connect with the past nor has an end to connect it with the 
future, and therefore, it neither has middle (Borges, 1999, pp. 330 – 331). 
Hence this present, in a Foucauldian sense, is actually an exit or a way out. 
What Courbet achieved through the painting, A Real Allegory, is not a mere 
representation of a particular present; rather he has succeeded in projecting 
the timeless themes in an immanent flux. The painting, through the 
juxtaposing of images, shows modern man’s eternal drive – a drive that is 
rooted in an immanent lack – to change himself. In short, it is a painting that 
celebrates the possibility of a painter; a painter, who is not a mere observer of 
the flux of time; rather he who takes himself as the ‘object of a complex and 
difficult elaboration’ (Foucault, 1994, p. 50).  
Baudelaire, in his essay on Constantin Guys, examines the modern painter‘s 
relation to the present. He writes, “Imagine an artist who was always, 
spiritually, in the condition of [a] convalescent…” (Baudelaire, 1964, p. 13). 
And if “the convalescence is like a return towards childhood” (Baudelaire, 
1964). He always will confront things in a state of newness. If a man of genius 
enjoys a sound nerve, the child celebrates his weak nerve. He delightfully 
absorbs form and colour; ‘he is always drunk.’ Baudelaire considers Guys to 
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be a ‘man-child.’ However, the present to the modern painter, according to 
Baudelaire, is essentially a possibility – it is an opportunity to exercise one’s 
own liberty. The present opens space for transfiguring the reality. In Guys, 
the “natural” is transfigured to “more than natural,” the “beautiful” turns 
itself to “more than beautiful” (Foucault, 1994, p. 50). His transfiguration, 
however, does not cancel reality; rather it invokes a ‘difficult interplay 
between the truth of what is real and the exercise of freedom’ (Foucault, 1994, 
p. 50).               
Conclusion 
The present chapter gains itself in strength from the findings of the previous 
chapter and, for that reason alone, it is nothing but a natural progression of 
the latter. The previous chapter, through a diagnosis of Foucault’s writings, 
has identified the ontological structure that spreads and organises his 
writings, and has located, in his works, two a priori structures: light and 
language. The present chapter has tried to examine, in detail, the first of those 
two, by contextualising Foucault’s writings that, directly or indirectly address 
the problem of light (of visibility) within the discussions that have developed 
elsewhere in the Western philosophical tradition. It advances itself first; with 
a study of the physics of the Platonic cave (one of the things Plato analyses 
through his cave allegory, is the essence of light. He compares the source of 
light within the cave – the bonfire – with that of the light source outside the 
cave – the sun – to develop his theory of truth), and then advances itself with 
a reading of Heidegger’s reading of Plato’s cave allegory (one will find here 
Heidegger struggling with the Platonic text, not to locate the essence of light 
or even to examine the truth of truth, but to locate the essence of beings, the 
unconcealed). 
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The chapter then evaluates the futility of a thought on the true experience of 
reality based on the state of things, and progresses with an analysis of 
Foucault’s reading of Stoicism, especially; its analysis of the materiality of the 
incorporeal. The reading of Stoicism allowed Foucault to reflect upon the play 
of the intangible, in the experience of reality. If Plato’s dualism opposed 
essence to appearance, the sun of truth to the shadows of the cave, Foucault 
has brought essence back into the terrestrial world. Consequently, essence is 
not anymore a transcendental excess; rather it is immanent within the reality. 
Then the task of philosophy is not exactly to overcome metaphysics, but 
rather to do a different metaphysics. In Foucault, the true experience of the 
reality is related to an open metaphysics. For instance, the text on Baudelaire’s 
essay on Constantin Guys, explores neither the essence of light nor the truth 
of reality, but rather, it makes a stunning discovery that the light itself can be 




















Form, Force and the Fold of the Articulable 
I 
“Within the freedom of the present lurks the past. For a 
few seconds you become both the bucolic grandfather 
with his white moustache, and the child at the water’s 
edge where the scent of elder trees lingers. In the time it 
takes to open and close the blade, you’re not so much 
caught between two ages as straddling them.” 
Philippe Delerm, 1998, p. 2 – 3 
Philippe Delerm in his short-fiction, “A Knife in your Pocket,” writes about 
the incorporeal transformations that an object, in its materiality, can probably 
effect on its holder, from within himself. The topic of his writing is actually a 
knife, and not any knife, but the sort of knife that any child would dream 
about. It is the sort of knife that every parent always insists to be too 
dangerous for children – a sort of knife, Delerm says, one could only ‘picture 
belonging to a perfect, imaginary grandfather’ from the French countryside 
(Delerm, 1998, p. 1). An evident sign of a simple life, and yet the writer claims 
it to be a virtual knife, considering its incorporeal affects (though it does not 
have the power to turn you either to grandfather-like or to a child). Since you 
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are already a man and, not a child anymore. Delerm says the pleasure 
however lies elsewhere: it is “an object which you can truly call your own, 
which makes your pocket bulge pointlessly, which you can take out from time 
to time, not to use, but just to experience the simple pleasure of feeling it, 
looking at it, opening and closing it” (Delerm, 1998, p. 2). And yet, it can 
never be reduced to a mere object of a selfish aesthetic pleasure; it is rather a 
sign that is both the cause and also the effect of an initiation, the incorporeal 
transformations.1 It is a sign like any sign is essentially a symptom of 
immanent signs, of immanent incorporeal effects of matter on matter, of 
bodies on bodies. Therein lies, within the play of to affect and being affected, 
the very matrix of language in its use.2 
The play itself is in fact an immanent flux of a Heraclitean nature, a play 
without seriousness or even playfulness. The play of to affect and being 
affected in effect constitutes our world and our use of language. It is that 
which ties man with the world. The incorporeal (or rather, the consciousness) 
is not a property of matter, rather it emanates from the play that comes into 
being when forces act upon each other, when matter affects each other.3 
Delerm, for instance, wants to write about a particular sort of knife, yet he 
himself seems unable to fix its physical characteristics, and suggests that “let’s 
agree on an Opinel No. 6 or a Laguiole pocket-knife” (Delerm, 1998, p. 1). In 
fact, he is merely occupied – not with its physical characteristics or even with 
it actual uses, rather – with its virtual potentialities.  
                                                          
1 Incorporeal transformation is here used in a Kantian sense, to point out the effects of matter on 
faculties, particularly, on imagination. It is that anonymous that is, at the same time, outside of and yet 
consistently shapes language. Peter Pal Pelbart writes, “What speaks in the writer is that “he is no 
longer himself, he is already no one:” not the universal but the anonymous, the neutral, the outside” 
(Pelbart, 2000, p. 203).       
2 Foucault, for instance, has famously declared that power and knowledge are mutually reinforcing.  
3 The extended nature of our consciousness is quite obvious in the case of a group prayer or even in the 
case of a violent mob that hits that street.   
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The play of to affect and being affected infinitely subverts any explicit 
distinction between cause and effect. They themselves become nothing but 
mere reversibles within the relation of forces – essentially, draining both the 
subject and the object positions. Foucault, following Schopenhauer and 
Nietzsche, has labelled the play of to affect and being affected as power 
relations. In his ontological project, the Kantian noumenon (the object = x) that 
is without any attributes, is always in a field of power relations, a site of 
relentless permutations and combinations. It is this field of forces that shapes 
the topography of the things we perceive and the words we utter. As a result, 
identity, essentially, becomes a play within a field of power relations, and 
consequently, the subject and the object become infinitely reversible positions 
within that economy of power relations. The question one could pose now is 
what are these power relations and how are they related to the question of 
language?  
If signs are only the symptom of (un)conscious exchanges, of to affect and 
being affected, one possible way to understand the nature of the initiation that 
assembles and imprints certain distinct signs on the body through incorporeal 
affects cannot be through a mere analysis of the symptom, the sign itself, and 
the gap that separates and differentiates them from one another, rather can 
apparently be through a diagnosis of the play of discourses in a relation of 
forces that hold signs in time-space and link them together. For instance, only 
a study of how the interplay of discursive formations associated with the sign, 
the oriental girl, and a strict control of work space, produces docile obedient 
work attitudes on work-floors in China’s numerous factories in the coastal 
provinces can fruitfully map its effects on the female body. The woman’s 
negotiation and identification with specific signs of womanhood and identity, 
in situations such as these, for their own benefits, are the topic of many 
studies. Salaff and Lee, in their respective studies on Chinese labour market, 
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have in fact acknowledged the mushrooming of conflicting version of 
discursive formations, both among different groups of female workers and 
the managements on the oriental woman, race, gender, sex and femininity 
(Salaff, 1981; Lee, 1995, pp. 529 – 47).  
Here the sign, an effect of immanent effects, the very symptom of dynamic 
(un)conscious flows, itself is the very symptom of change.4 It, when detached 
both from the signified and the evident materiality of the signifier, liberates 
itself from traditional metaphysics (that is, a structural relation of binaries, 
between the signifier and the signified or between the subject and the object) 
and, as a result, becomes the mere effect of incorporeal transformations.5 
Representation, consequently, is a stratagem of intervention, both shaped by 
and pointed against, an immanent field of power relations, a field essentially 
shaped by permutations and combinations. It becomes, in essence, 
articulation, an articulation, that is, nothing but a simulacra, the repetition 
without an original or, if one uses Deleuze, it is, actually, the repetition of 
difference itself. 
At the very heart of the process of surfacing – the appearance of the sign as 
sign – rests the problem. It is the intensity of a problem that actually surfaces 
a sign as a symptom. The problem, in a moment of undecidability, not just 
brightens, for the subject, the shimmering exterior but also accelerates the 
process of subjectification. Everything, to the subject, essentially unfolds in a 
field of immanence, in life, in the mystery of the problems that life poses to 
                                                          
4 Saussure defines sign as the arbitrary coupling of the signifier and the signified in a synchronic 
unfolding in time, however, in Derrida, since signifiers are primarily detached from the 
transcendental signified, sign becomes the sign of a mere substitution, in time, in a play of an infinite 
signification (Derrida, 2001, pp. 353 – 54).      
5 The incorporeal transformations, within subject, are in themselves the effect of (un)conscious flows 
(here one, primarily, has to acknowledge the fact that both, how the Other influences the faculties and 
the way one influence the Other are essentially outside thinking, that is, they are not given to 
knowledge, and therefore, they are by themselves mysterious), consequently, it cannot be reduced to 
thought; thought, on the contrary, is only an effect of effects, that is, it is only an effect of incorporeal 
transformation.  
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him. In the mystery of lovers, friends, enemies, words and matter, in a 
labyrinth of an infinitely straight line, in the interiority of an eternal time, life 
sprouts like tropical mushrooms.6 It sprouts out of a perpetual panopticon, in 
culture, in the exchange of gestures and gazes, in their immanent misreading, 
in a situation that is pregnant with the potential to activate language, the 
system of signs, in an infinitely circular movement (that is an a priori field of 
some sort of a system of signs is required to make sense of gestures and gazes 
as gestures and gazes, and yet language, in use, only activates itself within the 
play of gestures and gazes, that is, within a context). This actually means: 
“one learns the [language] game by watching [my italic] how others play” 
(Wittgenstein, 1958, p. 27e). It is only in the theatrical, in the immanent field of 
life, that the language will unfold itself. As Wittgenstein writes, “to imagine a 
language means to imagine a form of life” (Wittgenstein, 1958, p. ge).     
Even a reading triggers a virtual opening, a ‘silent dialogue’ with the master; 
that is, a reading cannot be a monologue. Though the disciple admires and is 
grateful to the master, his very image, his gesture, his gaze, his deception, and 
his authority over him infiltrates, unsettles and decentres the soul and 
unlocks a sea of perplexities in the disciple, and he finds the master extremely 
offensive7 - “as a disciple, he is challenged by the master who speaks within 
him and before him, to reproach him for making this challenge and to reject it 
in advance, having elaborated it before him; and having interiorized the 
                                                          
6 Borges, for instance, has advocated the eternity of time, in his short-fiction, titled “Death and the 
Compos,” through a mysterious labyrinth, which is constituted by an infinitely straight and 
indivisible line. If eternal time, like the mysterious straight line, for him, is indivisible, every problem 
posed in time will also essentially be going to stay with time, that is, no problem is going to end itself 
with the finitude of beings. What Borges says is that, along the line; there will be yet another 
detectives and criminals playing the same game, even if, the detective, the hero of his story, is killed at 
the end of this game (story). The relevance of the story here is that it implicitly suggests that life leaves 
traces, as it unfolds itself in the mystery of an eternal time (Borges, 1998, pp. 147 - 56)  
7 Soul here only means an intrinsic principle, the governing logic that organises one’s gestures, gazes 
and words. However, in a theatrical unfolding, because of the repeated infiltration, unsettling and 
decentring, the soul unfolds itself like a fugitive. Foucault, for instance, takes soul as soul-subject, and 
refuses to grant it any property of extension. Soul then is nothing but a point of view and it therefore, 
in itself, outlaws any quality of extension – that is, soul is not a substance (Foucault, 2005, pp. 54 – 60).  
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master, he is also challenged by the disciple that he himself is” (Derrida, 2001, 
p. 37). ““Caught in the act,” like the “infant” who, by definition and as his 
name indicates, cannot speak and above all must not answer back,” the 
disciple finds himself deceived and, begins to feel the pressure for standing 
for himself and is, at last, forced to strike back, with the untainted pleasure of 
purging the master of his position, with a force of deconstruction (Ibid, 2001, 
pp. 36 – 7).  
Whatever maybe the reasons, his purging of the master, in a relationship, in 
an immanent field of forces, cannot be reduced to a mere act of writing, to a 
play of signifiers; it is nothing but an act of vengeance, a childish instinct. The 
master, on the other hand, when challenged and forced to reply to the call of 
the disciple, ignores altogether the disciple’s attempt of purging and, 
purposefully avoids mentioning it in writing, and rather engages him in a 
philosophical dialogue, and thereby, reinforces his position – in their 
dialogue, the master has even cared to point out to the disciple his inability to 
think the exterior of philosophy (Direk and Lawlor, 1988. pp. 91 – 111).8 
However, it has to be made clear here that what actually recuperates and 
gives voice to the disciple is nothing but the very language of the master itself 
– his deception.9 In a play of the theatrical, at the crossing of the threshold, the 
very line that divides interior from the exterior, variations are inherent to 
                                                          
8 Foucault’s replies to Derrida’s critique that appeared in Writing and Difference has opened a dialogue, 
between them, on the problem of Cartesian cogito and exterior. Derrida in this critique of Foucault has 
focused on the few pages that Foucault dedicated to Descartes in Madness and Civilization. In his 
critique, Derrida has suggested that in the Meditations, Descartes takes madness to its extreme, rather 
than excludes it. He asserts that out of a universal doubt, a hyperbolic movement of suspicion that 
everything around is an illusion, in a movement of madness that cogito actually emerges, and 
therefore, it is not exterior to, but resides at the very heart of philosophy. In his reply that has first 
appeared as an appendix of Madness and Civilization in 1972, through a careful reading of Descartes, 
Foucault insists that the illusion that madness creates is fundamentally different from sensory 
illusions and dreams. In a state of madness, one must lose one own reason and, therefore, madness 
cannot be included.  
9 One finds a similar situation unfolding itself in Astra Taylor’s documentary, Zizek!, performed by 
Taylor and Slavoj Zizek, when Zizek encounters Jacques Lacan, in a telecast lecture, on TV (Taylor, 
2005, 00: 20: 27 – 00: 24: 38).  
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power. The theatrical essentially carries the gestures, the gazes and the words 
to their very limits, to a point where they cannot avoid the encounter with 
their own unconscious, that is, it is actually in relation to the master that the 
disciple gains a voice, a voice that is exactly the exterior of the master, his 
unthought.10 It is only in the theatrical, in the immanent field of life that the 
unthought will play out itself: it is through the disciple that the master 
encounters the voice of his own unthought. 
The unthought never plays out itself according to a Hegelian law, according 
to an internal logic. It could not merely be the silenced (a silenced that is 
determined within an arbitrary relation between thought and language) in a 
play of signifiers, in an order that preserves the silence. The unthought rather 
is that which repetitively pollutes thought from outside, that which endlessly 
deterritorialises and reterritorialises thought, and therefore, it cannot be 
accessed from within. For that reason, Foucault totally rejects granting 
sovereignty to a self-deconstructive “text,” and rather sees texts transgressing 
themselves, their own limits. Text in itself can never be self-deconstructive, 
that is, the forces that set language into motion, that set the diachronic 
unfolding of language in time are external to language itself. Language here – 
since it cannot successfully block transgression – is nothing but an objective 
phenomenon. It is out there, in the void that separates the subject from the 
object, that which is between the subject and the reality (Foucault, 1990). This 
is the reason why, Foucault in one of the most difficult chapters of The Order 
of Things poses this question: “what is language, how can we find a way 
round it in order to make it appear in itself, in all its plenitude?” (Foucault, 
1994, p. 306).  
                                                          
10 Foucault, in “A Preface to Transgression,” in a similar formulation, writes “we have not in the least 
liberated sexuality, though we have, to be exact, carried it to its limits: the limit of consciousness, 
because it ultimately dictates the only possible reading of our unconscious...” (Foucault, 1980, p. 30). 
84 | P a g e   C h a p t e r  I I I  
 
On the other hand, in Derrida’s works, the dominant experience of language 
is from the inside, that is, the objectivity of language is either absent or very 
limited. The outside of language is merely the violent breaches, the gaps of 
silence that language carries within itself. Hence there is nothing as such to 
refer to as an absolute silence, a silence that falls strictly under the realm of 
unthinkable, and therefore, unspeakable. Silence rather is nothing but a 
strategy, since the order is an absolute order, that is, reason in itself is 
unlimited. Descombes cites Derrida: “it is only to itself that an appeal against 
it [reason] can be brought, only in itself that a protest against it can be made; 
on its own terrain, it leaves us no other recourse than to stratagem and 
strategy” (Descombes, 1980, p. 138). The only available strategy, Derrida 
suggests, is silence, the dissemblance of nothing but dissemblance. Derrida 
writes, “within the dimension of historicity in general, which is to be 
confused neither with some ahistorical eternity, nor with an empirically 
determined moment of the history of facts, silence plays the irreducible role of 
that which bears and haunts language, outside and against which alone 
language can emerge – “against” here simultaneously designating the content 
from which form takes off by force, and the adversary against whom I assure 
and reassure myself by force” (Derrida, 2001, pp. 65 – 66). When speaking to 
the Master pretend to speak the Master’s language, that essentially means, 
embrace nothing but difference.  
Nevertheless, silence is something never to be uttered, it should always be 
kept outside all language, that is, it will only fade itself away ‘with the coming 
of day, [with] the dawn of language’ and, with its fading the pure difference 
itself fades away (Descombes, 1980, p. 141); what finally triumphs is only the 
rule of reason.11 The equivocity of utterance – the hypocrisy, the lies and the 
                                                          
11 This is actually the criticism that Derrida has levelled against Foucault’s archaeology of silence in 
Madness and Civilization and Levinasian dispute against Hegelian totality. 
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state of doubleness of philosophical language – in itself, according to Derrida, 
opens the theatrical possibilities – the theatrical here then is a possibility 
inherent to language that is within language itself. 
II 
The sign I, in a self-deconstructive text, is always constituted within the text, 
and is played out in a differential relation to other signs. It is fundamentally 
outside the vision, and in principle not a presence-at-hand; the I forever is an 
unsettled entity. To Derrida, a sign, in a differential relation, carries the mark 
of that difference, that is, it has to be deeply different from its original identity 
(if at all there is one), to constitute itself as a mark within a rule-governed 
system: Derrida for instance writes, ‘like the stigme of every mark’ [even the 
mark I is not an exceptional case here] ‘no matter how fine the point maybe,’  
made on a paper, with a ballpoint-pen, is already divided within itself 
(Derrida, 1988, p. 49). This essentially means, the I is not unconcealment, it 
fundamentally escapes the logic of presence, and therefore, it cannot be 
grasped within the Heideggerian question, the question of Being; rather the I 
is a sheer coming, an arrival. The I, in a differential relation, is temporal by 
character (Derrida, 1988, p. 53). In its present, the I is not only differential 
within itself, but also in relation to other elements, within the system. 
Elsewhere, Derrida has argued that what is absent is always present; it is in 
fact presented ‘alongside’ with what is presently present; for that reason, 
Derrida claims, the Aristotelian notion of the ‘now’ is not (as Heidegger 
allows it to be) presence in itself (Derrida, 1982, pp. 53 – 7): that is, “what is 
past and what is to come also becomes present (Anwesendes) namely as 
outside the expanse of unconcealment” (Derrida, 1982, p. 34).  
Though the I is split in itself, unsettled and in a permanent flux, Derrida 
places it firmly within the sovereignty of a self-deconstructive text. The 
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“limited Inc a b c,” a rhetoric directed against John R Searle’s “A Reply to 
Derrida,” for instance, has shown how words (even signatures, proper nouns 
and pronouns such as: JD, Searle, Derrida and I or you), in a play of 
differential relations, repeat themselves with difference. Iterability, Derrida 
suggests, is a necessary structure of language, that is; language, any human 
languages, for that matter, always repeats itself with differences; and it is the 
very iterability of language that creates effects, such as, the permanence of the 
text.12 The human language, if at all iterable in itself, that is, if at all 
differentiating in itself, as Derrida would suggest, then every act of 
communication, both written and spoken, and above all every human 
experience would be reducible to, nothing but, iterable graphemes of 
experience.  
What defines Derrida’s program of deconstructing the metaphysic of 
presence, in general, and the deconstruction of the Husserlian notion of 
intentionality, in particular, is that even though he categorically denies 
human mind the quality of intentionality, his project does not actually reject 
intentionality altogether, rather intentionality, in his scheme, is anchored in 
language. It is nothing but a quality of language itself, that is communication 
is not totally anchored in human intent to-be-in-contact-with, to 
communicate, it is rather only an effect of the iterability of language itself. 
Derrida writes: “What holds for the receiver [of a letter] holds also, for the 
same reasons, for the sender or the producer. To write is to produce a mark 
that will constitute a sort of machine [my italic] which is productive in turn, 
and which my future disappearance will not, in principle, hinder in its 
                                                          
12 One of the major objections that Prof. John R Searle levels, in “Reiterating the Differences: A Reply to 
Derrida,” against Derrida’s text titled “Signature Event Context,” on the theory of speech acts, 
developed mainly by J L Austin, is on ‘a simple confusion’ (as he puts it) in Derrida’s text between 
iterability and permanence (Searle, 1977, p. 200). Searle here claims that, besides being essentially 
visual, written word, by and large, is permanent, when compared to spoken word, and therefore, it is 
the permanence of the written word that actually produces iterability.  
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functioning, offering things and itself to be read and to be rewritten” 
(Derrida, 1988, p. 8). In the same page, Derrida continues, “for a writing to be 
a writing it must continue to “act” and to be readable even when what is 
called the author of the writing no longer answers for what he has written, for 
what he seems to have signed, be it because of a temporary absence, because 
he is dead or, more generally, because he has not employed his absolutely 
actual and present intention or attention, the plenitude of his desire to say 
what he means, in order to sustain what seems to be written “on his name”” 
(Ibid, p. 8). Therefore, for Derrida, “it is iterability [the condition of the 
emergence of the mark] itself, that which is remarkable in the mark, passing 
between [my italic] the re- of the repeated and the re- of the repeating, 
traversing and transforming repetition” (Derrida, 1988, p. 53).    
Here if the written words, the totality of the graphematic experience, in itself 
is iterable, then the intention or the attention directed towards the written 
words cannot be selfsame, that is, it cannot be a stable presence; an intention 
directed towards an iterable, in no case, will be ‘fulfilled, actualised,’ and 
therefore, will never be totally present to itself and to its object; “it is divided 
and deported in advance, by its iterability, towards others, removed [ecartee] 
in advance from itself” (Derrida, 1988, p. 56); this is the reason why, Derrida 
suggests, the sender and the receiver, of the shopping-list, are meant to be 
different, even if they are the same ego, even if they are the same person 
(Derrida, 1988, p. 49). Intention, according to Derrida, is in itself differing and 
deferring, from its very inception, in other words, human consciousness is 
implanted in language, and for that reason, they cannot be examined 
separately.  
If human consciousness is embedded in language, so is the context within 
which both language confronts/constitutes consciousness and consciousness 
articulates language itself; this is to say: the iterability of language suggests, 
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for Derrida, that language carries with itself an infinity of new contexts.13 It, 
therefore, can undermine any given context, and transform itself to go well 
with any possible context. With its iterative structure, human language can 
‘cut off from all absolute responsibility, from consciousness as the ultimate 
authority;’ being an orphan, it is in fact ‘separated at birth even from the 
assistance of its father’ – the writer, who wrote it (Derrida, 1988, p. 8). Thus, 
one may conclude that what Derrida imagines and suggests in his writings is 
a play within a grand system – a system that is, in itself iterable, and therefore, 
unlimited and all inclusive. Such a system actually denies direct encounter, 
since a direct encounter can sustain itself only if there is a visible crack in the 
system, an opening to a possible outside. 
In such a system, since every mark is structurally bound to every other mark, 
in a differential relation, the iterative structure within every single mark – to 
cite from Derrida’s own words, the already of the already-split from his 
sentence: ‘the stigme [point, in Greek language] of every mark, already split,’ 
signals the nature of the split itself (Derrida, 1988, p. 49) – generates and 
carries within them a reducible shame; that is, to put differently, since the 
iterability of every single mark, the differential structure implanted within 
each of them, is always already-there, that is, (even before they themselves 
recognize their own structure), there is nothing to be proud of their iterability. 
                                                          
13 For instance, from a Derridean point of view, Philippe Delerm’s story of knife, that we have cited and 
analysed at the beginning, would only communicate itself to me, the present writer, only if language 
from its very inception, carries with it an infinite number of new context (though I have to make it 
clear that that story has a different function in the totality of this chapter, here it is actually used to 
show, the play of the (un)conscious flows, upon which the entire system of signs rests on; the point I 
am actually trying to develop here is: the real drama (the theatrical) is in fact played out outside the 
‘text,’ and for that reason, what the text carries with it is only the ramifications; we have already seen 
while reading Delerm that a sign is only an effect of effects. To put differently, the context, in which a 
reader encounters the text, is not given in it: in order to set the text into motion, the context ought to 
be outside it. We will come back to it when we deal, in Foucault, the play between self, context and 
language).         
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Iterability of a mark is not something that it earned; rather it is only an 
outcome of the very differential relation that it has with other similar marks 
within the system. Iterability is something (like the cancerous cell in a body) 
that the system implants in the mark for nothing but, the uninterrupted 
functioning of the system itself; and precisely for that reason, even with its 
iterable structure, the mark can never be an outsider, or even an outcast. This 
is exactly the reason why even Derrida himself always insists on secrets that 
are never to be disclosed, that must always be kept outside of all languages. If 
his project against reason has any limitation, it is actually because of his 
reluctance to consider anything exterior to reason itself, and more precisely to 
language itself; he is unwilling to consider anything unthinkable, anything 
outside thought itself; to him, “there is nothing outside the text,” meaning 
human experiences, on the whole, are graphemes of experience (Derrida, 
2002, p. 163).14  
If Derrida stresses on the continuity of tradition, Foucault develops his 
critique of reason based on discontinuities. He may look less sophisticated 
and traditional at first glance, his critique because of its very complexity 
demands thought. When Derrida declares his war from within, Foucault takes 
the battle to the very limits of Western reason, the very line that divides the 
Western ratio from its Other. If Derrida is cunning enough to educate himself, 
to enable him to stand up face-to-face and speak to the Master in his 
language, repeat the Master, but with a difference, Foucault’s is an attack of a 
nomadic outcast, devoted to a guerrilla tactic against the Master, directed from 
the abandoned suburbs of the philosophers’ city.15 If Derrida hides himself, 
                                                          
14 Without temporality and difference, the present (and presence in present) are inassessable. The text 
and the trace are not mere human language; rather they are inscribed in matter, as the very condition 
of its materiality. Of Grammatology, for instance, mentions about arche-speech, the divine inscription in 
the heart and the soul (Derrida, 2002, p. 17).    
15 If Derrida (Algerian migrant) is an outsider, who pretends to be an insider, then Foucault (French 
citizen) is an outcast.  
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like a modern-day spy or a Trojan-horse, bluffs the Master and then aims at 
him, Foucault hastily declares himself as the enemy, a force to reckon with, 
and resorts to direct encounters. Juxtaposing them can only illuminate their 
tactics and strategies.  
In Foucault’s works, the I, on the other hand, transform itself outside but in 
relation to the text, that is, the I is exterior to the text itself. The man himself, 
Foucault the celebrated writer, is outside of his works, opening a space for 
scanty speculations. The man leaves no trace of himself in his works. Maurice 
Blanchot’s choice of title for his celebrated work on Foucault, “Michel 
Foucault as I Imagine Him,” suggests such an absence – the very indication, 
in the title itself, of the faculty of imagination at play derives force from such 
an absence. Yet to know the man, who wrote those brilliant works, one has no 
other choice but to rely totally upon his writings (that is, one actually has to 
explore those very gaps that the absence of the writer has left open). After all, 
his works, their quality, their style and, in particular, the intensity with which 
they have been written, suggest the fact that the man himself has spent most 
of his life writing. 
The very absence of the temporal subjectivity in the language marks the 
removal of death, from playing out itself, transforming the language 
essentially to a pure spatial objectivity. It then attains a transcendental being, 
affecting the self from outside, constituting and directing its desires towards 
their own limits, touching and transforming the soul itself. One thing that 
attracted Foucault to Raymond Roussel is his reluctance to disclose the key to 
enter into his own writing. Roussel fanatically excludes himself from his 
writing, leaving, before the reader, no clue of the experiences of both himself 
and his characters. His writings unfold itself according to some internal laws, 
some impersonal structures, through a stylish and elaborate description of 
objects and actions, ultimately neglecting his own thoughts and feelings. 
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However, it also unfolds itself without leaving any traces of a definite 
method, without suggesting the reader any common standards. Foucault 
quotes Roussel, “Once outside the realm of billiard, I continued to use the 
same method. I selected a word and linked it to another with the preposition a 
(to); and these two words, understood in some other way than their original 
meaning, provided me with a new creation.... I must say that at first this was 
difficult work” (Foucault, 1986, p. 31) 
Foucault still suggests that what makes Roussel difficult is “not that Roussel’s 
explanation is obscure or inadequate; for each of his words, it is absolutely 
efficient. Nor is it a question of there being something hidden; perhaps 
Roussel doesn’t tell all, but neither is he hiding anything” (Foucault, 1986, p. 
31), rather it is the language itself; since language, in Roussel, being 
completely entangled in its own difference, it “begins to weave its threads 
with a double motion of return and retreat” (Foucault, 1986, p. 20). The 
repetition, the doubling up of words and preposition, according to Foucault, 
frequently shapes language, constitutes it in such a way that it in itself, in 
Roussel’s writing, forms an intricate labyrinth. In his writing, language makes 
itself “go through the most complicated course and simultaneously take the 
most direct path in such a way that the following paradox leaps out as 
evident: the most direct line [like Borges has to say, about time, in his short-
fiction, “Death and the Compos”] is also the most perfect circle, which, in 
coming to a close, suddenly becomes straight, linear, and as economical as 
light” (Foucault, 1986, p. 31).  
The face, in Foucault’s case, is that exteriority that which essentially marks 
and locates identity in time–space; if it is that which fixes the identity, then 
writing, according to Foucault, is that labyrinth that repeatedly erases the 
face, leaving nothing but mere traces; writing in itself is actually the relentless 
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unsettling of identity.16 In The Archaeology of Knowledge, Foucault writes, “I am 
no doubt not the only one who writes in order to have no face. Do not ask who 
I am and do not ask me to remain the same: leave it to our bureaucrats and our 
police to see that our papers are in order. At least spare us their mortality when 
we write’” (Foucault, 1972, p. 17). To unsettle face is to become someone else, 
that is, to become someone other than oneself, whenever a mark is made, with 
a ballpoint-pen, on the paper; the instant, when the ink, from that ballpoint-
pen, stains and dries itself up on the paper, leaving a definite mark on it, a 
metamorphosis, in oneself, transforms the self to something other than itself.  
Writing, for Foucault, is one case in which the encounter between the self and 
the language, in a certain context, attains a form of circularity that, in itself, is 
not the return to the same; rather, one could only say, it is the return of the 
difference. In a definite context, the moment when the writer lifts his hand that 
holds the ballpoint-pen and makes a definite mark, on a piece of paper, and 
differentiates it from the rest of its kind, within that same system of marks, he 
himself loses time (that is, the time that differentiates marks from each other; 
the time that is linear; the time that runs from past to present and from present 
to future has existence only in discourse, and therefore, it no longer is time).  
Consequently, every intuition (even if it is not directly on time) implicitly 
involves an intuition on a lost time, an indivisible time;17 that means, an 
                                                          
16 In a society dominated by characters and perceptions on them, in a society that “tends to be arrested 
by the activities of faces that come and go, emerge and disappear,” Foucault writes, anonymity opens 
a ‘chance for being heard.’ With a book without an author, reading itself becomes theatrical, a kind of 
staging that gives force to different tendencies within a text, channels them towards their outside, 
towards the field of relations of power. In the interview, “The Masked Philosopher,” Foucault, for 
instance, has cited the story of the European psychologists, in a village in darkest Africa, doing a film 
test on the natives. When asked for their responses on the film, the natives reacted that all they have 
been seeing were ‘the movement of the light and shadow through the trees’ (Foucault, 1990, p. 323).  
17 Kant teaches us that time is a priori and is only given in thinking; yet the moment when one starts to 
think about something (like time) that is essentially characterless, he is not only thinking about it, but 
also substituting characters. However, Kant’s proposition gains absolute weight, when we also take 
into consideration that, to hold the non-time, that is to hold the discourse on time, in space, there must 
be an a priori  time, a time that is eternal and indivisible.    
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intention is split, in itself, from its very birth, as it is simultaneously an 
intention directed against an object or a system of objects and also an 
intention directed to make sense of the essence of an eternal time, a lost time.18 
To put differently, a conscious intention is not totally given to itself (that is, it 
can never be totally present to itself) rather it carries with itself (and is driven 
by) an infinite number of unconscious drives. Writing, for that reason, is not a 
play within a system of marks; rather it is much more complex than it actually 
appears. Since writing unfolds itself at the very expense of time; as it unfolds 
itself in a non-time, any relationship unfolded between the self and the 
language innately lacks any form of objectivity, that is; since neither the 
language that constitutes the self nor the self that articulates language is 
steady, there can be no objective relation between them; for this very reason, 
the moment of articulating language is also the moment of constituting the 
self. The Greeks, Foucault has suggested, have identified it positively, and 
they linked writing the personal notebooks, the hupomnemata, with the care of 
the self (Foucault, 1997, p. 217).  
In the Greek context, at least in their high culture, the act of writing is 
intricately linked not only with a concern for the other (for the time or for that 
particular present), but also equally with the concern of a concern for 
oneself.19 Alcibiades, in the Platonic dialogue titled Alcibiades, for that reason 
alone, can become an excellent king (a man ahead of his time), if only he 
concerns himself to take care of himself, if only he participates in the very 
culture of ‘taking care of oneself’ (Foucault, 2005, pp. 31 – 39). In the dialogue 
                                                          
18 We already have seen how intentionality functions in Derrida; there intentionality is essentially a 
quality of language itself, therefore, every mark, within a system of differential relations, is ‘already’ 
split.  
19 The Other (the otherness of one’s own body or, for that matter, even a fellow human), like the time, 
can only be imagined in discourse, since its transcendental existence demands intuition; this is the 
reason why, the Greeks developed an aesthetic relation to the body (bios); for them, it is much more 
attractive to consider the body as the material for an aesthetic piece of art, than, it is, to locate its 
essence.     
94 | P a g e   C h a p t e r  I I I  
 
that takes place between Socrates and the young Alcibiades, Alcibiades 
confirms before Socrates that his ultimate ambition is to rule the Greek city-
state; however, as the dialogue unfolds itself, Socrates comes to the conclusion 
that the young Alcibiades is actually “unaware of the object itself, of the 
nature of the object he has to take care of…He does not know the object of 
good government, and that is why he must pay attention to himself” 
(Foucault, 2005, pp. 37 – 8). Here the goodness of the ‘good government’ can 
only be entirely appreciated, if one is able to locate oneself in (and to rise 
above) one’s own present; an excellent king, for that reason, is supposed to be 
the one who has the courage to constantly invent himself; who has the 
audacity to transform himself to a man ahead of his own time, to a man who 
has that decisive spiritual strength to imagine, for himself and for the others, a 
different time; so suggests Socrates: if Alcibiades still wants to govern others, it 
is time for him to take care of himself.  
The Greeks, essentially, made the encounter between the self and the 
language very intricate; to them, the care of the self (or the taking care of 
oneself) is much more than any form of asceticism previously seen: the drive 
to engage with the body as the material for an aesthetic piece of art grows out 
of an unrest with the very pedagogical backdrop in which one previously 
located the body as the locus of a stable ego; however, Alcibiades, though has 
gained reasonably superior training, has an awfully weak pedagogical 
background, when compared to the Persian kings and yet he himself does not 
recognise it.20  
                                                          
20 Socrates, when engaging with Alcibiades, for instance, has compared Alcibiades with both, his 
possible internal and external enemies, especially, the Persian kings (Foucault, 1995, p. 34), and locates 
in him a pedagogical weakness. He convinces Alcibiades that, even if he has been privileged with a rich 
aristocratic ancestry, he has not been educated properly for the fulfilment of his own desires; 
therefore, to overcome his own weakness, Socrates has suggested Alcibiades that he must spent time 
and effort to educate and to transform himself.     
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This is the reason why, Socrates, unlike many other lovers of Alcibiades, at 
last decides to speak to this young man: Alcibiades is truly different from men 
of his age; he is not quite satisfied ‘with his traditional status, with the 
privileges of his birth and heritage’ (Foucault, 1997, p. 229); “during his 
adolescence, Alcibiades was desirable and had many admirers, but now that 
his beard is growing, his suitors are disappearing. Earlier, he had rejected 
them all in the bloom of his beauty because he wanted to be dominant, not 
dominated. He refused to let himself be dominated in youth, but now he 
wants to dominate others” (Foucault, 1997, p. 229); he starts desiring personal 
power over others and wishes ‘to transform his statutory privilege and pre-
eminence into political action,’ through governing others (Foucault, 2005, p. 
33). It is at this point that Socrates – as the voice of the gods, from above, 
inspires him to speak to the young Alcibiades (Foucault, 2005, p. 33) – appears 
before him, and succeeds where other lovers of Alcibiades have failed; and 
eventually, between them, they make a pact: thereby Alcibiades finally 
submits himself to Socrates’ love, not physically, but spiritually (Foucault, 
1997, p. 229).   
But what demands Alcibiades and Socrates to listen to Socrates and to the call 
of the Gods, respectively? Why the Other, Socrates in the case of Alcibiades 
and the Gods in the case of Socrates, has to be taken into consideration while 
practicing the care of the self? One possible answer is: the experience of the 
care of the self, for the Greeks, one must understand, is never a psychological 
one, rather an ontological one; it unfolds itself in the specificity of a given 
context. What the Greeks discovered is: the outside can be folded. They, like 
Baudelaire’s modern painter, are not actually interested in locating the 
essence of light, rather they are much more attracted to the folding of light 
itself (Baudelaire, 1964). With this the Greeks found out that, if the outside can 
actually be folded towards itself, then the self, which is essentially the inside 
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of that folded outside, requires regular care, as it is susceptible to an 
otherwise unstoppable muddling: the chaos of the phenomenal world can 
easily hold back the very sanity of the self from itself.  
A reading of Socrates, Seneca, Pliny confirms the importance of techniques of 
life in ancient Greeks; the problems that bothered them the most were not 
those about afterlife or whether God exists or not, rather the problem of 
which techniques [tekhne] do I have to use in order to live well as I ought to 
live? For the Greek citizens of the fourth or fifth century and even according 
to Plato’s Alcibiades, taking care of oneself is to enable oneself to take care of 
the city. Foucault, for instance, has quoted one of Epictetus’s exercises to do 
while walking in every morning for the mastery of techniques of the self: one 
should look around and search for things one could master. “And if you meet 
a consular figure you say, “Is the consul something I can master?” No, so I 
have nothing to do. If I meet a beautiful girl or beautiful boy, is their beauty, 
their desirability, something that depends on me, and so on?” (Foucault, 1997, 
p. 270). The idea of freeing one from oneself through techniques of the self, 
aiming for the mastery of one’s own desires and passions, is neither a 
hermeneutical relation, nor an attempt to fix a pre-given identity: it is rather 
an “art” of giving form. Foucault writes: “Self is a reflexive pronoun, and it 
has two meanings. Auto means “the same,” but it also conveys the notion of 
identity. The latter meaning shifts the question from “What is this self?” to 
“Departing from what ground shall I find my identity?”” (Foucault, 1997, p. 
230).     
The young Alcibiades, nevertheless, had thought that he could find the self in 
a dialectical movement; he thought, by taking care of the body, he would be 
able to take care of the self, and this is exactly what compelled Socrates to talk 
to him. The self can never be a substance (your body), neither can it be your 
clothing nor the tools that you use, or even your possessions, rather it has to 
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be found in the very principle (the soul) that makes use of one’s own tools and 
possessions; and therefore, the mere care of the body and the possessions will 
never lead to the taking care of the self. To put it differently, if self is the 
inside of the folded outside, if it is constituted through the folding of the 
outside towards itself, then the soul is that principle with which one folds the 
outside. It is that principle that uses the tools and possessions, at one’s 
disposal. Taking care of the self, consequently, becomes nothing but the 
taking care of one’s own activities. Yet soul (the principle that governs one’s 
actions) is never given to itself, that is, to examine itself it has to look at itself 
in a similar element; that is, to examine itself, it has to depend on another soul 
of its kind. 
This is the reason why, the pedagogical weakness that Alcibiades carries with 
him will never reveal itself before him; this is exactly the reason why, the 
Gods (in a Freudian sense, the unconscious) have to be there to inform 
Socrates his own duty. The other, for that reason, functions like a mirror, 
informing the soul its own limitations (Foucault, 1997, p. 231). We have 
already seen, while re-reading Derrida’s narration of his encounter with his 
master (Foucault himself), which appears at the beginning of “Cogito and the 
History of Madness,” how the soul’s relation with its own kind functions: we 
already have seen, how the disciple gives voice to the Master’s unconscious, 
and vice versa (Derrida, 2001, pp. 36 – 76). But then why it has to be so? The 
answer to this riddle has already been before us: we have already seen that 
every thought is, at the same time, a thought directed towards both an object 
(or a system of objects) and a lost time, and for that very reason, they are 
doomed to be incomplete. 
It is within the context of the care of the self that writing hupomnemata, 
personal notebooks, in antiquity, attains a radically new turn. Writing, for 
more than one reason, has finally become intrinsically linked to the care of the 
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self. Writing, on the one hand, sets into motion a circular relationship between 
the self and the language; a circularity that is nothing but the very return of 
the difference. As the moment of accessing the realm of discourse is also, for 
the self, the moment of losing time, the self essentially loses here the very 
sense of stability. This sense of instability, within the self, essentially 
unhinges, infinitely doubles and alters both the visible and the articulable, 
stimulating an inexplicable flux of a Heraclitean kind.21 On the other hand, 
writing also helps writer, in this perpetual movement, by opening the self to 
the gaze of others, by letting others to decipher and locate one’s own self. 
Thus the soul (the principle that governs one’s actions) that is not given for 
one’s own decipherment is eventually being objectified and examined in the 
gaze of others. 
It is actually in a specific context, around a specific philosophical principle – a 
principle that is deeply different from that of our own age – that the entire 
culture of the care of the self flourished in antiquity. In a missive detailing the 
daily life to Lucilius, Seneca, for instance, has recalled the moral maxim that 
“we should live as if we lived in plain sight of all men,” (Foucault, 1997, p. 
217). Through the missive, one not only surrenders oneself to the watchful 
gaze of the others, but also “put the correspondent in the place of an inner 
god (Foucault, 1997, p. 217); to correspond here then is nothing less than 
setting a face-to-face meeting.22 Foucault writes, “to write is thus to “show 
oneself,” to project oneself into view, to make one’s own face appear in the 
                                                          
21 Deleuze, for instance, has written: “The Heraclitean element has always gone deeper in Foucault than 
in Heidegger” (Deleuze, 1988, p. 113). The fold of Being, in Foucault, will only come at the third stage 
(not in the first two stages, the ontology of knowledge and the ontology of power), it will come only 
when he encounters the Greek method of folding the forces so as to be self-active. Once forces are 
folded towards itself, the outside will constitute a coextensive inside (Deleuze, 1988, pp. 113 – 114).   
22 Seneca, for instance, writes, “I thank you for writing to me so often; for you are revealing yourself to 
me [te mihi ostendis] in the only way you can. I never receive a letter from you without being in your 
company forthwith. If the pictures of our absent friends are pleasing to us...how much more pleasant 
is a letter, which brings us real traces, real evidence of an absent friend! For that which is sweetest 
when we meet face to face is afforded by the impress of a friend’s hand upon his letter – recognition” 
(Foucault, 1997, p. 216).   
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other’s presence” (Foucault, 1997, p. 216), thus the correspondence not just 
communicates but also establishes the reciprocity of gaze and examination.23  
Hence the missive, for the Greeks, not just moves the recipient, but it, through 
moving the recipient, also radically transforms the writer. Writing, for them, 
has thus been a particularly complex activity: writing at once sets the self in 
motion, and presents the self that is caught in the very flex before the other, 
for further introspection. For that reason, unlike Derrida’s theory of iterability 
and graphemes of experience, for the Greeks, the self, in the specificity of a 
context, touches the language, from without, essentially, feeling, transforming 
each other. Foucault’s journey to antiquity has actually developed an 
extremely useful conception of language. It systematically weakens the 
mechanical repetition of difference (iterability) and gives the subject some 
leverage. It allows him to believe that both the visible and the articulate can 
actually be folded, and advises him to encounter and change himself. 
III 
Well, my mother told my father 
Just before hmm, I was born  
"I got a boy child's comin' 
He's gonna be, he's gonna be a "Rollin' Stone"  
Sure 'nough, he's a "Rollin' Stone" 
Muddy Waters, 1950 
The old proverb, “A rolling stone gathers no moss,” credited to Publius Syrus 
of the first century BC, has more than one interpretation. Yet I have used it 
here to examine more closely the state of thought in a state of homelessness, 
in a state of infinite possibilities, that is; in a state in which the movement of 
                                                          
23 This mode of introspection is fundamentally different from both the Christian tradition and modern 
psychiatry, as it neither depends itself on self’s own decipherment of its truth or on counselling and 
aid in a fundamentally hierarchical system. The missive rather summons the other within oneself, 
establishes reciprocity of gaze, and activates a mode of introspection.        
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language (Francoise Collin for instance has written about Blanchot) “directs 
us not towards what gathers together but rather towards what disperses, not 
towards what connects but rather towards what disjoins, not towards work 
but rather towards the absence of work [...], so that the central point towards 
which we seem to be pulled as we write is nothing but the absence of center, 
the lack of origin” (Pelbart, 2000, pp. 201 – 202). This passion for/of the 
dispersed space, the space without place (in a time that infinitely erases the 
very presence), runs against Heidegger, against Being and the security of 
home (of the commune); and this is the passion that, in Foucault, denies 
thinking both innate or of acquired qualities: though thinking, first of all, is 
seeing and speaking, it actually unfolds in that very space that separates them 
from each other, carrying both seeing and speaking to their own limits. It 
consequently is nothing but a chance that comes from the outside. It “in the 
field of power as problem...involves the transmission of particular features: 
[thinking] is a dice-throw. What the dice-throw represents is that thinking 
always comes from outside” (Deleuze, 1988, p. 117).  
The contemporary claustrophobia,24 however, has brought the outside (that 
was previously linked to the domain of madness, literature and revolution) 
closer to everyday life. Foucault, for instance, has never written a history of 
private life; rather what he has considered for his writings are: the conditions 
that govern the way in which one’s relation to oneself constitutes a private life 
(Deleuze, 1988, p. 116); the Greeks found out that without the outside folding 
towards itself creating a self within man, man, as a force among forces, is ill-
equipped to fold forces that compose him (Deleuze, 1988, p. 114). The Greeks 
succeed in folding forces, and they discovered that forces can be folded only 
by deploying appropriate strategies, and with Baudelairian aesthetics, 
                                                          
24 A situation of political and psychic strangulation, in which one finds oneself thoroughly disarmed. 
Pelbart, for instance, has suggested that the contemporary claustrophobia has become an index of 
thought without outside, a world without exteriority (Pelbart, 2000, p. 202). 
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Foucault has suggested in “What is Enlightenment?” that, modern man has 
become closer to the outside than ever before.25 To lose oneself in ‘the eternal 
within the present’ also means to lose oneself in that which has no location 
(that which is dispersed); that is, when man develops, within him, an attitude 
to grasp the eternal and the “heroic” within the present, he himself will 
become an ascetic and is no more fascinated with the temporal of the time 
(fashion). He becomes intimately related to the dispersed and the 
interminable – the ceaseless outside. 
One can actually pose a series of questions: if thinking lies at the very limit of 
both seeing and speaking, at the space that divides them from each other, 
then what unfolds it at that space and takes it to its own outside? Under what 
condition does thinking itself become an object of desire? If the self lies 
outside the language, at the very margin of the void that holds language, 
what actually moves them to touch each other? What is this eternal within the 
fleeting present? Is this flicker of eternal, within the very surge, within the 
fleeting present, time itself?26  
The 2 December 1970 lecture, “The Discourse on Language,” at the College de 
France, evidently hints, at its beginning, the negation of the very unity of an 
instant in time, when he states that he himself is standing at the very path of a 
‘nameless voice,’ opening nothing but a ‘slender gap’ within itself: an instant, 
Foucault suggests, is that point in time where a matter cannot present itself in 
                                                          
25 If fashion, to him, is nothing more than calling into question the course of time, modernity is that 
attitude that makes it possible to recapture the ‘eternal that is not beyond the present instant, nor 
behind it, but within it:’ it is that attitude that grasps the “heroic” aspect of the present (Foucault, 1997, 
p.310). What Foucault actually does with Baudelaire in “What is Enlightenment?” is, he not just 
juxtapose Baudelairian aesthetics with Kantian professionalism, but also reread Baudelaire in the light 
of Greek thought on the care of the self, transforming Baudelairian aesthetics into politics.    
26 If time and space are a priori, if they indeed lack predicates, as Kant would argue, then they 
themselves cannot be differentiated from each other. “Time is neither movement (kinesis) nor change 
(metabole),” but rather it is that which makes possible movement, change, their measurement, and the 
difference in speed (Derrida, 1982, p. 58).     
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its unity.27 The passage, with a recognizable Kantian twist, goes on like this: “I 
would have preferred to be enveloped in words, borne way beyond all 
possible beginnings. At the moment of speaking, I would like to have 
perceived a nameless voice, long preceding me, leaving me merely to enmesh 
myself in it, taking up its cadence, and to lodge myself, when no one was 
looking, in its interstices as if it had paused an instant, in suspense, to beckon 
to me. There would have been no beginnings: instead, speech would proceed 
from me, while I stood in its path – a slender gap – the point of its possible 
disappearance [my italic]” (Foucault, 1972, p. 215). Though Foucault’s writings, 
time and again, place every discursive event, every production of 
discontinuity, within a totality, that is, within history; they, at the very same 
time, cancel and invalidate the unity of each and every single instant in time, 
through traversing and dispersing them. An event, by its very nature, 
Foucault suggests, cannot be corporeal, and for that reason, it can neither be a 
substance nor an accident, nor a quality or even a process. Yet it can also 
neither be immaterial, as it always takes effect (it itself becomes effects) 
always on the level of materiality. It, though, has its own place. It arises in, 
and as the very effect of, a material dispersion. It constitutes itself “in relation 
to, coexistence with, dispersion of, the cross-checking accumulation and the 
selection of material elements;” hence, Foucault suggests that the philosophy 
of event must advance itself in the direction of an incorporeal materialism and 
introducing the category of chance (Foucault, 1972, p. 231).  The production of 
events and the eventual surfacing of the discontinuities do not, however, 
suggest either ‘a succession of instants in time’ or ‘the plurality of thinking 
subjects’ but rather “what is concerned are those caesurae breaking the instant 
                                                          
27 Derrida, for instance, while reading Heidegger, has argued that Aristotle’s conception of now is much 
more than Heidegger, in Being and Time, allows it to be in: he writes, “what is past and what is to come 
also become present (Anwesendes) namely as outside the expanse of unconcealment” (Derrida, 1982, p. 
34).       
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and dispersing the subject in a multiplicity of possible positions and 
functions” (Foucault, 1972, p. 231).28 
The author’s name, Foucault insists, is not just like any other proper name. 
Much more than an indicative function; more than a suggestion or ‘an 
indication, a gesture, a finger pointed at someone,’ his name rather functions 
just like a description (Foucault, 1984, p. 105), and serves to characterize a 
certain mode of being of discourse; in our society, it even works as classifier of 
a (or a group of) discourse[s] from others. The proper noun, such as, Aristotle, 
Foucault suggests, is ‘a word that is equivalent of one, or a series, of definite 
descriptions, such as “the author of the Analytics,” “the founder of ontology,” 
and so forth’ (Foucault, 1984, pp. 105 – 106). Unlike many other proper name, 
the author’s name ‘does not pass from the interior of a discourse to the real 
and exterior individual who produced it;’ rather, ‘the name seems always [my 
italic] to be present, marking off the edges of the text, revealing, or at least 
characterizing, its mode of being’ (Foucault, 1984, p. 107), therefore, to him, 
the empty affirmation, the death of the author, is actually not enough; it is 
even not enough, to keep repeating after Nietzsche that both God and man 
have succumbed themselves to a very ordinary death. But rather one must 
locate, Foucault insists, the very space ‘left empty by the author’s 
disappearance, follow the distribution of gaps and breaches, and watch for 
the openings that this disappearance uncovers’ (Foucault, 1984, p. 105). “What 
is an Author?” has brought into circulation the notion of author function.29 
                                                          
28 Against the four central notions (signification, originality, unity, and creation) that have shaped the traditional 
history of idea, “The Discourse on Language” places the notions of chance, discontinuity and materiality. 
29 “What is an Author?” presented before an assemblage of philosophers, scholars, and intellectuals, at 
the prestigious French Society of Philosophy, is part of a larger critical current that has taken over 
France after the appearance of Roland Barthes’ much acclaimed and notorious work, “The Death of 
the Author.” “What is an Author?,” though in the first few paragraphs, has mentioned in passing that 
familiar theme, the writing’s relationship with death, it has firmly proposed that the mutation in our 
culture that has metamorphosed the very idea of writing (with this ‘the work, which once had the 
duty of providing immortality, now possesses the right to kill, to be its author’s murderer’) is only a 
resent stage in a long history.           
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The author’s function is not something that will develop spontaneously, it 
cannot even be a mere attribute of discourse to an individual; but rather it 
constitutes itself within a complex operation that transforms a rational being, 
from within, to what we call an author. Yet, on the other hand, writing, in our 
culture, is not that simple enough to be reduced to a dimension of expression 
(which is one point on which both Barthes’ and Foucault’s texts agree upon).30 
Writing now refers only to itself (nevertheless Foucault maintains here that: 
‘but without [my italic] being restricted to the confines of its [own] 
interiority’), identifies itself largely with its own unfolded exteriority 
(Foucault, 1984, p. 102), what he means here is: since the relation of signs is 
totally detached from the transcendental system of signified (and is organised 
only according to the nature of signifiers), writing now unfolds itself like a 
game, transgressing its own rules and limits. In writing, Foucault argues, “the 
point is not to manifest or exalt the act of writing, nor is it to pin a subject 
within language; it is, rather, a question of creating a space into which the 
writing subject constantly [my italic] disappears” (Foucault, 1984, p. 102), that 
is, a sign will appear itself only at the expense of its creator.     
At first, it might sound quite clear, yet it can develop, in an inquisitive 
observer, a new level of perplexities: under what conditions does the writing 
gain that power to take over the writer, transform him incorporeally to an 
author and bury him in the very depth of the play of the signs, which he 
himself has initiated? Rather than investigating the psychology behind why 
people still desire the author (Roland Barthes, in his work, The Pleasure of the 
Text, for instance, has stated that: “The author is dead but I desire the 
author”), we will actually explore the connection that links writing and death 
in relation to time and, will ask: under what condition the act of writing can 
turn itself into violence that swallows up both the self and the sign? Can 
                                                          
30 The author here is neither struggling with the rigid structures of language to express in it his personal 
experience, nor is he relying upon language for recourses; he rather is becoming something other than 
himself along with the unfolding signs, along with language itself.     
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violence play itself out in a non-time? Under what conditions writing (that 
traverses and transforms both the self and the sign) becomes an Event?  
The modern writer has a fundamentally different relation to his own text. 
Earlier, if the author has been always conceived as the past of his own text, if 
he and his text have been placed along the same line, in a successive time (as 
before and after), if he has been placed before his own text, as pre-existing it, 
feeding it, living, thinking, suffering for it, if his relation with the text had 
been conceived within a patrilineal value system; then now, the modern 
author is ‘born simultaneously with his text’ (Barthes, 1977), that is, the writer 
and his work cannot occupy the same line: means, he cannot be the subject of 
which his book is the predicate. The modern writer does not ‘transcend his 
writing’ and neither is he supplied with a being that precedes his work, 
Barthes continues, “there is no other [my italic] time than that of the utterance 
and every text is eternally written here and now” (Barthes, 1977). Now, what 
is the status of this “here and now” of writing, if it hasn’t already been 
coloured by its own past and future – a pure now? How is (modern) writing 
different from, say, surrealism?31  
Before we go further with our reading on the act of writing, we must here 
make some sense of the specific context in which philosophy has developed in 
Europe, particularly in France, after World War II. Europe’s entire experience 
with Nazism and Fascism, on the one hand, has set the general mood 
(reflected largely in the deep distress against totalitarianism); on the other 
hand, a recent surge of phenomenology and structuralism in academic circles, 
particularly in France, has built a new wave of restlessness over metaphysics 
of presence. The result has been a convergence of interests, among a new 
generation of thinkers, on some specific problems and themes. The question 
                                                          
31 Barthes, in “The Death of the Author,” even talks about Surrealism entrusting, what the head itself 
has ignored, to the hand, transferring the responsibility of writing as far as possible to the hand, and 
making it, in his own words “automatic writing.”   
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of difference, consequently, has become a major theme in the writings of 
thinkers such as, Levinas, Derrida, Deleuze and Nancy (Foucault, however, is 
an exception here); the repetition has become a problem to reckon with; there 
has been a revival of Nietzsche as a major figure in continental philosophy; 
and most importantly, in the writings of at least some of the above-mentioned 
thinkers, language and the act of writing themselves have been elevated to 
such a point that they themselves fall into the realm of  theoretical reflection. 
Such convergence of interests must have played a decisive role, by putting 
pressure on thinkers to read tradition differently (gain resource from it) and 
to develop systems of thought that are mutually exclusive. It, therefore, suits 
our interest here quite well, that we repeat the same strategy that has been 
deployed, more than once, in the course of this chapter (that is to locate a 
particular thinker – in our case Foucault – within the specificity of his present 
to understand better how his strategies and tactics work both in relation to the 
common tradition [the continental philosophy] and in relation to the 
strategies and tactics of other major thinkers of his time). The following 
section will explore Foucault’s take on the act of writing and time, by 
juxtaposing his against Derrida and Deleuze.      
“time could be a (in) being only in not being what it is...” 
Jacques Derrida, 1982, p. 52 
“Repetition is a condition of action before it is a concept of 
reflection. We produce something new only on condition 
that we repeat...”  
Gilles Deleuze, 1994, p. 90 
[Criticism] “will not seek to identify the universal 
structures of all knowledge [connaissance] or of all 
possible moral action, but will seek to treat the instances 
[my italic] of discourse that articulates what we think, 
say, and do as so many historical events” 
Michel Foucault, 1997, p. 315   
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Well, three significantly different propositions on time, evolved primarily 
from very different readings of Western philosophy; they are from the arsenals 
of three extremely difficult thinkers of post World War II Continental 
philosophy, who differ from one another not just in their reading of Western 
thought, but also in their very style of writing.32 Nevertheless, the question 
actually is not where they differ from each other in relation to their respective 
understanding of time, but rather, can we, in relation to these writers, make a 
difference here, in the understanding of time; the question consequently is: 
can we repeat/affirm them (here) with a difference? This in itself is a challenge 
(and yet not a mere challenge, but an attempt to intuit time itself), and we will 
only see, where this very challenge – this problem – can lead us from here on. 
Let us say, as a starting point that Deleuze is right, when he stated: questions 
and problems belong to the unconscious, and the unconscious in itself is 
iterable by its very nature (Deleuze, 1997, p. 108). 
Well repetition, for both Derrida and Deleuze, plays a decisive role. A writing 
that is not structurally iterable (Derrida’s word for repetition), he suggests, 
can never actually be considered writing at all (Derrida, 1988, p. 7), on the 
other hand, repetition, Deleuze argues, can never be an historical fact, but 
rather it is that historical condition under which anything new can appear 
(Deleuze, 1994, p. 90). Yes, one actually will see this word (repetition) 
                                                          
32 In Derrida, writing unfolds itself; the above-cited work is a classical example, where one finds Derrida 
labouring with Aristotle’s text on time and eventually unfolding, within his writing, circles of iteration. 
One finds Derrida coming back to the same themes, that he left at the beginning, more than once in the 
process of writing to understand their intricacies, both for himself and for his potential readers. The 
“Ousia and Gramme,” while engaging itself with Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle, in Being and Time, 
shows us that if metaphysics ‘signified the determination of the meaning of Being as presence in both 
senses and simultaneously,’ then time undoubtedly will exceed metaphysics (Derrida, 1982, p. 64). Every 
single mark, in his system, lacks presence in itself (that is, they essentially lack Being), and therefore, will 
only shy away from turning themselves to the order of concepts – even différance and iterability, 
according to Derrida, are not exceptions (maybe, there rather are the most exceptional ones). Deleuze, on 
the other hand, is dry, abstract and awfully difficult to penetrate; his work are directed with a more 
traditional approach to philosophy, Difference and Repetition, for instance, will only attempt to do 
metaphysics once more, and to him the work of philosophy is nothing but creating concept. Well when 
considering all these intricacies, it is important that one should not come to any direct conclusions, before 
even looking at those difficult pages in their works that deals with time. 
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reappearing, more than once, and determining the very style and content of 
their writings, still any comparison, without a proper investigation of the 
specific roles that it plays within their respective writings, can only be 
thoroughly deceptive. Iterability is nothing but the power of the written 
marks to function (that is, to be readable) in the absence of the receiver and 
the sender; it is that which allows a written mark to repeat itself, through 
grafting itself onto to a very different chain of marks. Derrida writes, “by 
virtue of its essential iterability, a written syntagma can always be detached 
from the chain in which it is inserted or given without causing it to lose all 
possibilities of functioning, if not all possibility of “communicating,” precisely 
(Derrida, 1988, p. 9).33 Let us develop a closer diagnosis, so that the problem 
itself gains enough force to surface itself adequately. 
Of those three above-mentioned thinkers, Derrida is the most enthusiastic 
critic of metaphysics of presence. To begin with Derrida, therefore, is to begin 
already at the very limit. Let us rather begin ourselves from the limit of the 
limit, from the very limit of Derrida’s own criticism of Western metaphysics, 
                                                          
33 The very source of this force of rupture, he suggests, is nothing but spacing – the spacing that constitutes 
the written sign (that which separates it both from other elements of the internal contextual chain and the 
all forms of present reference). It is actually the spacing, Derrida suggests, that opens the possibility of 
any written mark’s disengagement from the chain in which it is inserted and its eventual grafting onto a 
totally different syntagma. Derrida here quickly extends his conclusion on the written mark to include 
any spoken mark and suggests that the spoken signs actually share some of the defining characteristics 
of written signs (Derrida, 1988, p. 10). The 1966 lecture at Johns Hopkins University, (“Structure, Sign, 
and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences”), for instance, has located a rupture, a very significant 
incidence in the history of the concept of structure, that Derrida would, with confidence, call an event: 
the disappearance of the governing center and the opening up of the very possibility of a play. It is the 
very absence of a privileged (transcendental or central) signified, he argues, outside a system of 
differences that has opened the possibility of an extended domain and the infinite play of signification 
(Derrida, 2001, p. 354). As a consequence of the decentring of the center (with the absence of the 
transcendental signified) the radical difference between the signifier and the signified gets erased and, 
the signifier itself will be reduced to itself or, ‘amounting to the same thing, simply expelling its signifier 
outside itself’ (Derrida, 2001, p. 355). For there are, Derrida writes, “two heterogeneous ways of erasing 
the difference between the signifier and the signified: one, the classic way, consists in reducing or 
deriving the signifier, that is to say, ultimately in submitting the sign to thought; the other, the one we 
are using here against the first one, consists in putting into question the system in which the preceding 
reduction functioned...” (Derrida, 2001, p. 355), here then what actually measures the ‘quality and 
fecundity’ of a discourse is the critical rigor with which it has thought about its relation to the history of 
metaphysics and the concepts it have inherited from that metaphysical tradition.  
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so that we can skip a lot of unnecessary explanations and securely place 
ourselves, from the very beginning itself, at the frontiers of (his) criticism.  
Presence is the very sign of ‘outward evidence,’ and for that reason alone, it, 
for traditional ontology, is a point of reference, (Derrida, 1982, p. 31), it is in the 
very light of this reference that the meaning of Being itself has been grasped: 
being qua being. And this general form (that is, only as their Being as presence 
that beings are actually be grasped), merged with phonocentrism, demarcates 
and gives form to a range of dependent varieties, such as, ‘the eidos (the thing 
presented to the sight); ousia (presence as substance/ essence/existence), stigma 
(temporal presence as point of the now or of the moment [nun]), the self-
presence of the cogito, consciousness, subjectivity, the co-presence of the other 
and of the self, intersubjectivity as the intentional phenomenon of the ego, and 
so on’ (Derrida, 2002, p. 12). Presence (or the entity as it is given, in the 
present, to the senses), throughout the great epoch that covers the history of 
metaphysics, shaped and sustained a range of uneven relation – the relation 
between speech and writing, between the sensible and the intelligible, etc. If 
voice is close to the soul, if it emanates directly from the interiorising memory, 
writing is exteriorising, it is nothing but the very forgetting of self itself. It is 
against the self-presence of the speaking subject that the Western metaphysic 
has degraded writing (the written sign) to a status of ‘mediation of mediation,’ 
of a sign of sign, therefore, it should be in relation to this epoch that one must, 
after all, consider the crucial bifurcation of every (possible) sign along the line 
of sensible and intelligible. If language, according to modern structural 
thought, is a system of signs, then linguistics is nothing but part and parcel of 
that very system. Here what constitutes a sign (a sign, in general, and any 
linguistic sign, in particular) is its ‘twofold character,’ that is, every linguistic 
unit (sign) is bipartite, involving both the sensible – signifier – and the 
intelligible – signified (Derrida, 2002, p. 13) 
110 | P a g e   C h a p t e r  I I I  
 
Sign (usually said to be) in its very form, Derrida writes elsewhere, is nothing 
but a divergence, a necessary detour, when the present itself cannot be 
presented. In its very absence, the sign takes the place of the ‘thing.’ The sign, 
in the course of its circulation, infinitely defers the very moment of our 
encounter with the thing, presenting itself as ours, allowing itself to be 
seemed, touched, consumed, and even intuited. Sign, consequently, is nothing 
but deferred presence (to put differently, signification, Derrida writes, is 
différance of temporality). It takes over the present when the present itself 
cannot be presented, it, therefore, represents the present in its absence.34 This 
substitution (sign as the sign of present in its absence) is both secondary and 
provisional. It is secondary, as the sign derives itself from an original and a 
lost presence (the thing as the resource of meaning and referent),35 and it is 
provisional, as every sign is a movement of mediation, a movement towards 
this final and missing presence (Derrida, 1982, p. 9).  
The “Différance,” Derrida’s 1968 lecture, promises to speak about the 
unspeakable, and signals the arrival36 of a play, a play that exceeds every 
structure, a play that, through the very unsettling of every presence, infinitely 
repeats the domain of signification. “Différance” playfully plays with the two 
meanings of the word difference, which Derrida spells as différance.37 
Différance, according to Derrida, belongs neither to the sensible (signifier) nor 
to the intelligible (signified). The difference marked in the “differ( )nce” 
                                                          
34 Derrida, in Given Time: I. Counterfeit Money – “The Time of the King” – and in “Ousia and Gramme,” 
has shown us that time in itself is absolute absence, a gap in the order of reason; that is, it 
transcendences all circularity (his arguments on Being, gift and différance elsewhere should also be 
considered here to make sense of its ramifications on his other claims).     
35 Deleuze, in “The Simulacrum and Ancient Philosophy” that appeared in the appendix of The Logic of 
Sense, replies (to the question: what does it mean “to reverse Platonism”?) that “the formula seems to 
mean the abolition of the world of essences and of the world of appearances” (Deleuze, 1990, p. 254).  
36 Derrida also briefly examines here the crucial role difference plays for thinkers such as Nietzsche, 
Freud, Levinas and most importantly Heidegger.     
37 Derrida replaces the e of difference with an a to show actually the very absence of the differential 
elements that constitutes the sign, différance.     
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between the e and the a resists the order of sensibility (Derrida, 1982, p. 5), it, 
at the same time, also eludes the intelligible, the order of ideas, as différance 
does not affiliate itself with the objectivity of understanding (Derrida, 1982, p. 
5). It, Derrida suggests, even eludes hearing (as the ‘a’ of the différance, when it 
is spelled, in French, cannot be heard). Différance here is conceived as nothing 
but pure play, as absolute essenceless difference (Deleuze also conceives 
difference - Difference and Repetition - in a quite similar fashion).38 Derrida 
writes, “If différance is... [is actually is crossed out here, to signal the absolute 
absence of différance] what makes possible the presentation of the being-
present, it is never [actually] presented as such” (Derrida, 1982, p. 6).  
If différance eludes signification and meaning, it must be prior to everything. 
Yet Derrida denies différance a priori status, as it is non-full, non-simple, 
structured and differentiating origin of differences (since it is non-full and 
non-simple it just cannot be presence in itself and for that reason, it cannot be 
the origin). However, what produces differences (differences in a Saussurean 
sense – mediation as an effect of an arbitrary relation of signs) is only an effect 
of an absolute difference (différance as an absolute absence).39 Différance (unlike 
difference) is absolute absence and, therefore, (logically) untraceable. Derrida, 
for instance, writes: “One can expose only that which at a certain moment can 
become present, manifest, that which can be shown, presented as something 
present, a being-present in its truth, in the truth of a present or the presence of 
the present” (Derrida, 1982, pp. 5 – 6). Différance rather is a mysterious being, 
                                                          
38 At the end of the lecture, Derrida, in a few sentences, tries to compare différance from Heidegger’s 
reading of ontological difference (the difference between Being and beings) in “The Anaximander 
Fragment.” It is clearly impossible to locate the essence of Being (and of différance), to find a suitable 
word, a single word to name the essence of Being (Derrida, 1982, p. 24).      
39 It is actually here that Deleuzian conception of difference differs from différance, if différance, for 
Derrida, is absolute absence, the negation of negation, for Deleuze, it is energy, a swarm of non-
representational differences. He writes, every time we encounter an inadequate (incomplete) concept 
“we should ask what such a situation presupposes. It presupposes a swarm of differences, a pluralism 
of free, wild or untamed differences, a properly differential and original space and time; all of which 
persist along-side the simplifications of limitations and opposition (Deleuze, 1997, p 50)      
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as it resists itself from succumbing itself to the order of truth, as it reserves 
itself to itself. It never offers itself to the present. “Or to anyone,” for that 
matter (Derrida, 1982, p. 6). Yet, Derrida seems to have an apparently cunning 
strategy to trace the untraceable; he, therefore, promises to speak the 
unspeakable; he promises, at the very beginning of the lecture, that: “I will 
speak, therefore, of a letter;” he promises to speak about the a of the ‘differ( 
)nce’ (Derrida, 1982, p. 3). 
The question one should pose is: what presents Derrida such confidence to 
carry out a parody of the différance itself, when the différance in itself is not 
presenting itself to him? What actually allows Derrida to be this certain that 
he still has at his disposal a strategy, “a strategy without finality” (Derrida, 
1982, p. 7) that will allow him to speak nothing but the unspeakable?40 The 
question is: is the ‘a’ of the différance absolutely traceless? Is it actually an 
absolute absence, differ( )nce? If it is absolute absence, how then this strategy 
of Derrida works?41  
Différance, (though is neither a word nor a concept in Derrida’s conception), 
still compensates – economically – a loss of meaning, since différence (with an 
‘e’) can “never refer either to différer as temporization or to différends as 
polemos (Derrida, 1982, p. 8), that is, even though the a of the differ( )nce, at the 
very same instance of its affirmation, negates itself, denying itself to the 
present, it leaves behind a trace of its trace – a supplement. The supplement, 
as the trace of the trace, is in fact the trace of the a of the differ( )nce. It is 
precisely the supplement that the ‘a’ added to différance that differentiates the 
                                                          
40 At this point, Derrida even cares to differentiate his thought (though it is indistinguishable) from 
negative theology. Negative theology, to him, refuses to grant all predicates of existence to almighty, 
the God, only to acknowledge his ‘superior, inconceivable, and ineffable mode of being’ (Derrida, 
1982, p. 6); but since différance in itself is absolute absence, that is, since it neither belongs to existence 
and essence, his thought on such an absence is radically different from negative theology.       
41 The problem here is: is it actually possible to synthesis time, without being grounded in the certainty 
of the presence of the present?    
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différance (with an ‘a’) from the différence (with an ‘e’); and as a result, 
différance and différence can no longer be the same; and still, this 
temporisation (the differing together with the deferring) is only a trace of 
time,42 and cannot be categorised as either presence or the presence of the 
present, since ‘it is temporal only in becoming temporal, that is, in ceasing to 
be, in passing over to no-thingness in the form of being-past or being-future’ 
(Derrida, 1982, p. 40),43 that is, even though the supplements are inscribed, 
like sediments upon sediments, on the structure44 (that is, inscribed on its 
walls from within and without destroying the structure from outside), they 
themselves are actually in temporal becoming.  
Derrida, for instance, writes at one point in Of Grammatology: “The moments 
of deconstruction do not destroy [sollicitent] structures from the outside. They 
are not possible and effective, nor can they take accurate aim, except by 
inhabiting those structures. Inhabiting them in a certain way, because one 
always inhabits, and all the more when one does not suspect it. Operating 
necessary from the inside, borrowing all the strategic and economic resources 
of subversion from the old structure, borrowing them structurally, that is to 
say without being able to isolate their elements and atoms, the enterprise of 
deconstruction always in a certain way falls prey to its own work” (Derrida, 
                                                          
42 Derrida conceives trace as the “originary constitution” of time and space (Derrida, 1982, p. 8), it is 
nothing but the spontaneous [and together or hama] becoming of space and time, ‘the becoming-time 
of space and the becoming-space of time’ (Derrida, 1982, p. 8). Derrida, while reading Aristotle’s 
Physics IV in “Ousia and Gramme,” has suggested that: “it is together [my italic] that we have the 
sensation of movement and time” (Derrida, 1982, 49).        
43 “Ousia and Gramme” proves that the now (nun) as it is presented in Physics IV is not in itself 
temporal, that is, if time is ‘temporal only in becoming temporal’ or if it is always oscillating, like a 
pendulum, between the being-past and being-future, then now [nun] can never be part of time itself. If 
now is not part of time, then it cannot compose time (Derrida, 1982, p. 40).        
44 In “Structure, Sign and Play,” Derrida writes: “as soon as one seeks to demonstrate in this way that 
there is no transcendental or privileged signified and that the domain or play of signification 
henceforth has no limit, one must reject even the concept and the word “sign” itself – which is 
precisely what cannot be done. For the signification “sign” has always been understood and 
determined, in its meaning, as sign-of, a signifier referring to a signified, a signifier different from its 
signified” (Derrida, 2001, pp. 354 – 55).   
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2002, p. 24). The moment of deconstruction, therefore, establishes a parasitic 
relation with its hosts, like the nesting cuckoo, it inhabits and structurally 
exploits all the strategic and economic resources of hosts. It, therefore, is not 
destructive; it creates only through using and managing that which is already 
there.   
Our discovery so far is that: a) the supplements, in themselves, are not 
presence or even presence of present, rather can only be inscribed within the 
materiality of sign; b) they are only trace of trace and, therefore, they cannot 
be différance. Hence to retrace the trace of the trace, the supplement itself, 
(tracing différance at least from this point of view seems impossible) one 
actually has to relay upon the deferred presence, the sign.45 
Our earlier question remains unanswered and, therefore, it demands 
repetition: what presents Derrida such confidence to carry out a parody of the 
“originary causality,” the différance itself, (Derrida, 1982, p. 9), when 
différance in itself is not presenting itself to him? What sets into motion the 
deconstructive forces within a text? Why is this (hostile) distortion of text, this 
parody, this very retracing of the trace left behind by traces, of the 
supplement (in Derrida’s own language deconstruction) so dangerous? What is 
the source of this hostility? What is the politics of this parody? Can 
deconstruction be this dangerous, if its hostile readings of texts are not also 
directed against our most cherished values? On the other hand, one can also 
ask the question: can the Foucauldian ontology of present be so effective, if it 
                                                          
45 Up to here, Derrida’s approach is strictly Heideggerian; the quest for the meaning of Being, for 
Heidegger, becomes important as there occurred ‘a rupture between the original meaning of being 
and the word, between meaning and the voice, between “the voice of being” and the “phone,” between 
“the call of being,” and articulated sound…(Derrida, 2002, p. 22), “it is thus that, after evoking the 
“voice of being,” Heidegger recalls that it is silent, mute, insonorous, wordless, originarily a-phonic (die 
Gewahr der lautlosen Stimme verborgener Quellen…). The voice of the sources is not heard” (Derrida, 
2002, p. 22). However, Heidegger does not take difference (the ontological difference between Being 
and being) to its very limit, to absolute difference, to différance, consequently, unlike recollection; 
deconstruction is only a possibility within language.   
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were not critical (or a parodic doubling of) on the text that it has engaged 
itself with? How Edward Said, in Orientalism, negotiates the force of both 
Derrida’s deconstruction and Foucault’s ontology of present, is a case to 
study. 
One thing that is clear so far is that: deconstruction, as it is conceived by 
Derrida and his followers, does not actually destroy structures, and rather, it 
sustains itself only through borrowing the recourses from the old structures. 
Hence, with all good logic, one can conclude that to move itself 
deconstruction demands not just a self-deconstructing text, that is, not just the 
deferred presence, the sign (Derrida, 1982, p. 9), but also a larger shared (and 
therefore, structured) context (a shared totality, like the present of Foucault’s 
‘ontology of present’) that it can inhabit “in a certain way,” and borrows from 
it, structurally, all its ‘strategic and economic resources of subversion’ 
(Derrida, 2002, p.24). Derrida’s reading of most texts, especially, Levi-
Strauss’s and Rousseau’s, confirms such inhabitation, and yet Derrida doesn’t 
mind granting the text (alone) the deconstructive power (that is, to him, the 
text in itself is self-deconstructive; he for instance in Of Grammatology 
famously stated: “there is nothing outside the text” (Derrida, 2002, p. 163)), 
taking most responsibilities from the larger context in setting deconstruction 
into motion). Derrida, for instance, has written: “Différance, the 
disappearance of any originary presence, is at once the condition of possibility 
and the condition of impossibility of truth” (Derrida, 1981, p. 168). 
Any parodic retracing, the tracing of the trace left behind by the trace of time 
(in Derrida’s language: deconstruction) automatically demands a relation 
between the straight (deferred presence of the sign, in Derrida, however, 
suggests that the straight is already crooked) and the crooked; it demands 
consciousness (Vattimo, 1993), a synthesis of time, and yet, neither the 
absolute difference (the différance), nor the trace (of time), or the trace of trace 
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(the supplement), in Derrida, succumb themselves to the order of presence, 
and therefore, they cannot enact a synthesis (of time) and, for that reason 
alone, they will never constitute a consciousness. In “Ousia and Gramme,” 
Derrida, for instance, has argued that: time as nonbeing (as “no longer” or as 
“not yet”) could be in-being only in not being what it is (Derrida, 1982, p. 52). 
Consequently, one could conclude that to become conscious of itself and the 
world, the consciousness itself must become what it is not. In Derrida, the 
différance (with an ‘a’) or else the absolute difference, the trace and the 
simulacrum (the play of deferred presence, of signs) all signal a central 
absence, which is the absolute alterity of the non-time (time as in-being). 
What is then lacking in the very order of time (as in-being) is time itself. 
Hence, for the consciousness to be itself, that is, to be consciousness, it not just 
must spread itself from within a system of self-differentiating signs, but also 
must hold itself at the very threshold of (and directed towards) an 
unapproachable outside, its absolute alterity.     
In Foucault, the “outside,” on the other hand, like the modern city-streets, is a 
neutral field, a field of undifferentiated forces (for further references, see how 
Foucault, following Baudelaire, portrayed Guys in “What is Enlightenment).” 
Constantin Guys, to him, was a different genius of painter, because of the fact 
that he was not just into capturing a fleeting moment; but rather while doing 
it, he will (at once) “transfigure,” transform and create that very moment in a 
radically new way), a field of possibilities (Foucault, 1984, p. 41). It is that 
field that repeatedly draws and redraws the margins that divides Derrida’s 
absolute difference, the différance, and the simulacrum, the play of signs. It is 
the very sky above the nesting cuckoo (the sky that engulfs everything and, 
thereby, gives form to everything from without). The sense in itself, from a 
Foucauldian point of view, is folding – that means, the self can only be 
created, if only the outside is folded towards itself (Foucault, 1997).  
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What differentiates Foucault from Derrida here is the influence of the 
Heideggerian dictum, on him: ‘thrown into the world.’ The outside is non-
representional, and therefore, it is undifferentiated space.46 Quite like Kant’s 
claim that time and space are a priori, for Foucault, the sensible and the 
articulable, besides being a priori and deeply different from each other, also 
have their own histories. Thinking, Deleuze, for instance, has confirmed in 
Foucault, “is neither innate nor acquired” (Deleuze, 1988, p. 117), it rather 
comes from the outside; to think is nothing but to experience and 
problematise. Thinking, therefore, unfolds in that narrow space that 
differentiates the sensible and the articulable. “Knowledge, power and the self 
are the triple root of a problematisation of thought” (Deleuze, 1988, p.116). On 
the other hand, we, in fact, find Derrida progressing in resolving the problem 
of inside and outside in “Linguistics and Grammatology” (Derrida, 2002, pp. 
27 – 73). What Derrida quite successfully introduced is the notion of 
temporality. To him, it is the text and the trace (and, since the trace is always 
already in becoming temporal, it is not presence) that are the fundamental 
situation within which human being can make sense of both himself and his 
world, and this iterable graphemes of experience effectively withholds all 
experience of outside.             
Conclusion 
The present chapter, through an intense meditation, has aimed to make sense 
of the condition (not the possibility of any, but rather) of the materialisation of 
the sign. This, an extension of the first chapter, is crucial to the next (and final) 
chapter that deals with two questions that have surfaced at different stages of 
Foucault’s writings – “What is Man?” and “How should I live my life?.” It 
                                                          
46 The “outside” is a field of non-representational forces (since it is non-representational, one can only 
presume [or rather deduce from the conclusion that one arrive from the analysis of the simulacrum, 
the order of deferred presence] that they are in a differential relationship).   
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unfolds itself through a playful juxtaposing (repeating and, therefore, altering 
– Hume’s famous thesis (Deleuze, 1997, p. 70), for instance, which suggests 
that: repetition changes nothing in the object repeated, but does change something in 
the mind which contemplates it) of two mutually excluding theories of language: 
(a) Derrida’s claim that language carries within itself an infinite number of 
contexts (that is, the possibility within language that allows to read and 
reread the shared tradition always altogether differently) against (b) 
Foucault’s ontology of a shared present, the certainty of a totality (and 
therefore, it can’t be the fleeting instances) within which thought unfolds itself 
(to be specific, the singularity of the post World War II circumstance within 
which philosophy unfolded itself in France). Holland, for instance, has shown 
how Blanchot, during his life time itself, has divided an entire epoch in such a 
way that it can, under no circumstances, be a polarisation, but a struggle for 
the present in which thought itself takes place (Holland, 2007, pp. 46 – 66). 
The present chapter opens a close reading of Foucault’s thought to the idea of 
other major contemporary figures of French thought (in particular, of 
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The Theatrics: Body, Self and the Play of the Outside  
  I 
 CLAUDIUS 
I like him not, nor stands it safe with us 
To let his madness rage. Therefore prepare you. 
I your commission will forthwith dispatch, 
And he to England shall along with you. 
The terms of our estate may not endure 
Hazard so dangerous as doth hourly grow 
Out of his lunacies. 
Shakespeare, 2002, p. 102   
The madman’s voyage is at once a rigorous division and 
an absolute Passage. In one sense; it simply develops, 
across a half-real, half-imaginary geography, the 
madman’s liminal position on the horizon of medieval 
concern – a position symbolized and made real at the 
same time by the madman’s privilege of being confined 
within the city gates: his exclusion must enclose him: if he 
cannot and must not have another prison than the 
threshold itself, he is kept at the point of passage. He is put 
in the interior of the exterior, and inversely.  
Foucault, 2009, pp. 8 – 9.  
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Hamlet, Language and Life  
In On Poetics, says Aristotle, “without action, tragedy could not come to be, but 
without characters it could come to be” (Aristotle, 2002, p. 21), one example he 
has cited as proof is the paintings of Zeuxis, which, according to Aristotle, are 
characterless and yet poetic by their very nature. It is only through action,1 he 
argues, that characters gain their character; if put differently, what Aristotle 
suggests is that: it is nothing but the choice immanent in one’s actions that 
finally shape one’s happiness or the opposite. If Aristotle is right, then the 
question that can easily materialize itself and fill one’s thought is: why is 
Hamlet so reluctant to act. Why is he different from, say, Achilles and Hector or 
Oedipus and Othello?2 Well, anyone could easily find an effortless answer, and 
reply directly that if in Aristotelian tragedy lies, at its very core, human arete (an 
                                                          
1 Peri Poietikes (trans., “on poetics”), one of Aristotle’s most frequently read works, aims at elaborating the 
broader meanings of the verb poiein, which means “to do” in the sense of “to make.” If, to him, actors, to 
create characters, imitate action, so do we all humans; we all human being are actors, as it is natural to us 
to take pleasure in imitating. As it involves not just repeating somebody else, but also learning and 
figuring out; from childhood itself, human beings imitate what others do (Aristotle, 2002, p. 8 – 9). Peri 
Poietikes, then, would mean On the Art of Action (though, there is a narrower, secondary meaning as well, 
that is “to make poetry.” Even if the narrower, secondary meaning is true, Aristotle’s claim that tragedy 
– the imitation of an act ‘of stature and complete, with magnitude’ by means of ‘sweetened speech’ 
(Aristotle, 2002, p. 17) – is paradigmatic for poetry would only stress the importance of action in the 
sense of making (something) through imitation; however, the stress seems to be on “to make” and, that 
too, on to make “beautifully” (Aristotle, 2002, p. 36), rather than on the final result of an action. Aristotle, 
for instance, stresses that, there will be characters, when the speech and the action apparently open up 
some choice (Aristotle, 2002, p. 37) and it is only with the possibility of exercising choice that courage can 
surface itself and play its role. On Poetics here offers a point of view very different from Aristotle’s 
Nicomachean Ethics, which gives only an account of courage as a virtue, using mostly fictional characters, 
such as, Achilles, Hector and Diomedes (Aristotle, 2002, p. xv). If the great Japanese master, Katsushika 
Hokusai, in his much celebrated masterpiece The Great Wave off Kanagawa, managed to reflect upon life 
itself (life as an immanent field of rythum and chaos) then Aristotle’s On Poetics would only shows 
Hokusai’s heroes, those fishermen from Kanagawa, devotion to the kalon. On Poetics celebrates those 
men, our heroes, and their devotion to the kalon – the physical or moral beauty – so that we can see them 
closer than before and appreciate their beauty. In his introduction to On Poetics, suggests Michael Davis, 
if ‘all courage is metaphorical,’ then, like every courageous men, Achilles would also have been fighting to 
die like Achilles (Aristotle, 2002, p. xv), and this logic would only make poetry, or the art of making poetry 
the core of human life. However, how important is one’s relation to a myth (that suggests what one should 
be), its building and feeding through organizing one’s own life and action, for Foucault, is something to 
look at. How is ‘aesthetics of existence’ that anchors itself around the reciprocity of gaze (or the relation 
to oneself and others), differs from Aristotelian poetics?    
2 Achilles wouldn’t hesitate to revenge and he accepted full responsibility of the death of Patroklos; 
Oedipus too had a similar character, he was courageous enough to take full responsibility of his actions, 
and pursued in search of truth, even when the Queen Jocasta (his mother) disapproved his plan.   
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excellence of any kind); Hamlet lacks in him any such inherent quality. 
However, this easy answer would not then enrich the plot-structure of the 
current chapter, and therefore, we must abandon the surface, tunnel deeper 
into, and examine the very ground that supports and holds together this 
particular enterprise of Shakespeare’s. ‘Making sense of’ does not mean here 
understanding the character Hamlet himself or even Shakespeare’s Hamlet as a 
literary success, but rather it is to intuit upon, identify with and appreciate the 
very [human] condition (that the writer, Shakespeare himself, tries to elaborate) 
within which imitation of an act, the play itself, or within the play can in fact be 
actualised. To value Hamlet, in this case, involves reversal (through dissecting) 
and analysing the very parts that constitute this demanding play; it is also to 
intuit upon the condition that shapes itself alone with the putting together of 
events to tell a story, in other words, the plot-structure, and the very tango of 
light and darkness (the lightness of knowledge and the darkness of ignorance) 
that it produces alone with itself, within which characters act not just upon 
themselves but upon others too. 
Hamlet (since he is far from the purity of the Gods, who are the source of light, 
the ever victorious gaze that looks down on everything, and also from all our 
Heroes) at first instance, he is us or close to us; passive and pathetic like us, and 
yet a closer examination will only reveal that he is ahead of us. One finds 
Hamlet saying things that one would never hear from Homer’s Achilles or 
Sophocles’ Oedipus: “Why, what an ass am I! This is the most brave, that I, the 
son of a dear father murdered, prompted to my revenge by heaven and hell, 
must, like a whore, unpack my heart with words and fall a-cursing like a very 
drab, a stallion! Fie upon’t, foh! About, my brains” (Shakespeare, 2002, p. 84) A 
closer examination of how Hamlet deals with himself in relation to that very 
tango of light and darkness, to that very contrast that grows out of 
Shakespeare’s plot-structure itself, that is the contrast between lightness of 
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knowledge and the darkness of ignorance would only enlighten our intellectual 
and ethical interest to know about the nature of human condition. The 
following reading will try to explicate how Hamlet’s fascination with words 
has kept him suspended at the threshold that divided the renaissance society 
(that assigned definite relation between the word and the thing) from the time of the 
revenge. It follows the disconnectedness of his thoughts in relation to the world (the 
field of relations) he is into that is reflected in his occasional misjudgement of 
situations, and tries to examine why the prince has actually failed to take 
revenge, and keep the word that he has given to his Father’s spirit. 
He couldn’t just believe it, could he? Dazed, confused and caught in the 
middle of an act, the young prince has pronounced to himself these words: 
“My father’s spirit in arms! all is not well; I doubt some foul play” 
(Shakespeare, 2002, p. 51). It seems that though the young prince of Denmark 
is removed, without his prior knowledge, from his own native land, through 
a cunning plot3 and presented before Shakespeare’s medieval English 
audience to show himself, and to his English peers, his character. The 
frequent appearance of the apparition and its revelations, at the very 
beginning of the play itself, (that set the stage for rest of all the actions) shake 
the prince to the core and divide himself from within – “in my heart there was 
a kind of fighting, that would not let me sleep”(Shakespeare, 2002, p. 140); the 
resulting uncertainties and doubts that arise within him reach their pinnacle 
with his revelation that the times now (the times that he himself is living) are 
unhinged from their pedestal; that the young prince realises for himself that, 
“th[is] time is out of joint” (Shakespeare, 2002, p. 64). The time unhinged, the 
time out of joint, for anyone, is a time when thought may carry with itself 
only fear and fury, a shadow of sorrow and melancholy. It was a difficult time 
even for the young Danish prince, “the expectancy and rose of the fair state, 
                                                          
3 The plot is the way one puts together events to tell a story.         
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the glass of fashion and the mould of form, the observed of all observers” 
(Shakespeare, 2002, p. 89). Evidently transformed, his mother, even she, after 
the conversation with Hamlet, at her closet, suggests he is but mad and “mad 
as the sea and wind” (Shakespeare, 2002, p. 112). Recalling it, at one of the 
scenes in the castle, with such pain and sorrow, Ophelia has remarked: “O, 
what a noble mind is here o’erthrown!” (Shakespeare, 2002, p. 89). 
This quick shift in opinion and the attitude towards the young prince, among 
these other characters of the play, however, only reflect their finding in 
Hamlet an unexpected closure of the Cartesian ego or the sense of confidence 
of an I (an I that reason and act with certainty). This closure of the ego, this 
very deferring and suspending of the consolidation of the I in the Danish 
prince’s rhetoric might have tempted other characters to conclude that he 
lacks perspective and this very lack might only have let the young prince’s 
soul to fill itself with rhetoric, with words and a lot of them. This conclusion 
would only let a man like Lord Polonius to decipher some sort of lunacy at 
play at the very heart of Hamlet’s replies to him: “words, words, words.” This 
very lack (at least from the point of view of other actors) of perspective, in a 
social order that is obsessed, both in life and in art, with perspective might 
have suggested other actors to consider situating Hamlet and his rhetoric at 
the very edge of their own time, at the edge of Renaissance humanism. It, 
therefore, is not strange to hear from Lord Polonius that: “your noble son is 
mad: mad call I it; for, to define true madness, what is’t but to be nothing else 
but mad? But let that go....That he is mad, ‘tis true: ‘tis true ‘tis pity; and pity 
‘tis ‘tis true: a foolish figure” (Shakespeare, 2002, p. 71). 
However, the deferring of the act of revenge – from the very beginning of the 
play itself and till its end, when a carnal, bloody and unnatural act unfolds 
itself from (what says Horatio, at the very end of the play) an unrestrained 
play of “accidental judgements” and “causal slaughters” (Shakespeare, 2002, 
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p. 151) – should be viewed from a totally different theoretical light. The 
struggle for the young Hamlet is not just a struggle against the King and his 
political apparatus; but it is also a struggle within; he is in fact divided within, 
allowing the rhetoric to thrive within him. The revelations of the apparition, 
even though, open a glimmer of the exterior, allowing the prince to encounter 
the truth of reality that the time he is in itself is [in fact] out of joint 
(Shakespeare, 2002, p. 64). This privileged view, however, is not open for all; 
it is not granted to all. Queen Gertrude’s reply, in the scene at her closet, “This 
is the very coinage of your brain” (Shakespeare, 2002, p. 109), suggests such a 
situation. And still this privileged view, this view from the very edge, would 
only suspend Hamlet at the very threshold that has divided the interior (the 
prevailing state of order) from the exterior (the another possibility: if 
followed, for a moment, the point of view of other characters, one may say – 
insanity). Trapped, thus, at the very point of passage, perplexed by the 
complex labyrinth of words, Hamlet finds himself constantly dragged 
between the interior of the exterior and inversely. His inability to overcome 
the lure of words only drags him back to the order of linear time, the order of 
the present king. The young prince’s struggles to get rid of the linear time, to 
intuit upon the exterior – “to be or not to be” – however, only take him into 
the more intricate corners of the labyrinth of words. The lure of words opens 
in the young prince a flood of anxiety, he then finds himself withheld at the 
threshold, unable to cross to the exterior, unable, therefore, to act.   
Hence Hamlet can neither act (madness) nor can he actually be considered 
mad in a medical sense. His madness is not his disguise, but rather he is 
disguised from himself by the utter mystery of the time (it can even be “a 
damned ghost that we have seen”), the time into which he finds himself 
thrown into. Hamlet, since the revelations of the apparition granted him a 
glimmer of the truth of the reality that the time [indeed] is out of joint, views 
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reality from its very edge. As he (unlike other characters, especially the queen, 
Gertrude) does not actually believe King Claudius, it is only his anxiety for 
the exterior – exterior of time itself, the exterior of the socio-political order 
maintained by the figure of the king – that is reflected in his seemingly 
cunning rhetoric. It is the prevailing order that sustains itself through 
maintaining a definite relationship between words and things that makes 
others in the play to believe that the young prince is madness. It is in fact 
they, the other characters, who thought that he is mad. However, what 
actually throws the young Danish prince indefinitely into his present state, 
into this endless probing of the darkness of the prison, Denmark itself, with 
the aid of nothing but the flickering light of a slice of truth, granted to him by 
the apparition (the Father’s spirit), is words.4 Words defer action and suspend 
                                                          
4 Derrida’s interpretation of Hamlet, however, seems to have been shaped by his reading of Aristotle’s 
Physics, and Heidegger’s take on Aristotelian notion of time. The “Ousia and Gramme,” for instance, 
has famously stated that “time could be a (in) being only in not being what it is... (Derrida, 1982, p. 52); 
that is, since time itself has to undergo metamorphoses (that is, it has to become that which it 
essentially is not) for to be a (in) being, for to be in discourse, it is not what we actually perceive as 
being (as linear progression); Derrida suggests that time, for that matter, can only be an inaccessible 
other series. The reading of Hamlet, in Specters of Marx, it seems, only develops his argument further, 
when he argues that apparition (since it is only an apparition) is not totally part of (anyone’s) past [he, 
for instance, writes: “nor does one see in flesh and blood this Thing that is not a thing, this thing that is 
invisible between its apparitions, when it reappears. This Thing meanwhile looks at us and sees us not 
see it even when it is there. A spectral asymmetry interrupts here all specularity” (Derrida, 2012, p. 6)]; 
for this reason, he draws a line, a line actually along the other series, between the spirit-world and the 
future, and declares that it is actually the nocturnal (haunting) calling – Ghost: “Mark me...I am thy 
Fathers Spirit” (Shakespeare, 2002, p, 59) – that is the true source of ethics (it seems, temporality, at 
least from Derrida’s viewpoint, is an inherent property of time itself; that is, time, even at the level of 
the other series, is always in becoming temporal, moving from uncertainty to uncertainty, moving 
from the uncertainty of the spirit-world to the uncertainty of the future). However, does ethics have its 
roots in our nocturnal haunting? Is our desire to speak to and speak with the spirit truly the source of 
(our) ethics? And then – why this desire for apparition? Does the spirit also share a similar desire? 
Does it desire to speak to us? Why the spectre presence itself. Does it presence itself as absence? Is 
there a spectral asymmetry when it actually presence itself? The conversation between Hamlet and his 
friends, however, suggests; no, there is no such asymmetry, when it actually presence itself; since it 
itself desires to present itself, presence its corpse, “making night hideous.” Horatio encounters in the 
spirit exactly the king of the best of his memory; armed, prideful and victorious from battle, the image 
in itself has the stature of a metaphor for a desirable king (yet he noticed, in the apparition, an 
inconsistency, it wears a shadow of sorrow): “Hamlet: arm’d say you? Marcellus and Bernardo: Arm’s 
my lord. Hamlet: From top to toe? Marcellus and Bernardo: My lord, from head to foot. Hamlet: then 
saw you not his face? Horatio: O, yes my lord, he wore his beaver up. Hamlet: What, look’d he 
frowningly? Horatio: A countenance more in sorrow than in anger” (Shakespeare, 2002, p. 50). It is 
then true that when it appears, the apparition appears in material body that is, the desire to talk is 
nothing but a shared one – that the exchange is definitely not one sided. 
128 | P a g e    C h a p t e r  I V  
 
the young prince to the very center of a regal theatre of thought, a grand 
tango of light and darkness, as he himself recollects: “for there is nothing 
either good or bad, but thinking makes it so.” The challenge then, for Hamlet, 
is words.              
Words yet again triumph over the young prince of Denmark, even after all his 
attempts to get rid of them, they, like those sworn guards, who watch the 
prison of rhetoric, have always watched and followed him (their prisoner). 
Hear! Hamlet swearing: “Remember thee! Ay, thou poor ghost, while 
memory holds a seat in this distracted globe. Remember thee! Yea, from the 
table of my memory I’ll wipe away all trivial fond records, all saws of books, 
all forms, all pressures past, that youth and observation copied there” 
(Shakespeare, 2002, p. 61).5 And yet! Words, through their regular 
interferences, have only succeeded in deferring the young prince’s action.6 If 
Denmark is “one o’ the worst” prisons (‘a goodly one,’ with many ‘confines, 
wards and dungeons’), then language, for the young prince, is one of its 
confines or wards.  
The combination of levels of pessimism and scepticism actually makes 
Hamlet different from many other heroes. Hamlet seems mad, not because he 
has gone totally insane. He seems mad (to other characters in the play) 
because he is incomprehensible; because he does not give himself to other’s 
intellect. He is insane, as he, in a (renaissance) society preoccupied with 
analysing the relationship between words and things, is anxious of exploring 
all possible relations words can have with themselves in the very absence of 
any transcendental signified or of things. He seems insane because he is 
                                                          
5 A recognisable scepticism, quite similar to Pyrrhonian scepticism, can be dictated in Hamlet’s rhetoric, 
especially when he suggests to Rosencrantz that “there is nothing either good or bad, but thinking 
makes it so” (Shakespeare, 2002, p. 75), and yet he seems struggling throughout the play to achieve 
some level of tranquillity and composure. Pyrrhonians prefer calmness, as they thought, like Hamlet, 
that it is actually thinking that would make either good or bad.  
6 See Appendix 1 
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playing with rhetoric. He is rhetorical, most of the time.7 It is quite evident 
that, through Hamlet’s soliloquies, Shakespeare has invented human 
subjectivity. 
Hamlet, Ronald Knowles, for instance, has argued that, has masked himself 
with nothing but rhetoric. He has refused to communicate meaningfully, as 
he refused to give up his private grief to the public with “debased values” 
(Knowles, 1999, p. 1061). Knowles has suggested, the unintelligibility of the 
young Danish prince’s rhetoric is rather due to its intensity. Hamlet’s 
“understanding is intense that he is not understood” (Knowles, 1999, p. 1061); 
his conversation with Lord Polonius, for Knowles, is an example.  
Hamlet: 
For if the sun breed maggots in a dead dog, being a 
Good kissing carrion – have you a daughter? 
Lord Polonius: 
I have, my lord. 
Hamlet: 
Let her not walk i’ th’ sun. Conception is a 
Blessing, but as your daughter may conceive – friend, 
Look to’t.   
Though the language seems not communicating enough to Lord Polonius, 
Knowles, however, doubts whether it is actually true about us, who, unlike 
Lord Polonius, have accessed all Lord Hamlet’s soliloquies. He expressed his 
doubts on whether or not these remarks of Hamlet are communicating 
perfectly to us, the audience, by putting a question mark after the us – ‘(and 
                                                          
7 Since being both pessimistic and rhetorical, Hamlet seems, at least from the point of view of  On Poetics, 
not quite qualified either to be a true Aristotelian tragedy, the imitation of an act “of stature and 
complete, with magnitude” by means of “sweetened speech” (Aristotle, 2002, p, 17). The stress here on 
‘imitation’ and ‘sweetened speech’ that is constituted upon an understanding of time, as the ceaseless 
flow from past to the future, elevates courage (and, for that matter, all courage) to the stature of 
metaphor; this is one reason why Michael Davis, in his introduction to Aristotle’s On Poetics, has 
written that Achilles: (since “he [already] knows his fate”); “like all brave men, he [also] wants “to die 
like Achilles” (Aristotle, 2002, p. xv). Still this metaphoric I is not a transcendental incorporeal form of 
a Platonic nature, it rather is constituted within the matrix of the sense-perceptions.          
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us?).’ Lord Polonius does not understand, and he is not supposed to 
understand Hamlet either, since the young Danish prince is baffling with him 
and seems absolutely in control of the situation and still ‘he cannot be said to 
baffle Polonius completely since Polonius thinks that he is mad anyway’ 
(Knowles, 1999, p. 1062); but then can’t we really understand the person, 
Hamlet himself? Even after all his soliloquies! After re-examining the above-
mentioned passage, suggests Knowles, even though the sun is the source of 
decay, as it decomposes the corpse, by breeding maggots; it is also the source 
of life, as it also breeds (maggots). The vulgar association of the physiological 
with the moral, in the very process of fleshly corruption, tends Hamlet to 
think about Ophelia (“have you a daughter?”) and ‘of the human conception 
and birth’ (Knowles, 1999, p. 1062). Since sun, as we have already seen, is the 
source of procreative life; Knowles suggests, he must have puns sun as son 
(suggesting Hamlet as possible procreator) and recommends Lord Polonius, 
“Let her not walk i’ th’ sun.” Here sun is considered as the very symbol of 
kingship. In sum what this afore-mentioned exchange suggests, for Knowles, 
is that “keep her out of the court where the procreative act, sex, is corrupt, 
“but as your daughter may conceive, friend look to’t”” (Knowles, 1999, p. 
1062). 
Why then this obscurity, this conscious masking of words with words. Why is 
Hamlet hiding himself behind the shadow of words? What is the source of all 
his pessimism? Does the cause of his pessimism, this obsession with rhetoric, 
this very desire for word play suggest to us, the audience, anything? Are 
Hamlet’s wordplays actually faithful to their desired outcomes (their effects 
on other characters of the play)? It is very clear that the Wittenberg educated 
young prince, through rhetoric, has actually been able to have (more than 
once) a decisive influence on situations – situations into which he has been 
thrown into. Hamlet’s success in baffling, at different stages of the play, Lord 
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Polonius and his old childhood friends, Guildenstern and Rosencrantz, are 
signs of success; still while inspecting the skull of the king’s jester, in the scene 
at the churchyard, Horatio, on the other hand, immediately succeeds in 
reading young Hamlet’s mind and anticipates an imminent wordplay; his 
query, “What’s that, my lord?,” as a result, opens the very possibility of a 
conversation on Alexander the Great. 
The nature of Hamlet’s relationship with Horatio is reflected in his 
monologue with him – “give me that man that is not passion’s slave [my italic], 
and I will wear him in my heart’s core, ay, in my heart of heart” (Shakespeare, 
2002, p. 93) – in the castle-scene, before the players start staging the drama. 
Their relationship actually echoes the ancient Greek concern of the self that 
Shakespeare takes up seriously to reflect upon in Julius Caesar through a 
dialogue between Brutus and Cassius.8 The young prince’s growing concern 
for himself, for his disturbed soul – “since my dear soul was mistress of her 
choice” – here compels him to elevate Horatio, his good old childhood-friend, 
to the level of an inner god (Shakespeare, 2002, p. 92).9 Their relationship, 
therefore, develops, not from any form of compassion or even pity that the 
prince shows towards his poor friend; rather it evolves out of Hamlet’s 
educated reflection on himself and the situation into which he is thrown into 
by forces alien to his knowledge. The young Danish prince finds himself at 
perpetual danger, shadowed by fear – “To be or not to be” – he finds himself 
passive and pathetic “like a whore, unpack my heart with words and fall a-
cursing like a very drab, a stallion!;” his soul, shadowed with fear cultivated 
at its ‘heart of heart’ by a play of difference, shamelessly yields before her 
                                                          
8 “Cassius: ...Tell me, good Brutus, can you see your face? Brutus: No, Cassius, for the eye sees not itself 
but by reflection, by some other thing” (Shakespeare, 2005, p. 11); and therefore, “Cassius: ...good 
Brutus, be prepared to hear, and since you know you cannot see yourself so well as by reflection, I, 
your glass, will modestly discover to yourself that of yourself which you yet know not of” 
(Shakespeare, 2005, p. 12).         
9 Foucault, while studying Greek missive for instance has located, between the correspondences, the 
unfolding of a similar reciprocity of gaze, which is essentially non-hierarchical (Foucault, 1997, p. 217).  
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own desires. He is the sun that is the very source of both life and decay and, 
therefore, a strong companion-guide like Horatio, the young Danish prince 
would, at last, have concluded that, be a very desirable partner, a partner, 
whom he can wear in his heart’s troubled ‘core, ay, in [his] heart of heart.’ 
Hamlet despises himself; he finds himself crippled (as he is fully taken in its 
trap) by his rationales (his own thoughts) and ignoring the act of revenge; in 
most cases, the thought for the young Danish prince is for its own sake; in 
other words, thought, in his case, is devoid of any significant contribution 
from the sense-perception; his intuitions are not always backed by any careful 
studies of the reports from sense-perception, rather they are pure intellectual 
endeavours. At the very heart of Hamlet, therefore, is rationalism, the form of 
it that continues from Plato to Descartes and then to Leibniz.10 That is, a 
certain aversion, in Hamlet, towards considering the reports of own sense-
perceptions, the signs of the present (as elements constituting knowledge) 
turns the seeking of truth purely a rational activity. He speaks words, like a 
man with fine innate qualities, than a very studious observer. He is a man of 
intellect, a man of sheer genius. This aversion for the inputs of the sense-
perceptions, for the world of sensible, at times, has guided him to misreading 
of time the present in itself – “Now might I do it pat, now he is praying; and 
now I’ll do’t. And so he goes to heaven (Shakespeare, 2002, p. 104): these 
misreading of time, at different stages of the play, this particular inability of 
the young Danish prince to see the present without prejudice and 
justification, to see it in itself, insert fear in his soul. Hamlet’s thought, 
                                                          
10 It is no wonder that the Cartesian cogito (the certainty of an I confirmed by “I think,” the rational 
activity of a mind that combines concepts to develop conceptions) and the Leibniziean monad (the 
mind folded towards itself) have their linage in Greek thought, especially in Plato. With Plato all true 
forms of knowledge are actually nothing but reason’s comprehension of intelligible forms. The 
transcendence and the priority of the incorporeal forms link seeking knowledge with recollection and, 
for that reason, all forms of true knowledge are justifiably independent of sense-perception. Besides, 
in all these thinkers, it is actually noticeable that, a priori knowledge is always grounded in innate 
ideas.    
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consequently, is a thought fuelled, at his soul, by an ever intensifying 
pessimism, rooted in nothing but fear and fury. However, Hamlet, with such 
fine innate intellect, cannot be a man unaware of his own weakness; his 
exchange, particularly with Horatio – the god whom he wears in his heart of 
heart – before the players start playing their drama, at the castle, in front of 
the king and the queen, quite clearly implies some form of his earlier 
educated evaluation of himself, his qualities and his ill-fates in analysing 
sense-perceptions; he solicits Horatio, therefore, to help him in observing his 
uncle, the king Claudius himself, and his occulted guilt: “when thou seest that 
act afoot, even with the very comment of thy soul observe mine uncle” 
(Shakespeare, 2002, p. 93). 
Considering Hamlet’s stature of high degree, as the person “most immediate 
to [the] throne” of Denmark (Shakespeare, 2002, p. 47), the king, for instance, 
has indicated that ‘Madness in great ones [my italic] must not unwatched go;’ 
that the lunacy, in the young Danish prince, must in no case be left 
unwatched that it may rage (Shakespeare, 2002, p. 90). His judgement of 
Hamlet, however, is a conditioned one; it is deeply structured by the plot (the 
way Shakespeare organised events to tell the story, the way he wanted it to 
be). With the guilt of the culprit and the sole bearer of the truth of the reality, 
the king must have, in him, a lot to hide. Like most of his remarks,11 this 
particular remark of the king is nothing but a mere deceitful (and it, therefore, 
from his point of view is trivial) one, since he himself doubts Hamlet. The 
king, it seems, is reasonably convinced that Hamlet’s insane act “was not like 
madness. [And rather] There’s something in his soul o’er which his 
melancholy sits on brood, and I do doubt the hatch and the disclose will be 
some danger” (Shakespeare, 2002, p. 89); hence the question actually is: can 
                                                          
11 The only sincere words he might have uttered are in the soliloquy that follows his failed attempt to 
pray: “My words fly up, my thoughts remain below. Words without thoughts never to heaven go” 
(Shakespeare, 2002, p. 105). 
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one of us, the audience, the viewer, who has got the privilege to place himself 
at the very threshold that sets apart his life and Shakespeare’s plot, take, any of 
the king’s trivial remarks on the young prince, for granted, without proper 
criticism and declare Hamlet (by merely considering the circumstances that 
lead to the withholding of his privileges of birth) a tragic hero? The young 
prince, as the immediate heir to the crown, is obviously important. But then, 
is Hamlet really a person of any greatness? What kind of effect can his lack of 
control on himself at a time of total decay inflict on our feeble souls? Does his 
troubled soul suggest anything to ours?   
The lure of words defeats Hamlet altogether, engulfs his soul and corrupts it 
with fear and fury; he is a man totally immersed in and driven by words. 
This, to a large extent, cripples his abilities to detach the spirit effectively from 
all kinds of external influence and to observe, without prejudice or 
justification, both himself and the framework of his own thoughts. He is a 
man who lacks the spiritual strength to rise above the thick fold of words and 
its very lure and organise a sensibility that is exterior to and yet in relation to 
the linear time (time as (in) being) – a sensibility that, we should all live under 
the illuminating light of ethics; as if we were living under the plain sight of 
both oneself and all other men (Foucault, 1997, p. 217). Hamlet, consequently, 
has failed to organise a vision without an image. His desire for revenge, 
therefore, cannot come out of any ethical drive or a demand for justice; rather 
it is a very clear act of vengeance: “The point envenomed too! Then, venom, 
[my italic] to thy work” (Shakespeare, 2002, p. 149). With mind folded 
towards itself, Hamlet rather is a true monad, and yet is also a man neglected 
by himself; even at this time of decay he is reluctant to take care of himself.12 
                                                          
12 Foucault’s journey to the Greek antiquity and his encounter with the Socratic rationality, for instance, 
suggest that no observation (or a search for the truth) is complete without also considering seriously 
the observer, who undertakes that very observation. The aim of the man of the antiquity is to master 
oneself by mastering over one’s own passions and desires through techniques of self; here mastering 
oneself directly involves detaching one from oneself (Foucault, 1997, p. 270). 
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Driven by words and the thought that carries them, he rather lets himself 
involve in a cat and mouse act with other characters. ”Polonius: My lord, the 
Queen would speak with you, and presently. Hamlet: Do you see yonder 
cloud that’s almost in shape of a camel? Polonius: By th’Mass, and ‘tis like a 
camel indeed. Hamlet: Methinks it is like a weasel. Polonius: It is backed like 
a weasel. Hamlet: Or like a whale? Polonius: Very like a whale. Hamlet: Then 
I will come to my mother by and by (Shakespeare, 2002, p. 101). The 
cunningness and the deception that Hamlet displays only stop the playing out 
of the force of pure play, and therefore, he fails to initiate new beginnings.  
Hamlet has that innate quality to pick the very pulse of a situation and reacts 
adequately; he is a born actor and for that reason, a very demanding character 
for any accomplished stage actor; like a chameleon, he is able to switch 
colours to suit the situation. He is a man moulded by reactive forces. Quite 
often he, ignoring his responsibilities, engages in wordplays, both with 
himself and others, and explores the immanent moves within them. It is 
evident that Hamlet practices what he believes, and what he believes, he 
teaches others: he, for instance, advises the players to “be not too tame 
neither, but let your own discretion be your tutor. Suit the action to the word, 
the word to the action, with this special observance, that you o’erstep not the 
modesty of nature: for anything so o’erdone is from the purpose of playing, 
whose end, both at the first and now, was and is, to hold, as ‘twere, the mirror 
up to nature; show virtue her own feature, scorn her own image, and the very 
age and body of the time his form and pressure” (Shakespeare, 2002, p. 91). 
Here is a man, in Hamlet, who plays tricks with his own time, than concern 
himself to change himself and his time. 
Immanent to any mode of existence is a certain mode of relationship to time, a 
certain mode of mapping time, time as (in) being. With a peculiar 
combination of fear and fury, Hamlet‘s relation to his own time however 
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stands apart. This, on the one hand, opens space for the discussions on 
different modes of relationship to time in the footnotes, and, on the other hand, 
permits placing Foucault’s encounter with the care of the self. 
II 
ARJUNA: 
Yea! I have seen! I see 
Lord! All is wrapped in Thee!13 
Arnold, 1996, p. 138 
But to apprehend 
The point of intersection of the timeless 
With time, is an occupation for the saint – 
No occupation either, but something 
given 
And taken, in a lifetime’s death in love, 
Ardour and selflessness and 
Self-surrender. 
T S Eliot, The Four Quarters  
Form and the Play of the Outside  
In Foucault’s work, what ceaselessly splits the living present into past and 
future through contraction and expectation is a central absence that ceaselessly 
repeats itself. It is the very repetition of this absence that sets the both sides of 
the divide, the past and future, into motion, and exposes man to an immanent 
                                                          
13 The infinity, as it reveals itself before Arjuna, he becomes one with the immanent whole, the ultimate 
reality. The irresistible presence of the infinite liberates language from the dialectical movement of 
representation. His thought, therefore, emanates not from any formal relation to the infinity, but 
directly from the overpowering presence of the infinity. It is a fundamentally different experience. The 
swarming infinity stops the returning of any particular desire; rather than letting desires multiply 
themselves, they themselves become one with the ultimate reality, the univocal one. Arjuna describes, 
without any yearning, the infinity, as he himself becomes one with it. The absolute immanence of the 
infinity not just limits his desire from traversing any distance, but also restrains him both from 
recording that experience and also from the psychological invention of the moment of encounter; and 
therefore, Arjuna does not desire the infinity (that is, as the movement of desire does not attain 
circularity, his experience is always new); rather he, in the grace of infinity, lives that moment. In a 
quite similar situation, while encountering the father’s spirit, Hamlet, the young Wittenberg educated 
Danish prince, on the other hand, overpowered by fear, uttering words: “Angels and ministers of 
grace defend us!” (Shakespeare, 2002, p. 57). The force of his rationale always led him to suspect all 
others; he even suspects the apparition. When the theatre group arrives, to play their act at the castle, 
Hamlet was even suspicious of the revelations of the apparition – “it is a damned ghost that we have 
seen” (Shakespeare, 2002, p. 93). 
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flux, to a field of undifferentiated forces. It is within the play of this morphogenetic 
field of forces that both the self and the topography of the world that it perceives 
take form. Since the center is an unapproachable absence, and it is the 
repetition of this central absence that unfolds this very immanent field of 
movement, Deleuze, in his work on Foucault, argues that self is constituted by 
folding the outside towards itself, in other words, the self is constituted by 
folding the forces of desires and pleasures towards themselves. It, then, is a 
recession into future. The following reading aims to outline broadly the actual 
topography of this immanent field within which the whole action unfolds 
itself. It opens with a reading of Foucault’s reading of Bataille. There, what 
one finds is: being that is nothing but pure movement (and, therefore, has no 
existence outside movement) repeatedly transgressing the limit in the very 
presence of a central absence, an empty skull, that is, forces organising coups 
from beneath the consolidated masks of previous forces.   
Transgression, here, is conceived as an act of profanation without an object, 
that is, it is not against anything, and therefore, does not negate anything. It is 
a profanation that is essentially, “empty and turned inward upon itself and 
whose instruments are brought to bear on nothing but each other” (Foucault, 
1980, p. 30). Foucault writes, what transgression prescribes is not just the sole 
“manner of discovering the sacred in its unmediated substance, but also a 
way of recomposing its empty form, its absence, through which it becomes all 
the more scintillating” (Ibid, 1980, p. 30). The following reading tries to 
highlight the very nature of transgression that Foucault portrayed, and that in 
short is: being (that is nothing but movement) repeatedly transgresses (an act 
of profanation without an object, that is, this act essentially an empty act) the 
limit in a relationship that takes the form of a spiral, around a central absence, 
an empty skull. Here the emptiness of the act itself suggests the recession into 
future.              
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In “A Preface to Transgression,” Foucault, through an examination of the play 
of limit (finitude) and transgression (being), presents a theory of the 
affirmation of division, and a possibility inherent to it, that is, the very 
possibility of a non-dialectical language. Obstinacy, Foucault suggests, is the 
governing law of the play of limits and transgression. Foucault writes, 
“transgression is an action which involves the limit, that narrow zone of a line 
where it displays the flash of its passage, but perhaps also its entire trajectory, 
even its origin; it is like that transgression has its entire space in the line it 
crosses” (Foucault, 1980, p. 34). It ‘incessantly crosses and recrosses a line 
which closes up behind it in a wave of extremely short duration.’ Hence it is 
made to return again and again right to the horizon of the uncrossable taking 
its relation with the limit to the form of a spiral. With each transgression, ‘the 
limit opens violently onto the limitless, finds itself suddenly carried away by 
the content it had rejected and fulfilled by this alien plenitude which invades 
it to the core of its being. It, therefore, only serves as the glorification of the 
nature it excludes’ (Foucault, 1980, p. 34). 
Transgression, Foucault writes, is violence in its purest form. But it does not 
relate to the limit like the relation between black and white or that between 
the outside and the inside. Since it contains nothing negative, it does not even 
transform the other side of the mirror (the limit). Rather it only ‘affirms the 
limited being – affirms the limitlessness into which it leaps as it opens this 
zone to existence for the first time’ (Ibid, 35). Foucault writes, “Perhaps it is 
like a flash of lightning in the night which, from the beginning of time, gives a 
dense and black intensity to the night it denies, which lights up the night from 
the inside, from top to bottom, and yet owes to the dark the stark clarity of its 
manifestation, its harrowing and poised singularity; the flash loses itself in 
this space it marks with its sovereignty and becomes silent now that it has 
given a name to obscurity” (Ibid, p. 35).  
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Transgression carries thought to its very limits and, ‘from there, to the Limit 
where an ontological decision achieves its end.’ To contest (in the sense that 
Blanchot gives to the word), according to Foucault, ‘is to proceed until one 
reaches the empty core where being achieves its limit and where the limit 
defines being’ (Ibid, 1980, p. 36). Still this motion, one finds Foucault insisting, 
must not be understood ‘as the promised return to a homeland or the 
recovery of an original soil which produced and which will naturally resolve 
every opposition (this is a very important difference that Foucault draws 
against metaphysics – one can deploy even against the Hindu metaphysics 
which we have examined at the beginning – where the morphological field of 
intensities that produces both names and extensions are essentially unfolding 
within an ultimate reality, a univocal one, but for Foucault such a reality is 
inaccessible to human experience). On the contrary, transgression aims to 
liberate our language – by carrying it to its very limit and, finally folding it 
towards itself to liberating it from its speaking subject. Transgression is an act 
of affirmation that affirms nothing; it is essentially with an empty core. 
Foucault suggests, “[a]t the very transgressed limit, the “yes” of contestation 
reverberates, leaving without echo the hee-haw of Nietzsche’s braying ass” 
(Ibid, 1980, p. 36): Deleuze, on the contrary, writes in Pure Immanence that 
“affirmation is itself essentially multiple and pluralist, whereas negation is 
always one, or heavily monist” (Deleuze, 2001, p. 74). Power as a will to power, 
according to Deleuze, does not suggest that which the will wants, but rather 
that which wants in the will. To him, Dionysus himself is the will to power 
(Deleuze, 2001, p. 73).     
Foucault writes, “[a]nd perhaps to all those who strive above all to maintain 
the unity of the philosopher’s grammatical function – at the price of the 
coherence, even of the existence of philosophical language – we could oppose 
Bataille’s exemplary enterprise: his desperate and relentless attack on the 
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preeminence of the philosophical subject as it confronted him in his own 
work, in his experience and his language which became his private torment, 
in the first reflected torture of that which speaks in philosophical language – 
in the dispersion of stars that encircle a median night, allowing voiceless 
words to be born. “Like a flock chased by an infinite shepherd, we, the 
bleating wave, would flee, endlessly flee from horror of reducing being to 
totality “” (Ibid, 1980, pp. 42 – 3). In Bataille’s work, Foucault suggests, it is the 
eye that has kept its value as the figure of inner experience: “When at the 
height of anguish, I gently solicit a strange absurdity, an eye opens at the 
summit, in the middle of my skull” (Ibid, 1980, p. 44). If the eye, within a 
philosophy of reflection, ‘derives from its capacity to observe the power of 
becoming always more interior to itself,’ in Bataille its function is reversed 
entirely in an opposite direction.         
The eye, in a violent move, is forced from its ordinary position. It is made to 
turn itself upwards to face it towards the nocturnal, towards the interior of 
the skull, thereby allowing us to see only its usually concealed surface, white 
and unseeing. It ‘shuts out the day in a movement that manifests its own 
whiteness (whiteness being undoubtedly the image of clarity, its surface 
reflection, but for this very reason, it cannot communicate with it, nor 
communicate it)’ (Ibid, 1980, p. 46). Hence ‘the circular night of the iris is 
made to address the central absence which it illuminates with a flash, 
revealing it as night’ (Ibid, 1980, p. 46). Even though this violent upward 
turning of the eye denies any possibility of seeing, the eye (as white and 
unseeing) is open to sight, evicting the philosophical subject totally and 
followed to its limit, allowing now the sovereignty of the philosophical 
language to be heard ‘from the distance, in the measureless void left behind 
by the exorbitated subject.’ When the great eyelid closes upon the world, in 
that very moment of meditation, what it discovers is that the interior is nothing 
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but an empty skull, a central absence (Ibid, 1980, p. 49). Hence the play of limit 
and transgression is played out, according to Foucault, in the presence of a 
central absence – he suggests that the inside, in relation to the outside, is an 
empty skull.    
The play of transgression and limit that Foucault shows in “A Preface to 
Transgression” is entirely different from Aristotle’s definition of action in On 
Poetics, since an action for Aristotle is related essentially to imitation. 
Transgression is not an act of courage (organised around a myth). It is neither 
violence in a divided world nor a victory over the limit. It is rather an empty 
act and, therefore, without an object, and is essentially folded towards itself, 
and what it affirms is the existence of pure difference. It is rather governed by 
obstinacy (which is an essential characteristic of forces). Foucault writes: ‘at 
the very transgressed limit, the “yes” of contestation reverberates, leaving 
without echo the hee-haw of Nietzsche’s braying ass.’ Is transgression, then, a 
tension internal to a discourse driven by (affirmative) forces? – to ‘a discourse 
whose tension would keep separate the empirical and the transcendental, 
while being directed at both; a discourse that would make it possible to 
analyse man as a subject, that is, as a locus of knowledge which has been 
empirically acquired but referred back as closely as possible to what makes it 
possible’ (Foucault, 1994, p. 320). In Foucault’s work, thought that is 
conceived as a confused form of discursive formations, is, actually, the very 
form of action, and for that reason, it has both Apollonian (logic, reason and 
individuation) and Dionysian (intuitive, impulsive or emotions) aspects 
within it. Since the interior is an empty skull, a central absence, thought must 
always come from outside, and addresses nothing other than itself. 
Through an act of transgression, thought then is carried to its limits and from 
there to the Limit where an ontological decision achieves its final end. 
Thought, then, involves both constraint and freedom, and this is built upon 
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Foucault discovery that power is not external to freedom. What Foucault 
presupposes, Sybylla writes, is ‘a complicated process, an ‘agonism,’ as it is 
not consciousness, but also the ‘unknown sage,’ ‘the body’s active, 
unconscious and mutable forces’ that rule human beings (Sybylla, 2004, p. 
318). Foucault writes: “thought is not what inhabits a certain conduct and 
gives it its meaning; rather, it is what allows one to step back from this way of 
acting or reacting, to present it to oneself as an object of thought and question 
it as to its meaning, its conditions, and its goals. Thought is freedom in 
relation to what one does, the motion by which one detaches oneself from it, 
establishes it as an object, and reflects on it as a problem” (Foucault, 2003, p. 
23). Foucault builds problematisation around Kantian notion of critique. Yet 
the empirical and the transcendental are coupled in Foucault in the confused 
form of discourse on the human (Djaballah, 2008, p.7). Foucauldian 
problematisation, for that reason, is not formal, as is the case with Kantian 
criticism. Like Kantian criticism, Foucauldian problematisation, driven by 
scepticism to power – that is, organised forces – is naturally a problem 
concerning power. Problematisation, Foucault writes, “does not mean the 
representation of a pre-existent object nor the creation through discourse of an 
object that did not exist. It is the ensemble of discursive and non-discursive 
practices that make something enter into the play of true and false and 
constitute it as an object of thought (whether in the form of moral reflection, 
scientific knowledge, political analysis, etc.)” (Rabinow and Rose, 2003, p. 
xviii).   
It is actually the problem concerning power that must have held back 
Foucault from developing a theory of relation of words and things out of his 
archaeological method. Unlike hermeneutics, his archaeology does not claim 
to explore the deeper meaning within layers of historically developed 
discursive formations. Archaeology rather aims to treat human sciences 
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merely as discourse-objects, without involving in the debates around their 
truth, that is, it is inclined, at the very level of method, to treat its materials 
(the discourse-objects) deprived of its contents: that means, without taking 
into consideration their meanings or truth claims. Foucault writes, 
“statements do not attempt to evade verbal performance in order to discover 
behind them or below their apparent surface a hidden element, a secret 
meaning that lies buried within them, or which emerges through them 
without saying so...” (Foucault, 1972, p. 109). Archaeology rather treats 
discourses only as rule-governed systems, with their “accepted concepts, 
legitimized subjects, taken-for-granted objects, and preferred strategies, 
which yield justified truth claims” (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1982, p. xxiv).  
Unintelligibility is the defining characteristics of this casual power attributed 
to the rules governing discursive formations, and this incomprehensibility of 
the relationship between the discursive and institutional formations, and the 
ways with which they shape meaning and truth of life, it seems, to have 
always concerned Foucault’s thinking, and for that reason, his later 
Nietzschean turn, that is his shift towards genealogical approaches, is only a 
possibility opened within his archaeology (that is, even though archaeology 
deals primarily with knowledge, it also tempt one to imagine an outside). 
Dreyfus and Rabinow quote Foucault: “I believed that I spoke from the same 
place as that discourse, and that in defining its space I was situating my 
remarks: but I must now acknowledge that I can no longer speak from the 
space from which I showed they spoke” (Ibid, 1982, p. xxiv). Problematisation 
is an experience unfolded within a system of relations of power.  
Through a microphysics of relations of forces, Deleuze, for instance, suggests 
that in its becoming, before the force coup and overcome the pre-existing 
force and its masks, it must appear concealed by the mask of pre-existing force; that 
is, according to him, “life must first imitate matter” (Deleuze, 2001, p. 67). 
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Philosophical force, at the time of its birth in Greece, for instance, has to 
disguise itself by the mask of a pre-existing force, the priest. ‘The young 
Greek philosopher has something of the old Oriental priest’ (Deleuze, 2001, p. 
67). The peculiar solitude and the sensibility, an excess to the mask of the pre-
existing force, the form of thought of a priest, are actually beyond the guess of 
that mask, it is in fact beyond any form of guess. The finer microphysics of forces 
that constitutes and presences the logics and sensibilities of the force of philosophy 
that would eventually overthrow the mask of the priest is also in the becoming. Like 
all forces, the force of philosophy also recreates itself. Whenever it overcomes 
the mask of pre-existing force, it always comes with new masks. Without 
masks, force is only a much fainted sense of change – a ceaseless self-becoming not 
given to either intelligence or intuition. Force, from the point of view of the 
senses, is essentially movement.  
Can we assume that all forces gain their force in relation to a system; that is it is 
only when force transgresses its own limit that is the limit built within itself, in 
accordance with its relations and functions within a system that it becomes a 
force? To become a force, does it actually have to ceaselessly coup itself (like 
the heart, with each beat, drives blood, stimulates the faculties of sensation and 
gives voice to silence)? Are these ceaseless coups, from within itself that 
maintain the force as force? Is it through overthrowing itself that a force 
overflows the virtual order, the mobile arrangements of relations? Becoming of 
force involves ceaseless coups – coups that involve not just overthrowing of 
the mask of the pre-existing force, but also self-overthrowing. To put 
differently, to affirm itself force has to negate at once both its interior and 
exterior. In other words, it affirms the whole. Deleuze, for instance, suggests 
in Pure Immanence that the secret of philosophy lost at its very origin ‘remains 
to be discovered in the future’ (Deleuze, 2001, p. 68). Does this defining nature 
of all affirmative forces have anything to do with this lose? It is within the free 
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play of form and force that the theatrics unfolds itself. The force of philosophy 
had to transgress the form (limit) of the priest with a peculiar solitude and 
sensibility, that is, it has to organise a coup from beneath the mask of the 
priest to affirm itself.    
Derrida in his take of the two drives, the Apollonian and the Dionysian that 
Nietzsche has identified in Greek culture, writes in “Force and Signification” 
that “Form fascinates when one no longer has the force to understand [my 
italic] force from within force” (Derrida, 2007, p. 3). The demand for a certain 
force in oneself, evoked here when Derrida writes when-one-not-longer-has-
the-force-to-understand-force-from-within-force seems to refer to a force gained 
through forms of pain, that is, through disciplines and training. 
Deconstruction, one must say, is Dionysian in its very heart; it is a play of 
excess. In Derrida’s reading – that is, ‘[o]ne not longer has the force to 
understand force from within force’ – one only senses within it the temporal 
nature of the unfolding relations between form and force. The question, it 
seems, is much more than whether one has within himself, a fascination towards 
form or a force to understand force from within force. It rather demands 
proficiency in using techniques to understand force from within force.    
The Dionysian and Apollonian spirits that Nietzsche identified in ancient 
Greek culture have quite significantly influenced French philosophical scene 
during the Post II World War, and Foucault is in fact not an exception. The 
forms of life that they celebrate, even though contradict each other, are still to 
be seen evolving from one morphogenetic field. This becomes evident in Thus 
Spoke Zarathustra, when Nietzsche writes that “There is always some madness 
in love. But there is always, also, some method in madness” (Nietzsche, 2012, 
p. 36). Love here – beauty, Derrida for instance writes, is value and force 
(Derrida, 2007, p. 21) – is a play of form and force. He continues, “It is true we 
love life; not because we wont to live, but because we are wont to love [my 
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italic]” (Nietzsche, 2012, p. 36), besides any wont to live only lose life, as life, 
in any rate, an excess that is at once an excess to itself and an excess to senses, 
indeed exceed all concepts. If ‘we are wont to love’ that always has in it some 
madness, an excess, then we are also wont to excess. Yet we are wont to love 
rather through a discreet melancholy (a form of pain).  
Derrida’s critique that appeared in Writing and Difference, for instance, 
claiming that in Madness and Civilisation Foucault’s reflections on Descartes’ 
Meditations conceived madness as exterior (madness as exterior to 
philosophy) has opened a dialogue between them. Derrida, by pointing out 
the spatial dimension of Foucault’s argument, implies that Descartes, in his 
Meditations, rather has taken madness only to its extreme, and has not 
excluded it altogether. The stress on the temporal aspect suggests that cogito 
rather emerges from within the movement of madness, that is, it actually 
emerges from within a hyperbolic movement of suspicion. However, the 
temporal dimension of Foucault’s thinking is much more evident, when he 
writes in The Order of Things: “was it not also on the basis of error, illusions, 
dreams and madness, all the experiences of unaccounted-for thought, that 
Descartes discovered the impossibility of there not being thoughts [my italics] – to 
such effect that the thought of the ill-thought, of the non-true, of the 
chimerical, of the purely imaginary, emerged as the possible locus and the 
primary, irrefutable proof of all those experiences?” (Foucault, 1994, pp. 323 - 
24). Descartes, to Foucault, was actually concerned to reveal thought in its 
most general form in all thoughts, that is, even at the level of error or illusion, 
and therefore, he rendered them as harmless, so that he would be free, even 
after retreating from his meditation on error or madness, to return again to 
them and explains them, and to develop a method to guard against them.  
With the modern cogito, on the other hand, the distance that, at the same 
time, separates and links thought-conscious-of-itself and whatever contains 
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within it is given greater value within the immanent field of non-thought. 
Consequently, it is not as such a discovery of an evident truth, rather it “must 
traverse, duplicate, and reactivate in an explicit form the articulation of 
thought on everything within it, around it, and beneath it which is not 
thought, yet, which is nevertheless not foreign to thought [my italics], in the sense 
of an irreducible, an insuperable exteriority” (Foucault, 1994, p. 324). 
Consequently, cogito in its modern form, according to Foucault, is not a 
sudden and illuminating discovery that all thoughts are thought, as is the case 
with Cartesian cogito. It is rather a ceaseless interrogation “as to how thought 
can reside elsewhere than here, and yet so very close to itself [my italics]; how it 
can be in the forms of non-thinking” (Foucault, 1994, p. 324). The modern 
notion of transcendence, Foucault writes, is remote from Kantian analysis. If 
the Cartesian cogito aims to fix the very definite truth of its own presence 
even in the midst of a field of turbulence, even in madness, then, modern 
cogito gains movement from within a disturbance, and starts to interpret and 
evaluate both itself and the World in relation to its own unthought. Here it is 
not at all Truth, but rather change itself is its immediate objective. It is 
interesting here to examine how Foucault integrated Kant into his thinking, so 
that one will be more equipped to pursue the question of becoming, which is 
more explicit in this late writings on the care of the self and use of technique. 
The following reading of Foucault’s work tries to elaborate the status of man, 
and the relation between oneself and oneself, and oneself and the others.    
Foucault, Kant and Pragmatism  
In Kant, Foucault and Forms of Experience, Marc Djaballah writes “By contrast 
with previous projects of criticism – as undertaken by Descartes, Locke, or 
Hume, for example – that integrate a method to delimit the use of reason so 
that mistakes can be avoided by ensuring certainty in knowledge, Kant 
develops a method to delimit a sphere outside of which empirical knowledge 
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is impossible. Outside this space of real objects, thought has no empirical content 
[my italic]” (Djaballah, 2008, p. 26). In the “Introduction to Kant’s 
Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View,”14 Foucault, for instance, 
notices a shift in Kant’s focus from both a concern with the human animal and 
with the self-consciousness. Kant’s Anthropology, according to him, preoccupies 
with Menschenwesen that is the questioning of man’s limits in Knowledge and 
the concrete existence. The Introduction to Kant’s Anthropology, for instance, 
stresses the empirical dimension of Kant’s Anthropology, and for that reason, 
Foucault argues there that it has no “contact” with a reflection on the 
conditions of experience. However, this essential difference cannot be seen of 
the kind/order of a non-relation, as ‘a certain analogy lets one half-see in the 
Anthropology like a (photo) negative of the Critique’ (Foucault, 2013).  
Foucault’s reading of Anthropology, to shift focus from the search for ‘origins’ 
in a distant time and truth to the context of man’s finitude, has in fact taken 
shape against the danger of formalising epistemological activity. Through careful 
reflection he tries to show ‘the point where philosophical reflection comes to 
culminate into an interrogation of the interrogations themselves.’ Here the 
source is thoroughly dried out without leaving any trace – and, for that 
reason, it is nothing but an unapproachable absence. Therefore, there cannot 
be an origin, a spring, rather everything including the contemplating I 
unfolds from within a temporal field – from the very density of becoming. 
Foucault through his reflections on Anthropology integrates the three questions 
of the Critiques – what can I know?; what must I do?; and what can one hope 
for? Respectively – by adding a fourth one, what is man? He writes: “[t]hese 
three questions that hang over and, to a certain extent, command the 
organisation of critical thought, can be found at the beginning of the Logic, 
                                                          
14 Online source: Michael Foucault, Introduction to Kant’s Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View 
(trans. Arianne Bove), http://www.generation-online.org/p/fpfoucault1.htm (12/6/2013).         
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but affected by a decisive modification. A fourth question appears: what is 
man? – which only follows on from the first three in order to take hold of 
them again in a reference that wraps them all: because they all have to relate 
themselves to that one” (Foucault, 2013). Hence because of this very fact, to 
him, the largely empirical status that the first Critique assigns to the 
Anthropology is seriously challenged here.  
Still the Anthropology, as we know it, does not lend itself at any moment to 
answer this fourth question. According to Foucault, it does not lend even a 
broad empirical exploration of the question. The question, rather, is posed 
much later in the Logic and in the Opus postumum. In Opus postumum, the 
question of man appears in the context of the relation between God, the world 
and the man (Ibid, 2013). Foucault continues by asking: ‘What is the correct 
meaning of this unification of God and the world in man and for man?’ If God 
and the world attain unity in man, it is because he exercises his sovereignty as 
a thinking-subject – thinking God and thinking the world.15 Foucault here 
compares the structure of the judgement with the traditional logic: the trilogy 
Subjekt, Praedikat, Copula. Man, consequently, is that ‘which is then the 
copula, the link – like the verb ‘to be’ of the judgement of the universe. It is in 
him (in man) that a universal synthesis establishes, or else, he ‘appears as the 
                                                          
15 It is interesting here to compare how Levinas deals the problem. He hesitates to integrate the ‘self’ and 
the ‘other’ with an immanent field. This very rejection of a shared-present between them highlights 
the very collapse of all phenomenality. The other hence is always immune to all imminent acts of 
representation, and, for that very reason, the self, according to him, is always responding to the call of 
the other. Since the self is always responding to, Levinas suggests, it is incapable of taking the 
discursive initiative that is, it can never be the origin of a speech act. In other words, since proximity is 
prior to all initiatives of the ego, that is, since the very call of the Other is prior to freedom, language is 
already scepticism. Like a disturbing prophecy, the absolute alterity declares its approaching (Levinas, 
2006, p. xxv); and it is, actually, like the proximity of the apparition in Derrida’s reading of Hamlet. 
We, however, have seen in Shakespeare’s Hamlet what kind of harm responsibility as an irreducible a 
priori, a presence (of an absolute absence) that unsettles all other presence through their internal 
scission can inflict on the subject. We have seen in Hamlet a troubled mind, under a haunted sky, 
hesitating, like a frightened kid, to be still, hesitating, even for a while, to wait and watch; a man 
consumed in fear and fury. Does Hamlet do justice to his father’s spirit? No! Is the suggested answer 
we get from Horatio at the end of the play. Does Hamlet do justice to himself? Again no! The point I 
am trying to arrive at here is: any conception of justice that does not care to summon, within it, the one 
who conceives it, for serious reflection, is not just at all.          
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universal synthesis,’ unifying the personality of the God (sensible) and the 
objectivity of the world (supra-sensible principle). The absolute, by starting 
from him, can be thought. These texts of Kant, Foucault admits, should not be 
considered as enough, as they are neither answers nor solutions to the fourth 
question, rather they only suggest the possible paths and tests that Kant’s 
thought has taken while advancing on the ground of finally attained 
transcendental philosophy (Ibid, 2013). The topography of Kant’s thought as 
it evolves yet to be scanned each time – the interrogation on man cannot be 
separated from the problematic of the world and God. 
The answer to the fourth question is not resolved yet, as one confronts a new 
sequence of problems – problems rooted primarily in language, as the world 
is not simply given to language. It is actually not easy to talk about this world. 
The world, as a system of real relations, is folded towards itself, and is kept 
outside of the system of signs and the chain of signification. Here establishes a 
closure, as the world as ceaselessly folding itself towards itself excluding the 
language. Foucault writes in the Introduction: the ‘accomplishment of the 
closure of this folding seems to entail the exclusion of language, and of its 
primary form that is predication. The text of Opus postumum suggests that 
personality is the predicate of God, but then it only ‘makes illegible what the 
predicate of the world ought to be by way of symmetry,’ and remains 
‘unfilled on the side of language, as the world as a whole is beyond all the 
predications and maybe at the root of all the predicates. Still the world 
remains not without structure or signification; it is rather its opposition to the 
universe allows one to fix its meaning’ (Ibid, 2013).       
The universe against the world (as the system of real relations) is the unity of 
possible. The world, in contrast, is given within a system of actuality; it 
envelops existence, as it is at once the concept of its totality and the true place 
of its realisation. There can only be one universe, but world unfolds itself in 
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numerous ways, and is given in numerous examples. Foucault writes: still 
‘the world is not the open space of necessary, but rather a domain where a 
system of necessary is possible,’ as the possible can only be thought ‘starting 
from a system given by actualite; and the plurality of worlds can only be 
delineated starting from an existing world and from what can be offered to 
experience’ (Ibid, 2013). The world consequently appears according to a triple 
structure that of source, of domain, and limit. According to Foucault, the 
fourth question cannot be fundamentally different from the three questions 
that the Critique poses. In fact, through determining the source of human 
knowledge, one gives meaning to the question: what can I know? Whereas, 
through determining the domain of the possible and natural usage of 
knowledge one comes up with the reply to the question: what shall I do? And 
through determining the limits of reason, one gives meaning to what is 
possible to hope?  
The repetition of the three questions posed in the Critique does not still come 
back with the same. Anthropology, according to Foucault, neither claims 
universality of meaning nor takes the interrogation of man at a much radical 
level. Against the Critique, which is an investigation of what is conditioning in 
foundational activity, the Anthropology, on the other hand, is an 
investigation of the unconditioned within the conditioned. Foucault writes, 
“Kant’s Anthropology offers us another lesson: to repeat the a priori of the 
Critique in the originary, i.e. in a true temporal dimension” (Ibid, 2013). Thus 
anthropology becomes at once a popular knowledge and knowledge of the popular, 
that is, it is at once popular and systematic. Still Kant’s Anthropology is 
systematic not because it enunciates all that can be known of man, rather 
because it forms, as a knowledge, a coherent whole. The principle of this 
totality is not man himself, as a coherent object; rather he is always already 
part of the world. It is popular, because the reader easily finds examples from 
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it, as both the author and the reader is united by ‘the undivided basis of daily 
language that continues to speak, without transition and without changes, the 
page that once was blank’ (Ibid, 2013). It is still systematic only to that extent 
that it borrows its coherence from all of the thought of the Critique.  
Foucault writes:  
[There is] one example to determine how exactly this repetition 
occurs: the text entitled ‘Apology of sensitivity’’ refers to the relation 
between intuition and understanding. This repetition is not a going 
back to the same. The relation described by the Anthropology has its 
own dimension within the slow, precarious and always doubtful 
labour of the succession: the manifold as it offers itself to the senses is 
not yet (noch nicht) ordered; the understanding must come to add 
itself (hinzukonsmen) and insert an order that it supplies itself 
(hineinbringen). A judgement that is produced before this ordering 
activity [putting into order (zuvor)] risks being false. On the other 
hand, this relation of succession does not put up with/withstand 
being extended with impunity; if, in the order of time, the 
retrospective reassessment of reasoning (Nachgrubeln) and the 
indefinite folding (repli) of reflection (Uberlegung) intervened, the 
error could equally slip. The given is therefore never deceptive, not 
because it judges well, but because it doesn’t judge at all, and what 
judgement inserts within time, forms truth according to the measure 
of this time itself. The time of the Critique, form of the intuition and 
of the inner sense, only provides the multiplicity of the given through 
an activity already constructive at the outset; it only offers the diverse 
already dominated within the unity of the I think. On the other hand, 
the time of the Anthropology is guarantor of an insurmountable 
dispersion; because here the dispersion is no longer that of the given 
and sensible passivity; it is the dispersion of synthetic activity in 
relation to itself – dispersion that offers itself as a ‘jeu’. Its 
(dispersion) is not contemporaneous to itself in the organisation of 
the manifold; it inevitably succeeds/follows itself, thus giving rise to 
error (donnant ainsi prise á l’erreur), and to all the slippings that 
have been made (Ver Kunstein, Verdichten, Ver ruchen). Given that 
the time of the Critique had reassured the unity of the originary 
(from the originally given until the originary synthesis), thus 
deploying itself at the level of the Ur…, the Time of the 
Anthropology remains doomed to the domain of the Ver…, because 
it maintains the dispersion of the syntheses and the always renewed 
possibility of seeing them escaping from one another. Time is not that 
in which, and through which, and because of which the synthesis is 
made. It is that which gnaws at the synthetic activity itself (Ibid, 
2013).         
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Foucault directs us to consider for reflection the question of subjectivity to 
examine how ‘the relations of the synthesis and of the given are presented in 
the Anthropology alongside the universal image of what they are within the 
Critique. On the question of subjectivity, of the I that always appears as the 
bottom or the foundation of the thought, Foucault argues, is not taken up by 
Anthropology for finer analysis. The texts that appeared between 1770 and 1780 
only link it to the possibility of being an object for itself, or to the objectifying 
it allows. According to Foucault, it is the Critique that takes up this issue: ‘The 
‘I’ can never be the object, but only form of the synthesis’ (Ibid, 2013). The I 
that appears in the Critique as an apriori in the order of knowledge, is 
considered in the Anthropology as the passage of feeling to thought, from 
Fuhlen (feeling) to Denken (thinking). The spoken “I,” however, marks this 
passage, without being either the real agent or the simple coming to 
consciousness of this passage. What Foucault suggests is that the synthetic 
activity of the ‘I,’ in the anthropological analysis, appears as a figure already 
synthesised (as the structure inextricably primary and secondary) only within 
the empirical and manifest form (Ibid, 2013).  
As a species of a prior of existence, the I denies access to man, rather when it 
presence itself, it presence itself within a multiplicity of a temporal sensibility. It 
always presences itself as already there, as the irreducible foundation of the 
thought. Foucault, therefore, claims that ‘it is within this ‘I’ that the subject 
will come to recognize its own passage and the synthesis of its identity’(Ibid, 
2013). What appears as the a priori of knowledge, from the point of view of 
the Critique, is not yet transformed right away, in the anthropological 
reflection, as an a priori of existence. But rather, when it suddenly presences 
itself it presences itself within the density of a becoming. It is within the 
density of becoming that the I takes infallibility, in retrospect, the very meaning 
of the already-there. Hence the anthropological perspective in fact does not 
154 | P a g e    C h a p t e r  I V  
 
actually offer the given according to an inert multiplicity indicative in an 
absolute fashion of an originary passivity. The dispersion of the I rather is 
always already reduced in the anthropology, and is ‘secretly dominated by a 
whole series of synthesis carried out apart from the visible workings of 
conscience’ (Ibid, 2013). What is fascinating then in Foucault’s reflections on 
Kant’s Anthropology is that he tries to evoke in it a complex formation 
involving a numerous passive and active syntheses of the elements of the 
perception involved in the constitution of the I as infallibility, within the 
density of a becoming. The original is really not something always already 
given; rather it can only be given within and therefore lightened within the 
density of a becoming. 
In anthropological research each faculty traces a line that is also the path of all 
possible deviations. Self-consciousness, consequently, appears rather ‘as the 
always re-emerging temptation of a polymorphous egoism,’ than as a form of 
experience and the condition of limited but founded knowledge. The 
possibility of asserting ‘I,’ as a result, also takes form, in the consciousness, the 
prestige of a ‘me good-soul,’ or else a self, that ‘fascinates it, to the extent that, 
in a paradoxical return, consciousness will renounce the language of this first 
person,’ and declines itself in the fiction of a ‘We.’ Here use then is reduced 
each time to an abuse. Hence the study of the sensibility that reworks through 
the critical opposition of appearance and phenomenon abandons the further 
exploration of what can be held as well-founded in the phenomenon, and 
aims to explore what is at once fascinating and precarious within the 
fragment of appearance, ‘since the latter veils what it makes shimmer 
(dangle), and also comes to transmit what she steals’ (Ibid, 2013). 
The question of man as such cannot be then contained within an originary 
authority, the ‘I,’ since all reflection on man attains circularity (a movement 
either from the inside to the outside and vice versa) that means, since man is 
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defined as the inhabitant of the world, all reflection on man inevitably leads to a 
reflection on the world. Foucault writes: ‘the world is discovered in the 
implications of the ‘I am,’ as a figure of this movement for which the me, in 
becoming object, takes place in the field of experience and finds there a 
concrete system of belonging (Ibid, 2013). Then this world thus disclosed is 
neither the Physis, nor the universe of validity of the law,’ rather this world 
unfolds within the virtual relation (that is not based on any principle, plan or 
a system) that diagonally passes through, (and at the same time maintains) 
the interior and the exterior, which means, any dealing with the interior 
immediately announces the exterior and vice versa.  
It is then here that what the Critique discerns as the very possible within the 
order of conditions (that is the order of faculty) and the real within the order of 
the constituted (that is the phenomenon) is given by the Anthropology in one 
inextricable...continuity(Ibid, 2013). This field of continuity is built around the 
play of imagination, which is actually the power of original ‘invention,’ 
imagination ‘in the fantastic shipwreck of dreaming, imagination in the 
poetry tied to the sign. Or again: the power to desire with one’s emotions; the 
false truth of passions; the place of the supreme good.’ The secret of power is, 
for that very reason, revealed in the luminosity of the Phenomenon, where it 
finds at once its truth and the truth of its perversion (since the use becomes 
abuse, as in the language in the first person), and is denounced in its 
perversion by the Phenomenon, power is imperially recalled to this radical 
truth that binds it to itself in the mode of obligation...Power at the root of its 
possibility, power found and lost, made possible and betrayed in its 
phenomenon, power imperatively tied to itself.’ Foucault then continues, 
‘from Vermogen (faculty as ability, wealth, or as potential) to Erscheinung 
(phenomenon), the relation is at once of the order of manifestation, of the 
adventure of perdition, and of the ethical connection.’ It is precisely where the 
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articulation of Konnen [be able to] and Sollen [ought to] resides, and for that 
reason, where what is essential to anthropological thought is established 
(Ibid, 2013). 
The Order of Things, through an intricate analysis of the mutations at the 
archaeological level and its ramifications on episteme, further elaborates this 
fourth question in a much finer analysis. The mutations at these levels that 
lead to the reconfiguration of thought in its modern times, according to 
Foucault, have established four theoretical segments, fundamentally different 
from its Classical equivalents. The connection of the positivities with finitude, 
the reduplication of the empirical and the transcendental, the perpetual 
relation of the cogito to the unthought, the repeat and return of the origin, 
consequently, define the mode of being of man in modern thought. If the 
Classical thought sticks to an analysis of representation, the modern thought, 
according to him, organises its gaze at a deeper level. It ceaselessly 
investigates, beneath the fold of life, labour, and language, a fold of being, 
which is not given to man in his nature, in his exchange or in his discourse. 
The most distant and still the closest of all, the mode of being still opens up and 
animates, within man, all these three folds. The above-stated problem, 
nonetheless, demands our attention, as it also reveals Foucault’s take on a 
series of thinkers, such as Nietzsche, Mallarme, Holderlin and Heidegger. 
This extremely dense and difficult chapter in The Order of Things actually 
opens itself by juxtaposing Nietzsche’s famous question, “Who is speaking?” 
against Mallarme’s reply, “what is speaking is, in its solitude, in its fragile 
vibration, in its nothingness, the word itself – not the meaning of the word, 
but its enigmatic and precarious being” (Foucault, 1994, p. 305).  
Within a certain mutation at the archaeological level, the thought on man’s 
finitude has advanced itself from the Classical to a modern formulation. If the 
Classical thought determined finitude, on the basis of the infinite, as 
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positively constituted. It allowed only an account of body, needs and 
language as negative forms – and therefore, the possibility of knowledge on 
them was not wholly given in its totality. For the Classical thought, the 
possibility of knowledge was always limited, and still it was only through the 
chain of representation that this limited being of things could actually surface. 
In the “Classical age, [Foucault writes] the function of general grammar was 
to show how a language could be introduced into the sequential chain of 
representations, a language that, while manifesting itself in the simple and 
absolutely tenuous line of discourse, presupposed forms of simultaneity 
(affirmation of existences and coexistences; patterning of things represented 
and formation of generalities; original and inerasable relation between words 
and things; displacement of words within their rhetorical space)” [italics 
added] (Foucault, 1994, p. 337).  
But in modern thought, with life, production and language, unfolding within 
their own existence, historicity and laws, they all are positivities in their own 
rights. Their positivity, therefore, provides, as a negative correlation, a 
foundation for the limited character of knowledge, and still the limits of 
knowledge provide, inversely, a positive foundation for the possibility of 
knowing, in an experience that is always limited, what life, labour, and 
language really are. This shaky ground has abandoned human being, in 
relation to life, labour and language, in a very precarious position. Human 
being, “with his own being, with his power to present himself with 
representation [now] arises in a space hallowed out by living beings, objects 
of exchange, and words, when, abandoning representation, which had been 
their natural site hitherto, they withdraw into the depths of things and roll up 
upon themselves in accordance with the laws of life, production, and 
language” (Foucault, 1994, p. 313).  
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With life, labour and language begin to unfold themselves within their own 
existence, historicity and laws, representation closes down on itself, and is left 
without having any validity as the locus of origin of living beings, needs and 
words. It ceases to be the primitive seat of their truth. With wrinkles surfacing 
(as representation is folded towards itself, in a ceaseless meditation on life, 
labour and language); it only indicates an immanent sphere in which their 
(life, labour and language) reflection on themselves – that is, with its inability 
to carry truth within its folds, modern thought has left representation to the 
stature of a lady meditating on truth in her old-age. The chain that linked the 
words and things into an inerasable relation in the Classical age, that is, the 
chain of representation, has ceased this function perpetually. The things, 
consequently, have ceased to manifest their identity in the chain of 
representation; their identity rather belongs to themselves, in their interior 
laws. What is then revealed in representation is the external relation they 
establish with human being. Foucault writes: “Cuvier and his contemporaries 
[hence] had required of life that it should itself define, in the depths of its 
being, the conditions of possibility of the living being; in the same way, 
Ricardo had required labour to provide the conditions of possibility of 
exchange, profit, and production; the first philologists, too had searched in 
the historical depths of languages for the possibility of discourse and 
grammar” (Ibid, 1994, p. 312). 
Man, consequently, is compressed and withheld in a hollowed out space 
formed at the middle of the folds of life, labour and language that ceaselessly 
multiply in themselves, and still it is within him, within his fundamental 
finitude that the folds of life, labour and language unfold and animate 
themselves. This indeed is an ambiguous position. Since, on the one hand, he 
is governed by the folds of life, labour, and language that are anterior to the 
time of his birth, and for that reason, are multiplying in themselves even in 
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his absence. His concrete existence, consequently, can only find its 
determinations in them. The very possibility of accessing him lies only 
through his spoken words, in his organism, and the objects he makes. And 
still, on the other hand, he is kept outside of his own truth – that is, it is 
actually not him, but they (his life, labour and words) harbour his truth. It is 
actually in them, that is, in his life, labour and word, that man also 
experiences his alienation and, it is in his finite act of knowing the life, labour 
and language that his finitude is ultimately heralded. As the historically 
formed systems of life, labour, and language (that is, they have been 
unfolding themselves even before his birth, even in his very absence) hide 
from his both their truth and the truth of himself, man, consequently, is 
informed, at every instant of his short lifetime, of his finitude.   
Still within the positivities of life, labour, and language (within the infinite 
possibilities assured by them), man’s finitude, however, is not outlined in the 
rigour of a limitation, rather is fixed in the paradoxical form of the endless. It 
is within their positivity that the very positivity of a finite act of knowing is 
materialised, then he is not conceived here as an end, but rather as always in 
becoming (an in that very becoming he is ceaselessly alienated from himself, 
in an already unfolding circularity of life, labour and language). Here, he is 
given a body, a body which is his own – “a fragment of ambiguous space, 
whose peculiar and irreducible spatiality is nevertheless articulated upon the 
space of things; to the same experience, desire is given as a primordial 
appetite on the basis of which all things assume value, and relative value; to 
this same experience, a language is given in the thread of which all the 
discourses of all times, all successions and all simultaneities may be given” 
(Ibid, 1994, p. 314). Here, my body prescribes for me not just the mode of 
being of my life, but also that which determines the fact that life cannot 
indeed exist without also prescribing its form to me. Here, both ‘the mode of 
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being of production and the weight of its determinations upon my 
experience’ are always already given to me in my desire. And here, the mode 
of being of language, the whole historically built discursive formations ‘to 
which words lend their glow are also given to me in the slender chain of my 
speaking thought.’ In this whole experience, that is, the independent spirals of 
life, labour and language, the body, which is conceived as the locus of desire 
and unconscious drives, reduces all the play of difference to the order of 
identity, and to an act of knowing that is constituted as positive, against man’s 
finitude, which is conceived, in relation to the positivity of life, labour and 
language, as negativity. Foucault, however, suggests that even though man’s 
finitude is ‘marked [here] by the spatiality of the body, the yawning of desire, 
and the time of language,’ it is still a radical other, that is, it is a fundamental 
finitude, as it is not actually a determination imposed upon man from outside. 
Man rather is radically finite. 
In the seventeenth and eighteenth century thought, man’s finitude is a 
reactive force driving him to live an animal existence, drawing him 
ceaselessly into the expanding spirals of life, labour, and language, in his 
search for articulating their meaning, means and words. In modern thought, it 
only prevents him arriving at any absolute knowledge of the mechanism ‘of 
the body, the means of satisfying his needs, the methods of thinking without 
the perilous aid of a language woven wholly of habits and imagination’ (Ibid, 
1994, p. 316). Man’s finitude only forced him there “to work [further] by the 
sweat of his brow, to think with opaque words” (Ibid, 1994, p. 316). His 
knowledge is doomed to be finite, as he is trapped, and unable to liberate 
himself, from within the positivity of life, labour and language, and inversely, 
life, labour and language would always affirm themselves in their positivity 
only because knowledge in itself is always finite. If put differently, it is his 
(man’s) absolute absence that is, his radical finitude, that endlessly spines the 
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spirals of life, labour and languages. Here Foucault suggests, with nineteenth 
century, a new form of analysis of finitude surfaces itself, revealing man’s 
finitude in its radical positivity. 
If Classical thought positively constituted finitude as a determination on the 
basis of infinity, the modern thought (Foucault suggests) still constituted 
man’s finitude as negativity against the positivity of life, labour and language. 
If in Classical thought, beings in its finite forms, surface themselves within an 
inerasable relation between the thing and the word, in a chain of 
representation, in modern thought, even though things denied their beings to 
appear in the chain of representation, the external relation they establish with 
human being surfaces in that chain. Since the empirical contents are situated 
within the chain of representation, a metaphysics of infinity is not only 
possible here, but also necessary. It is then against the metaphysics of infinity 
that finitude gained form within the space of representation. Man’s finitude 
necessarily manifests itself; in modern thought, it is then marked ‘by the 
spatiality of the body, the yawning of desire, and the time of language.’ 
Foucault writes: “but when these empirical contents were detached from 
representation and contained the principle of their existence within 
themselves, then the metaphysic of infinity became useless; from that point 
on, finitude never ceased to refer back to itself (from the positivity of the 
contents to the limitations of knowledge, and from the limited positivity of 
knowledge to the limited knowledge of the contents). Whereupon the entire 
field of Western thought was inverted” (Ibid, 1994, p. 316).  
The very correlation between a metaphysics of representation and of the 
infinite and an analysis of living beings, of man’s desire and of the word’s of 
his language hitherto prevailed have been withheld, and an analytic of 
finitude and human experience rather has been initiated along with, or in 
opposition to it (that is in a correlative opposition to it), one actually finds is a 
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perpetual tendency to constitute a metaphysics of life, labour and language. 
Since these new tendencies undermine themselves from within, Foucault 
suggests, they are never anything more than tendencies, “for there can be no 
question of anything but metaphysics reduced to the scale of human finitude: 
the metaphysics of life that converges upon man even if it does not stop with 
him; the metaphysics of a labour that frees man so that man, in turn, can free 
himself from it; the metaphysics of a language that man can reappropriate in 
the consciousness of his own culture” (Ibid, 1994, p. 317). Insofar as the 
metaphysics of life, labour and language shows how life, by prescribing a 
form to itself, denies itself; how human labour is indeed alienated within the 
system of production; and that of language that man can only reappropriate 
in the consciousness of his own culture, respectively, metaphysics has value 
only within the analytics of human finitude. Foucault writes: “modern 
thought, then, will contest even its own metaphysical impulses, and show 
that reflections upon life, labour, and language, in so far as they have value as 
analytics of finitude, express the end of metaphysics: the philosophy of life 
denounces metaphysics as veil of illusion, that of labour denounces it as an 
alienated form of thought and an ideology, that of language as a cultural 
episode” (Ibid, 1994, p. 317).  
Of the four theoretical segments (of the analysis of finitude, of empirico-
transcendental repetition, of the unthought, and of origin) that we have 
pointed out at the beginning of this reading, the following three are, in fact, 
only ramifications of this radical mutation in Western thought – in the 
analytic of finitude. With a radical shift in the site of analysis, as it is no longer 
representation but man himself in his radical finitude that is taken for 
analysis, the spark that triggers analysis in modern thought is rather the 
revealing of the conditions of knowledge on the basis of the empirical 
contents given to it. Foucault writes: “for the threshold of our modernity is 
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situated not by the attempt to apply objective methods to the study of man, 
but rather by the constitution of an empirico-transcendental doublet which 
was called man” (Ibid, 1994, p. 319). 
Our modernity, Foucault suggests, is really situated by the constitution of an 
empirico-transcendental doublet, that is, how man constitutes himself as an 
ethical subject. While the eighteenth century empiricist concerned more with 
general theories of knowledge, and focused on analysis of properties and 
forms of representation that make knowledge in general possible, and a 
metaphysics of representation. This shift has then introduced further 
mutation in both the nature and the substance of analysis. The divides that 
separated the analysis that operate within the space of the body and function 
as a sort of transcendental aesthetic, by studying its mechanisms and forces 
(such as, perception, sensorial mechanism and neuro-motor diagrams) from 
the sort of analysis that functioned as transcendental dialectic (that 
illuminates historical, social and economic determinants of knowledge) 
ultimately, in modern thought becomes a very grey tension within a form of 
discourse – the very source of power, in general, and the power of 
imagination, in particular. What is indicated here is a birth of a new form of 
discourse, a new form that is neither of the order of reduction nor of the order 
of promise – “a discourse whose tension would keep separate the empirical 
and the transcendental, while being directed at both; a discourse that would 
make it possible to analyse man as a subject, that is, as a locus of knowledge 
which has been empirically acquired but referred back as closely as possible 
to what makes it possible, and as a pure form immediately present to those 
contents; a discourse, in short, which in relation to quasi-aesthetics and quasi-
dialectics would play the role of an analytic which would at the same time 
give them a foundation in a theory of the subject and perhaps enable them to 
articulate themselves in that third and intermediary term in which both the 
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experience of the body and that of culture would be rooted” (Ibid, 1994, pp. 
320 – 21). In fact, a reflection on how Foucault has integrated Kant’s 
transcendental analysis in the Critiques within an anthropological perspective 
illuminates us, in this context, on the theoretical backing of this reading of 
modern thought.  
In modern thought, the analysis of actual experience takes shape. The actual 
experience is here at once the space in which all empirical contents are given 
to experience and the original form that makes them possible in general and 
designates their primary roots. Here, the movement that opens up the space 
of the body and the time of culture to each other also opens up the 
determinations of nature to the weight of history, and vice versa. But it is only 
“on the condition that the body, and, through it, nature, should first be 
posited in the experience of an irreducible spatiality, and that culture, the 
carrier of history, should be experienced first of all in the immediacy of its 
sedimented significations” (Ibid, 1994, p. 321), that means as time. This model 
of motion that works in the becoming space of time and the becoming time of 
space, it seems is a more originary violence that sets the nature-culture divide 
unstable, or else nature is always given to life in rhythm and, vice versa.16  
The auto-affection, the mark of all living beings, the very force that divides 
the self and introduces differentiation in it, also functions in same rhythm. It 
is always in rhythm that any form can be given to life – and still, this can be 
true, only if rhythm is seen as pure movement that is, only when seen without 
moral values (without reducing rhythm into binary), in the very absence of 
guilt. The pure movement that informs the very spatiality of the space is evaluated 
                                                          
16 It is in rhythm (that is the movement of time becoming space and space becoming time) that nature is 
given to man. Nature otherwise is not given to man. Heraclitus, for instance, in The Fragment says: 
“nature loves to hide.” Kahn in his commentary on Heraclitus’s The Fragment interprets it as “The true 
character of a thing likes to be in hiding” (Kahn, 2001, p. 33). In the fragment L Heraclitus writes: “As 
they step into the same rivers, other and still other waters flow upon them” (Kahn, 2001, p. 53). The 
World given to us in the form of relations, according to Heraclitus, is always in a state of flux.     
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at once in an immanent succession of sediments deposited in time, that is, from 
within a chain of interpretation of interpretation. Here the question that 
immediately pops up and troubles mind is: why movement? What causes 
movement (in mind). We have, actually, seen the model working in “A 
Preface to Transgression” – when being transgresses limits in the presence of 
a central absence. Being is actually set into motion around a central absence 
that ceaselessly repeats itself, unfolding in man the spirals of life, labour and 
language – virtuality of life, yearning of desire, seduction of production, and 
the emptiness of words. This movement is inevitable since none of these 
sedimented interpretations in time actually carry with them the truth of one’s 
being – they actually are mere interpretations. In “A Preface to 
Transgression,” Foucault shows how being (that is not given to consciousness 
– the pure affirmation, the ‘yes’ of Nietzsche’s Zarathustra and, therefore, is) 
in the form of transgression (or else, pure force) transgresses the limits built 
around the circularities of life, labour and language and pushes those limits to 
confront their exterior.  
Foucault writes:  
The limit and transgression depend on each other for whatever 
density of being they possess: a limit could not exist if it were 
absolutely uncrossable and, reciprocally, transgression would be 
pointless if it merely crossed a limit composed of illusions and 
shadows. But can the limit have a life of its own outside of the act 
that gloriously passes through it and negates it? What becomes of it 
after this act and what might it have been before? For its part, does 
transgression not exhaust its nature when it crosses the limit, 
knowing no other life beyond this point in time? And this point, the 
curious intersection of beings that have no other life beyond this 
movement where they totally exchange their beings, is it not also 
everything which overflows from it on all sides? It serves as a 
glorification of the nature it excludes (Foucault, 1980, p 34).   
If it is guilt (the very trace of culture itself) that informs us on the moral order of 
the time, and our always shifting relation with it, then, rhythm belongs to 
nature. What the trace of culture initiates in man’s being could, then, be the 
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very possibility of deviation – it might have triggered waves of uncertainty at 
the very heart of man’s being. The metamorphosis of spirit into camel, lion and 
child, in Nietzsche’s Thus Spoke Zarathustra, suggests such a model in play. The 
spirit, suggests Nietzsche, in its search for truth, should transform itself to “a 
camel, the camel a lion, and the lion at last a child.” Hence the child because of 
his innocence and forgetfulness is actually placed close to nature and, a change 
of the very status of an event can only be possible through pure movement that 
is the rhythm of nature. Child, thus, is conceived as ‘a new beginning, a game, a 
self-rolling wheel, a first movement, a holy Yea’ (Nietzsche, 2012, pp. 19 – 20). 
Deleuze, for instants, shows that the three metamorphoses actually designate 
different moments in Nietzsche’s work, as well as the stages of his life and health. And 
therefore their relations by nature are arbitrary. He senses that the camel that 
carries ‘the weight of established values, the burdens of education, morality, 
and the culture’ into the desert has already in it a lion, the destroyer of statues 
and a critique of all established values; and in lion, it has already within itself a 
child, ‘he who represents play and a new beginning – the creator of new values 
and new principles of evaluation.’ And yet, the child has already in him a tragic 
outcome (Deleuze, 2001, pp. 53 – 54).  
The child’s closeness to nature returns again for theoretical reflection in 
Baudelaire’s work on modern painter, when he considers Guys as a “man-
child.” Baudelaire writes: “imagine an artist who was always, spiritually, in the 
condition of [a] convalescent...” (Baudelaire, 1964, p.13); and if “the 
convalescence is like a return towards childhood” (Baudelaire, 1964), he always 
will confront things in a state of newness. Foucault’s reading of Baudelaire, in 
“What is Enlightenment?,” for instance, studies the kind of mode of existence 
(that is the form of relation with or to time) that would enable one to access 
truth (Foucault, 2003, pp. 43 – 57). Here truth has one very important quality, it 
is in itself an eternal bliss, and only the truth can unwind man’s agony.  
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In Foucault, the univocal one, the ultimate truth of reality, however, is given 
only as a certain absence. The being (that is in the form of transgression has no 
life beyond its movement) becomes movement in the very presence of this 
certain absence – that is, only when the present denying us its truth and 
presences itself as virtual. If we are not what are given to us as ourselves in 
the very circularity of our life, labour and language, then, who are we? Since 
the modern production is ultimately linked to profit, it tempts to hide as 
much as it reveals, opening a field of seduction, therein, the very being of man is 
consumed with consumption – he, then, tempts to see things in terms of their 
utility and profit.17 This larger spiral of production hides at once its own truth 
and the truth of the things it produces, man’s appetite hence is not driven by 
needs but by the yearnings of his desire. The Capitalist mode of production 
actually has nothing to do with the real. It functions, rather, through the 
‘codification of a higher order, a hyper-reality that made the real obsolete,’ 
and for that reason, it is, essentially, self-referential. Life, hence, is ‘being 
exchanged for nothing, for a handful of glittering toys, work absorbed time 
like a sponge and left no traces’ (Lotringer, 2007, pp. 12 - 3). The tension that 
surfaces between life and work, essentially, deprives labour its dignity. 
Though the labour is deeply decentralised and nullified to an informal status 
and, though it is pushed to the very fringes of World Capitalism, the 
decentralised production and the thorough dispersion of the Third World (as 
both the First and the Third Worlds have already lost all its geographical 
determination) have only multiplied the fringes. In this larger spiral of 
production of commodities, ideas, images and the entire virtual field of 
desires, though man is destined to be a consumer, in him, the very tension 
between life and labour does not die away, but rather it is only going to 
deepen, unfolding sudden deviation at all levels of production.           
                                                          
17 See Appendix 2 
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The truth is not given, that is why it is worth searching. Searching involves 
movement – and that indeed involves the at once becoming of time and space – 
and here we already lost nature and man is, thus, kept suspended at the very 
threshold that differentiates nature from culture. Therefore, the modern 
cogito gains movement from within a field of disturbance, whose meaning is 
neither given to culture nor, it truly belongs to nature. The tendency to 
ceaselessly interpret and evaluate itself in relation to a field of forces, that is, 
external to it, then, is immanent to knowledge itself, but it gains a form of 
circularity within a discourse only in the certainty of an absence. Foucault, for 
instance, indicates the birth of a new form of discourse that ‘would make it 
possible to analyse man as a subject that is, as a locus of knowledge that has 
been acquired empirically, and still referred back as closely as possible [my 
italic] to what makes it possible’ (Foucault, 1994, p. 320). Deleuze writes, it is 
Nietzsche, who has “replaced the Ideal of knowledge, the discovery of the 
truth, with interpretation and evaluation” – interpretation here establishes the 
meaning of a phenomenon, which essentially is fragmentary and incomplete, 
and it is, therefore, evaluation that “determines the hierarchical “value” of the 
meanings and totalizes the fragments without diminishing or eliminating 
their plurality” (Deleuze, 2001, pp. 65 -6). Nietzsche introduces to philosophy 
two forms of expressions: aphorism and poetry – with aphorism both the art 
of interpretation and what must be interpreted, and poetry both the art of 
evaluation and what must be evaluated. What links Deleuze and Foucault is 
an empiricism of “multiplicities,” which says “the abstract doesn’t explain, 
but must itself be explained” (Ibid, 2001, p. 7).  
Deleuze, however, invokes a pre-Socratic unity of life and thought in 
Nietzsche – “it is a complex unity: one step for life, one step for thought. 
Modes of life inspire ways of thinking; modes of thinking create ways of 
living. Life activates thought, and thought in turn affirms life” (Ibid, 2001, p. 
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66). But he indicates, however, that this pre-Socratic unity is already lost, as 
‘we no longer have even the slightest idea’ of it and what, then, we have are 
‘instances where thought [rather] bridles and mutilates life, making it 
sensible, and where life takes revenge and drives thought mad, losing itself 
along the way’ (Ibid, 2001, pp. 66 – 7). The only choice that we have now is 
the choice between mediocre lives and mad thinkers that is, ‘lives that are 
docile for thinkers, and thoughts too mad for the living.’ The choice left, 
according to Deleuze, is between Immanuel Kant and Friedrich Holderlin, 
therefore, the fine unity of life and thinking (in which the hyperbolic doubt – 
or else, madness – would cease to be such) is yet to be rediscovered – “a unity 
that turns an anecdote of life into an aphorism of thought, and an evaluation 
of thought into a new perspective on life” (Ibid, 2001, p. 67).    
As a paradoxical figure, it is, however, in man that ‘the empirical contents of 
knowledge necessarily release, of themselves, the conditions that have made 
them possible.’ It is in him that the empirical (sensory) and the transcendental 
(thought) that repeat eternally in themselves intersect and establish an 
antagonistic relationship. Since this field of action has an ontological existence 
independent of man, and yet it could only be unfolded in him, he is inevitably 
the locus of misunderstanding. This radically restrains man from positing 
himself in the immediate and sovereign transparency of a cogito. Consequently, 
man, Foucault suggests, is an empirico-transcendental doublet. He writes, “man 
is a mode of being which accommodates that dimension – always open, never 
finally delimited, yet constantly traversed – which extends from a part of himself 
not reflected in a cogito to the act of thought by which he apprehends that part; 
and which, in the inverse direction, extends from that pure apprehension to the 
empirical clutter, the chaotic accumulation of contents, the weight of experiences 
constantly eluding themselves, the whole silent horizon of what is posited in the 
sandy stretches of non-thought” (Foucault, 1994, pp. 322 – 23).  
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Man, as an empirico-transcendental doublet, is also the locus of 
misunderstanding. Relentlessly exposing his thought to the very risk of being 
swamped by his own being, the misunderstanding ‘also enables him to 
recover his integrity on the basis of what eludes him.’ Hence, Foucault 
suggests, the question no longer is: “how can experience of nature give rise to 
necessary judgement? It is rather to ask:  
“how can man think what he does not think, inhabit as though by a 
mute occupation something that eludes him, animate with a kind of 
frozen movement that figure of himself that takes the form of a 
stubborn exteriority? How can man be that life whose web, 
pulsations, and buried energy constantly exceed the experience that 
he is immediately given of them? How can he be that labour whose 
laws and demands are imposed upon him like some alien system? 
How can he be the subject of a language that for thousands of years 
has been formed without him, a language whose organisation 
escapes him, whose meaning sleeps an almost invincible sleep in the 
words he momentarily activates by means of discourse, and within 
which he is obliged, from the very outset, to lodge his speech and 
thought, as though they were doing no more than animate, for a brief 
period, one segment of that web of innumerable possibilities?” 
(Foucault, 1994, p. 323).  
Against the Kantian position, Foucault suggests that there then has been a 
fourfold displacement: the question no longer is of truth, but of being. It is not 
of nature, but of man. It is no longer of the possibility of understanding, but of 
the possibility of misunderstanding. It is then no longer of the unaccountable 
nature of philosophical theories against science, but of beginnings in a clear 
philosophical awareness of that whole realm of unaccounted-for experiences 
in which man does not recognise himself (Ibid, 1994, p. 323). The shift from 
the question of truth and of nature to that of being and of man is unavoidable, 
since with the modern cogito, the whole being of things has not been really 
reduced to thought ‘without ramifying the being of thought right down to the 
inert network of what does not think.’ 
Modern cogito, for that reason, unfolds itself within a double movement – 
within a double movement that at once fabricates the web of thought and the 
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inert network of non-thought. This double movement, Foucault claims, only 
explains why the ‘I think’ in no ways leads to the evident truth of ‘I am.’ The 
‘I think’ in its modern form always shows itself to be embedded in an always 
already unfolded density throughout which it is ‘quasi-present,’ and which it 
animates, though in an equivocal ‘semi-dormant,’ ‘semi-wakeful’ mode, it is 
incapable of making it lead on to the affirmation ‘I am.’ This very moment in 
which the cogito in its modern form shows itself, essentially, denies itself the 
very immediacy and the sovereign transparency of its own truth, and 
ceaselessly relates itself to that which is not of its kind – the unthought. 
Foucault writes: “for can I, in fact, say that I am this language I speak, into 
which my thought insinuates itself to the point of finding in it the system of 
all its own possibilities, yet, which exists only in the weight of sedimentations 
my thought will never be capable of actualizing altogether? Can I say that I 
am this labour I perform with my hands, yet which eludes me not only when 
I have finished it, but even before I have begun it? Can I say that I am this life 
I sense deep within me, but which envelops me both in the irresistible time 
that grows side by side with it and pose me for a moment on its crest, and in 
the imminent time that prescribes my death?” (Ibid, 1994, pp. 324 – 25). The 
answer could well be that I am and that I am not all these.  
This precisely is the effect of the double movement within which modern 
cogito shows itself. Rather than leading to the affirmation of being, the cogito 
in its modern form leads to a whole series of question concerning being. This, 
however, has more than one consequences: on the one hand, by showing how 
thought eludes itself, it takes man at once to the always expanding labyrinth 
of thought and its negativity the unthought, and on the other hand, as a 
positive side, it also enables him to confront his own unthought in relation to 
which he can constitute himself as a thinking subject. Thus with modern 
cogito, the search of the origin or the original (that hidden absolute and 
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sovereign truth) is essentially unfeasible, as with the cogito in its modern 
form, there is a fundamental difference in the nature and purpose of 
interpretation. With the birth of modern cogito, interpretation no longer is 
directed towards the exposure of the meaning hidden in a very puzzling origin, it 
is rather “the violent or surreptitious appropriation of a system of rules, 
which in itself has no essential meaning, in order to impose a direction, to 
bend it to a new will, to force its participation in a different game, and to 
subject it to secondary rules, then the development of humanity is a series of 
interpretations [my italic]” (Foucault, 1984, p. 86). Here rather than searching 
for the distant origin (than hidden absolute and sovereign truth), thought in 
its modern form is oriented towards opening new beginnings – events of 
thought.   
This is exactly what Foucault has found in Nietzsche’s genealogy, and that 
which brings his ‘ontology of the present’ closer to Deleuze. What these 
thinkers, then, share between them is actually an empiricism of 
‘multiplicities.’ Both “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History” and “Theatrum 
Philosophicum” intend to explain it in detail – besides them, this theme 
surfaces in his other texts too. For instance, in “What is Enlightenment” and in 
“The Art of Telling the Truth,” Foucault points out that the Kant’s text on 
Aufklarung is a rather different one. Though “in other texts on history, Kant 
occasionally raises questions of origin or defines the internal teleology of a 
historical process” (Foucault, 1984, p. 34). The text on Aufklarung rather deals 
openly with the question of contemporary reality. It “does not pose any of 
these questions directly, neither that of origin, nor, despite appearance to the 
contrary, that of fulfilment, and it poses to itself in a relatively discreet, almost 
sidelong way, the question of the teleology immanent in the very process of 
history” (Foucault, 1988, p. 87). Kant, according to Foucault, rather is looking 
for a difference here: ‘What difference does today introduce with respect to 
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yesterday?’ (Foucault, 1984, p. 34). The trouble Kant has undertaken, 
according to Foucault, is not to locate the essence of an origin, but rather to 
open up the play of difference. 
Addressing difference in its unadulterated form opens a deviation from 
philosophies of Descartes, Kant and Hegel and the subjective activities. 
Difference, as it manifests itself as an absolute alterity to the self, that is, as 
something beyond the control and, therefore, surpass the categories of 
recognition that brace the authority of the self, it ceaselessly displaces the self 
within a swarming phantasm - and compels the self to think both about and 
with it. Phantasms swarms with the presence of difference, as the self is 
forced to contemplate the other that is presented as difference – as it engages 
with the other, it is forced to contemplate about the very meaning of its 
discourses, its emotional qualities and what it shows in it. This drags the self 
into a certain relation with the other, as it becomes more and more entangled 
in a shared mood. ‘An attuned mingling of feelings might occur, a sense of 
trust, of undefined and mutual presence as our awareness of the other 
clarifies and undergoes a focus in the presence and impact of the other’ (Scott, 
2011, p. 205). Such experiences of thinking with (the other) unfold in time, and 
it is not alien to dialogues that are ‘intensely hostile or belligerent when you 
experience directly from another far more than you think about.’ It opens up a 
field of theatre, and the “Theatrum Philosophicum,” actually, reveals the 
theatrical aspect of Foucault’s thinking.  
Difference, Foucault stresses, hitherto has been assumed to be – and is posed 
from within the unity of a concept – the difference from or within something. It 
is hitherto seen as that, which must necessarily be specified ‘within a concept, 
without overstepping its bounds,’ and the swarming diversity that ceaselessly 
gluts the bounds of a concept is assumed as repetition. Beneath ‘the ovine 
species, we are reduced to counting sheep’ (Foucault, 1980, p. 182). Difference, 
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consequently, is reduced to specification within the concept, and repetition ‘as 
the indifference of individuals outside the concept.’ Thus what then reduces 
the singularity of difference is the common sense – it “extracts the generality 
of an object while it simultaneously establishes the universality of the 
knowing subject through a pact of goodwill” (Ibid, 1980, p. 182). Foucault 
subsequently asks: what if this subjection to common sense that reduces the 
anarchism intrinsic to the difference is overthrown. Difference then would 
cease to be ‘a general feature that leads to the generality of the concept, and it 
would become – a different thought, the thought of difference – a pure event,’ 
and repetition, in this case, ‘would cease to function as the dreary succession 
of the identical, and would become displaced difference’ (Ibid, 1980, p. 182). 
Thought would then only produce a meaning-event, by repeating a phantasm 
– it will then reaffirm its genital singularity. Consequently, it is good sense 
that reigns in the philosophy of representation, and for that reason, Foucault 
instructs: “let us pervert good sense and allow thought to play outside the 
ordered table of resemblances; then it will appear as the vertical dimension of 
intensities, because intensity, well before its gradation by representation, is in 
itself pure difference: difference that displaces and repeats itself, that 
contracts and expands; a singular point that constricts and slackens the 
indefinite repetitions in an acute event. One must give rise to thought as 
intensive irregularity – disintegration of the subject” (Ibid, 1980, p. 183). Later 
in the text Foucault sites Warhol.  
Warhol’s work forces the spectator to consider what happens beneath the 
surface of cultural objects and images that have attained certain dubious 
iconic status in the capitalist system of production. Unlike the late medieval 
and the Renaissance iconography that stressed the humanity of Christ, the 
divine (if put differently, by reversing the Renaissance iconography), 
Warhol’s art treats the mundane as the divine (or else, his art tries to inform 
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the spectator how the mundane attains a status of the divine in a society that 
is obsessed with commodity fetishism. It explores the repetitive structure, the 
mechanical production (he often describes his studio as a factory and calls 
himself a machine) that maintains the modern icons divine. Warhol’s art 
actually forces the spectator to contemplate upon the non-conceptual 
difference - the repetition of pure difference - that very ungrounding and 
differentiating activity that define everything what they exactly are.18 It is this 
secret repetition, the very repetition of the difference within the production of 
sameness that is for Deleuze the activity of differentiation, the very force that 
destabilises and decenters everything that is stable. The sense of stability itself 
is actually materialised from within the play of this differentiating activity, 
this repetition of pure and non-conceptual difference, the difference without a 
concept.  
To free difference, thought must essentially free itself from the grip of 
contradiction, dialectics and negation. It demands a thought without 
contradiction, without dialectics, without negation. It rather must accept 
divergence. It must be an affirmative thought that is capable of, and skilled in, 
disjunction, a thought of the multiple – ‘of the nomadic and the dispersed 
multiplicity that is not limited or confined by the constraints of similarity [my 
                                                          
18 Unlike the abstract expressionism in art, Warhol’s art (even though he shares with abstract 
expressionists a concern for the real) does not try to reveal the unrepresentable structure of the real, 
rather for him the order of the mundane does not conceal any hidden mystery. Rather, the 
differentiating activity itself is what makes the production of the same essentially mundane. In his 
work, the playful use of colour, (media-oriented) theatrical use of lighting, random brush strokes, the 
flat surface on which the images are linearly organised into series (that cuts all perspective) all are 
aimed to introduce the spectator into a temporal field, by blocking him from decipher any hidden 
truth beneath what is presented within the space of the canvas. Foucault writes: ““It’s the same either 
way,” stupidity says, while sinking into itself and infinitely extending its nature with the things it says 
of itself; “Here or there, it’s always the same thing; what difference if the colors vary, if they’re darker 
or lighter. It’s all so senseless – life, women, death! How ridiculous this stupidity!” but in 
concentrating on this boundless monotony, we find the sudden illumination of multiplicity itself – 
with nothing at its center, at its highest point, or beyond it – a flickering of light that travels even faster 
than the eyes and successively lights up the moving labels and the captive snapshots that refer to each 
other to eternity, without ever saying anything: suddenly, arising from the background of the old 
inertia the darkness, and the eternal phantasm informs that soup can, that singular and depthless 
face” (Foucault, 1980, p. 189).                                     
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italic];’ thought that ceaselessly exceeds pedagogical model (the fakery of 
prepared answers); but then it must attack insoluble problems – ‘that is, a 
thought that addresses a multiplicity of exceptional points, which are 
displaced as we distinguish their conditions and which insist and subsist in 
the play of repetitions’ (Ibid, 1980, p. 185). Hence the problem itself cannot be 
displaced by an answer, as it in itself is a dispersed multiplicity. It ‘cannot be 
resolved by the clear distinctions of a Cartesian idea, because it is an idea it is 
obscure-distinct; it does not respond to the seriousness of the Hegelian 
negation, because it is a multiple affirmation; it is not subjected to the 
contradiction of being and non-being, since it is being’ (Ibid, 1980, p. 185) – in 
Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth, Foucault, for instance, argues that the “we” 
should not be prior to the problem. He writes: “Laing, Cooper, Basaglia, and I 
had no community, nor any relationship; but the problem posed itself to those 
who had read us, as it also posed itself to some of us, of seeing if it were 
possible to establish a “we” on the basis of the work that had been done, a 
“we” that would also be likely to form a community of action” (Foucault, 
1997, p. 115). Difference, according to Foucault, can only be liberated through 
the affirmation of an acategorical thought, and with a clear and unprejudiced 
vision. 
In Foucault’s work, a clear, objective eye repeatedly lingers (both at the 
theoretical and methodological levels). It illuminates the subject, as he 
constitutes himself as a knowing subject, who speaks and acts. In the preface 
to The History of Sexuality, Volume II, Foucault, for instance, through a studied 
objectivity (that is actually intrinsic to thought itself) examines, in retrospect, 
the emergence of three axis (the types of understanding [savoir] that is of the 
domain of knowledge, forms of normality that is of the system of rules, and 
modes of relation to oneself and others that is of ethical practices, and the play 
between them that constitutes the forms of experience) in his work, since the 
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publication of Madness and Civilization, and aims to elaborate how thought 
strives to transform itself through a work of thought upon itself – through an 
investigation upon its own singularity and historicity, that is, through an 
awareness that critical activity (the work of thought upon itself) will only 
bring to light transformable singularities. He writes: “by “thought,” I mean 
what establishes, in a variety of possible forms, the play of true and false, and 
consequently constitutes the human being as a knowing subject [sujet de 
connaissance]; in other words, it is the basis for accepting or refusing rules, and 
constitutes human being as social and juridical subjects; it is what establishes 
the relation with oneself and with others, and constitutes the human being as 
ethical subject ...In this sense, thought is understood as the very form of 
action” (Foucault, 1997, pp. 200 – 01).  
Later in Sexuality, Volume II, while differentiating enkrateia against sophrosyne 
and the interiority of Christian morality; he locates its meaning and practice 
as self-mastery. If the pagan morality is shaped around exteriority, in acts in 
their concrete realisation, “in their visible and manifest form, in their degree 
of conformity with rules, and in the light of opinion or with a view to the 
memory they leave behind them,” then the Christian interiority “is a 
particular mode of relationship with oneself, comprising precise forms of 
attention, concern, decipherment, verbalisation, confession, self-accusation, 
struggle against temptation, renunciation, spiritual combat, and so on” 
(Foucault, 1988, p. 63).     
While the virtue of sophrosyne is described “as a very general state that one 
will do “what is fitting as regards both gods and men” – that is one will be not 
only moderate but righteous and just, and courageous” (Ibid, 1988, p. 64). In 
Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle, Foucault suggests, has characterised sophrosyne 
“by the fact that the subject deliberately chooses reasonable principles of 
action, that he is capable of following and applying them, that he holds to the 
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“right mean” between insensitivity and excess (a middle course that is not 
equidistant between the two, because moderation is actually farther away 
from excess than from insensitivity), and that he derives pleasure from the 
moderation he displays. The opposite of sophrosyne is immoderation (akolasia) 
that means deliberately choosing bad principles (Ibid, 1988, pp. 64 – 5). 
Enkrateia, in contrast, is located on the axis of struggle, resistance, and combat, 
and its opposite is akrasia. It rules over pleasures and desires, and is self 
control, tension, “continence.” As the form of effort and control that the 
individual must apply to himself in order to become moderate (sophron), 
enkrateia can well be considered as the prerequisite of sophrosyne.   
Ethics, Subjectivity and Truth places the struggle of self-mastery, enkrateia, 
within a culture of silence and listening, within a culture of writing 
hupomnemata, that is personal notebooks, and exchanging missive between 
friends. What correspondence establishes is an unprejudiced, tolerant and 
non-hierarchical reciprocity of gaze and examination. Enkrateia, as a struggle 
for self-mastery, becomes studied observation of both oneself and the other in 
a field of pure difference. Foucault writes: “it is noteworthy that Seneca, 
commencing a letter in which he must lay out his daily life to Lucilius, recalls 
the moral maxim that “we should live as if we lived in plain sight of all men,” 
[footnote omitted] and the philosophical principle that nothing of ourselves is 
concealed from god who is always present to our souls. Through the missive, 
one opens oneself to the gaze of others and puts the correspondent in the 
place of the inner god” (Foucault, 1997, p. 217) – a pure difference. Thought 
unfolds and organises itself at the presence of this singular mask that conceals 
nothing, it is set into motion with the constant repetition of this pure 
difference – the objective gaze of the ‘other’ that is put in the place of the 
‘inner god.’       
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It is the pure difference that sets the entire field into movement, and opens up 
the self to the order of intangible objects, the swarming phantasms, and 
ceaselessly displaces itself within that field. Foucault writes: “We must be 
alert to the surface effects in which the Epicurians take such pleasure: 
emissions proceeding from deep within bodies and rising like the wisps of a 
fog – interior phantoms that are quickly reabsorbed into other depths by the 
sense of smell, by the mouth, by the appetites; extremely thin membranes, 
which detach themselves from the surfaces of objects and proceed in impose 
colors and contours deep within our eyes (floating epiderm, visual idols); 
phantasms created by fear or desire (cloud gods, the adorable face of the 
beloved, “miserable hope transported by the wind”)” (Foucault, 1980, p. 169). 
This always expanding domain of intangible objects, Foucault insists, must be 
integrated into thought, and articulate a philosophy of phantasm, which 
‘cannot be reduced to a primordial fact through the intermediary of 
perception or an image, but that arises between surfaces, where it assumes 
meaning, and in the reversal that causes every interior to pass to the outside 
and every exterior to the inside, in a temporal oscillation,’ [in the becoming 
time of space and the becoming space of time] ‘that always makes it precede 
and follow itself – in short, in what Deleuze would perhaps not allow us to 
call its “incorporeal materiality”’ (Ibid, 1980, p. 169).                   
There is neither a substantial truth behind the phantasm, nor it is useful ‘to 
contain it within stable figures and to construct solid cores of convergence 
where we might include, on the basis of their identical properties, all its 
angles, flashes, membranes, and vapors,’ rather phantasms are to be allowed 
to function at the very limit of bodies, and against bodies. It is because they 
actually stick to bodies ‘and protrude from them, but also because they touch 
them, cut them, break them into sections, regionalize them, and multiply their 
surfaces; and equally, outside of bodies, because they function between 
180 | P a g e    C h a p t e r  I V  
 
bodies according to laws of proximity, torsion, and variable distance – laws of 
which they remain ignorant’ (Ibid, 1980, p. 169 – 70), and yet they do not ever 
enlarge bodies into imagery domain, but rather only topologize the 
materiality of the bodies. Freed from the dilemmas of truth and falsehood and 
freed of being and non-being, Foucault insists that ‘they must rather be 
allowed to conduct their dance, to act out their mime, as “extra-beings.”’ 
What gives rhythm to their dance is pure difference, and what unfolds from it 
is a pure event. Still one requires a metaphysical basis to consider this pure 
event, and yet neither the metaphysics of substance nor the metaphysics of 
coherence is capable of conceiving it. If the metaphysics of substance serves as 
a foundation for accidents, then, the metaphysics of coherence situates these 
accidents within the entangled nexus of causes and effects. Though an event, 
such as, a wound or death, actually is an effect produced entirely by bodies 
colliding, mingling or separating, it is not of a corporeal nature, Foucault 
suggests, it is rather ‘the intangible, inaccessible battle that turns and repeats 
itself a thousand times around Fabricius [the Roman general and statesman], 
above the wounded Prince Andrew [the main character in Tolstoi’s War and 
Peace]’ (Foucault, 1980, p. 173). Event thus does not belong to corporeal order. 
It is physics that concerns causes, but event (the very effect of bodies 
colliding, mingling or separating amongst one other) does not belong to the 
order of physics. Events rather are without thickness, mixture, or passion – 
that is, they are pure.  
The Logic of the Sense, Foucault argues, should be considered as the boldest 
and most insolent of metaphysical treatises. Illusion haunts metaphysics with 
all kinds of difficulties, not because metaphysics, by its very nature, is 
doomed to illusion, but it is because it has always been haunted by illusion, 
and also because of its own fear of the simulacrum, it is always directed to 
hunt down illusion. Metaphysics, however, is not illusion; illusion, rather, is a 
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form of metaphysics. It steams out of a particular form of metaphysics that 
aims to filter, and separate, the simulacrum from the original copy. It is 
Deleuze who assigned to himself the very task of unearthing metaphysical 
illusions, and established its necessity. If physics is a discourse that deals with 
the ideal structure of bodies, mixtures, reactions, internal and external 
mechanisms, then the metaphysics deals with the materiality of incorporeal 
things – phantasms, idols, and simulacra. What then Deleuze initiates through 
metaphysics, according to Foucault, is a critique capable of the disillusioning 
of the phantasms, and elevating them to the status of an ‘extra-beings,’ and by 
doing this, he develops a thought that is ‘capable of comprehending the event 
and the concept, their severed and double affirmation, their affirmation of 
disjunction.’ 
The incorporeal nature of event, however, suggests that it does not actually 
belong to the physical order, it, therefore, can never be the state of thing, and 
it does not even belong to the swarming phantasms. Event is altogether a 
different series.19 The fact of death, for instance, is a state of thing, and as it is, 
one can verify an assertion as true or false in relation to it. Dying, however, is 
a pure event, and therefore, it is incapable of verifying anything. Death then 
stands as a perfect example to a meaning-event, as it being the event of events 
                                                          
19 Deleuze’s attempt to conceptualise the event, Foucault suggests, stands apart from all the previous 
attempts. The neopositivism failed as it confused the event with a state of things, and lodged the event 
within the density of bodies, and transformed it into an attribute. With ‘a pretext that nothing can be 
said about those things which lie “outside” the world,’ it ‘ rejects the pure surface of the event and 
attempts to enclose it forcibly – as a referent – in the spherical plenitude of the world. Phenomenology, 
with a ‘pretext that signification only exists for consciousness, placed the event outside and 
beforehand, or inside and after, and always situates it with respect to the circle of self. The philosophy 
of history, on the other hand, closed the event in a cyclical pattern of time. Foucault writes: “its error is 
grammatical; it treats the present as framed by the past and future: the present is a former future 
where its form was prepared and the past, which will occur in the future, preserves the identity of its 
content” (Foucault, 1980, pp. 175 – 76). The world, the self, and God, or else a sphere, a circle, and a 
center, these conditions, according to Foucault, always obscure the event, and have always 
constrained the successful formation of thought and Deleuze, on the other hand, through a 
metaphysics of the incorporeal event (that is the irreducibility to the physics), a logic of neutral 
meaning (without a phenomenological signification based on the subject) and the thought of the 
present infinitive (that is, without the circularity of time) has lifted the event from its subjugation to 
the world, the self and God.            
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and the meaning in its pure state – it then is an unadulterated state. Foucault 
writes: a meaning-event is as neutral as death: “not the end, but the unending; 
not a particular death, but any death; not true death, but as Kafka said, the 
snicker of its devastating error [from Blanchot’s L’Espace Litteraire cited in 
Difference and Repetition that Foucault cited to defend his argument]” 
(Foucault, 1980, p. 174). Still this meaning-event demand a grammar attuned 
to fasten it rather with a verb (to die, to live) than situating it in a proposition 
as an attribute (to be dead, to be alive). It demands a grammar with a different 
form of organisation. The verb, ‘conceived in this fashion, has two principle 
forms around which the others are distributed: the present tense, which posits 
an event, and the infinitive, which introduces meaning into language and 
allows it to circulate as the neutral element to which we refer in discourse.’ 
Neither seeking the grammar of events in temporal inflections, nor seeking 
the grammar of meaning in the fictitious analyses of the type ‘to live = to be 
alive,’ according to Foucault, is sensible, rather around two asymmetrical and 
insecure poles that the grammar of the meaning-event revolves, and they are 
the infinitive mode and the present tense, and for that reason, the meaning-
event is at once the ceaseless displacement of the present and the eternal 
repetition of the infinitive. “To die,” as a pure state, always elude the density 
of a given movement, it is, essentially, not given in it, ‘but rather as a pure 
and universal state it infinitely divides the shortest moment. It belongs to the 
eternal present. What the ceaselessly displaced present, the eternal, lacks is 
unity, as it lacks plenitude, hence it is the (multiple) eternity of the (displaced) 
present (that is, if what the mask hides is nothing but another mask, there is 
more than one mask, and therefore, more than one truth – that also means, 
more than one destiny). To die is even smaller that the moment it takes to 
think of it, and yet dying lingers and indefinitely repeats on either side of this 
width-less crack – the eternal present. 
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In relation to physical body, or at its very limit, an event is incorporeal. It is 
truly the metaphysical surface of body. It shapes the topography of words 
and things. It is the meaning of a proposition (its logical dimension), that 
means, objectivity and neutrality of meaning. Meaning in its pure form (in the 
very absence of the subject, who gives its phenomenological signification), 
and ‘in the thread of discourse, an incorporeal meaning-event is fastened to 
the verb (the infinitive point of the present),’ that is without raising the 
conceptual future in a past essence. At this point, the two separate series, the 
event and the phantasm, are essentially brought into resonance. The 
incorporeal and the intangible are brought into resonance. It is “the resonance 
of battles, of death that subsists and insists, of the fluttering and desirable 
idol: it subsists not in the heart of man but above his head, beyond the clash of 
weapons, in fate and desire. It is not that they converge in a common point, in 
some phantasmatic event, or in the primary origin of the simulacrum. The 
event is that which is invariably lacking in the series of the phantasm – its 
absence indicates its repetition devoid of any grounding in an original, 
outside of all forms of imitation, and freed from the constraints of similitude. 
Consequently, it is disguise of repetition, the always singular mask that 
conceals nothing, simulacra without dissimulation, incongruous finery 
covering a nonexistent nudity, pure difference” (Ibid, 1980, p. 177).  
Against the singularity of the event, the phantasm essentially is excessive, yet 
this excess does not imply an excess of imagination as a supplementary force 
added to the bare reality of facts. Neither, it is an embryonic generality from 
which the organisation of the concept gradually emerges. To conceive the 
death as an empty mask, repeating itself ceaselessly and thereby converting 
the swarming phantasms into a field of battle, does not mean it is the very 
‘old image of death suspended over a senseless accident or with the future 
concept of a battle secretly organising the present disordered tumult; the 
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battle rages [rather] from one blow to the next and the process of death 
indefinitely repeats the blow, always in its possession, which it inflicts once 
and for all’ (Foucault, 1980, p. 177). The phantasm as the play of the missing 
event and its repetition, then, can neither be reduced to or given the form of 
individuality, nor must be measured against the reality. It rather presents 
itself as universal singularity – to die, to fight, to vanquish, to be vanquished.  
Foucault in “Nietzsche, Genealogy and History” writes: “Genealogy is history 
in the form of a concerted carnival” (Foucault, 1980, p. 161). It is systematic 
dissociation of identity, and is necessary as the weak identity that we tempt to 
support and unify under a mask. According to Foucault, the weak identity in 
itself is a parody. What we rather have is more than one (mortal) image of 
ourselves, that is, “countless spirits dispute its possession; numerous systems 
intersect and compete. The study of history makes one “happy, unlike the 
metaphysicians, to possess in oneself not an immortal soul but many mortal 
ones [italic added].” And in each of these souls, history will not discover a 
forgotten identity, eager to be reborn, but a complex system of distinct and 
multiple elements, unable to be mastered by the powers of synthesis” (Ibid, 
1980, p. 161). An event then unfolds from within a field of forces, from a 
complex system of distinct and multiple elements. It, therefore, cannot take 
form in the strange density of a thin instance, but rather, like a game, unfolds 
from within an already active field. Foucault writes: “an event, consequently, 
is not a decision, a treaty, a reign, or a battle, but the reversal of a relationship 
of forces, the usurpation of power, the appropriation of a vocabulary turned 
against those who had once used it, a feeble domination that poisons itself as 
it grows lax, the entry of a masked “other” (Foucault, 1980, p. 154). 
Phantasms are linked to bodies. They delineate the topography of the bodies. 
While reading Galen’s On the Usefulness of the Parts of the Body, Foucault, for 
instance, doubts that the desire and pleasure might not have been added in 
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the soul as a mere supplement, but rather, ‘it was most certainly planned as 
an integral consequence of the mechanisms of the body,’ and that, they ‘are 
direct effects of anatomical dispositions and physical processes’ (Foucault, 
1988, p. 107). Galen situates his analysis of aphrodisia by invoking and placing 
it within the ancient thematic of the relations between death, immortality, and 
reproduction. The Foucault’s reading follows: while doing her work, nature 
encountered an obstacle, a sort of intrinsic incompatibility in her task. When 
she initiated, what she had in mind was an immortal work, but then the 
substance on which she had to work did not permit her to accomplish it, as 
‘she could not make arteries, nerves, bones, and flesh using an “incorruptible” 
material. Galen, thus, ‘discerns at the very core of the demiurge work – the 
demiourgema – an internal limit and a kind of “failure” due to an unavoidable 
inadequacy between the immortality that was planned and the corruptibility 
of the material used.  
This demanded something ingenious. She, therefore, had to perform a ruse to 
bring her work to its logical conclusion: to overcome unavoidable 
corruptibility of the material with which this world is essentially made, she 
had to perform a ruse of logos, a ruse that presides over the world, and thus it 
brings with itself the play of three elements. First; the organs of fertilization; 
second, the capacity for pleasure and; third, in the soul, the very longing to 
make use of these organs – a marvellous, inexpressible desire, that is, she had 
to place the principle of force, an extraordinary dynamis, both in the body and 
in the soul of living creatures. For Galen, the very necessity of marking sexes, 
‘the intensity of their mutual attraction, and the possibility of generation are 
rooted in the very lack of eternity.’ Change, consequently, is the condition 
within which all these relations unfold. The very flux that envelops the 
surface (of the body) and ceaselessly fills the void that separates and, at the 
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same time, connects bodies is internal to it as well. It steams out, and become 
movement, from the internal limit that gives form to the body.  
In “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,” he points out that we tempt to believe in 
body as an event that obeys the exclusive laws of physiology and, therefore, it 
always escapes the influence of the history. Rather a great many distinct 
regimes are involved in moulding the body – ‘it [rather] is broken down by 
the rhythms of work, rest, and holidays; it is poisoned by food or values, 
through eating habits or moral laws;’ it, therefore, builds resistances. Man is 
in perpetual flux, nothing is sufficiently stable, and not even his body, ‘to 
serve as the basis for self-recognition or for the understanding of other men’ 
(Foucault, 1980, p. 153). It is the inscribed surface on which events unfold. It is 
the locus of the dissociated self, and a volume in perpetual disintegration. It is 
moulded by everything that touches it – values, diet, climate, and soil.       
It is, actually, the very absence of constants that differs the ‘effective history’ 
from the traditional history, and its metaphysical biases. It introduces 
discontinuities into our very being. The effective history descents and ‘studies 
what is closest, but in an abrupt dispossession, so as to seize it at a distance.’ 
Thought gains force from, and hovers over, this certain and spontaneous lack. 
Since it prefers to descent, the thought, in this modern form, stands apart 
from the ascending traditional metaphysics that is always in search of a 
distant origin, remote from the reality. In this thought, what hounds language 
then is the very potential of an immanent silence, the sign of its own death. 
‘To live’ also implies ‘to survive’ and that to language is to engage with itself, 
to spontaneously repeat itself at the virtual presence (the absence) of its own 
death. Since the repetition is impulsive, life to language (if only it carries 
along with it the trace of imagination) is an excess. Life always affirms itself as 
infinite potentialities. The spontaneity of life always surpasses the gravity of 
authenticity, and life is the immanent field of forces – the very freedom of 
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creativity, the very freedom to create one’s own life, like an artist. Hokusai 
managed to take a snapshot (The Great Wave off Kanagawa) and Pollock 
portrayed its rhythm, as life unfolds itself in them, respectively. And yet, it is 
also a force that envelops all living forms equally, that is, it is also that vital 
force that sets itself into action. It, then, is the absolute other of thought, and 
can only be nurtured through techniques. To language, the spontaneous 
repetition of itself is a technique of life that born along with itself. The modern 
thought, then, functions like ‘a doctor, who looks closely, who plunges to 
make a diagnosis and to state its difference’ (Foucault, 1980, p. 156). It has 
more in common with medicine than philosophy. Genealogy, as an analysis 
of descent, is placed within the articulation of the body and history (Ibid, 
1980, p. 148). 
Philosophy, then, becomes a life-form and a way of life that is indefinitely 
suspended at the threshold where more than one differentiated series 
intersect – the physical order, the swarm of phantasms, and the series of the 
absolute ‘Other’ – death, life, being, (the pre-ontological) body, and nature. 
Philosophy, thus, concerns not just thought, but also feelings, emotions and 
body, and is, intrinsically, linked to self-reliance and, ultimately, to freedom. 
In The History of Sexuality Vol. III, Foucault evokes such a form of life from the 
antiquity.  
Philosophy as a Life-form and a Way of Life 
The period of the Flavians and the Antonines cultivated an intense and 
prevalent taste for things that are medical, and widely recognised as a 
practice that was of interest to the public. It was recognised so, and elevated 
to the dais of high form of culture along with rhetoric and philosophy. 
Foucault writes:  
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“G. W. Bowersock observers that the medical model accompanied the 
development of the Second Sophistic and that a number of important 
rhetors had received medical training or manifested interests in the 
field. It had long been established that philosophy was closely related 
to medicine, even though the demarcation of boundaries posed 
doctrinal problems and gave rise to territorial rivalries. In the first 
lines of Advice about Keeping Well, Plutarch echoes these debates: 
the physician is wrong, he says, when he claims to be able to do 
without philosophy, and one would be quite mistaken to reproach 
philosophers with crossing their own boundaries when they concern 
themselves with health and its regimen. One must consider, Plutarch 
concludes, that medicine is in no way inferior to the liberal arts 
(eleutherai technai) in elegance, distinction, and the satisfaction it 
yields. To those who study it, it gives access to a knowledge of great 
importance since it concerns health and the preservation of life” 
(Foucault, 1988, p. 99).  
Medicine, therefore, is not approached merely as ‘a technique of intervention, 
replying, in cases of illness, on remedies and operations’ rather it is aimed ‘to 
define, in the form of a corpus of knowledge and rules, a way of living, a 
reflective mode of relation to oneself, to one’s body, to food, to wakefulness 
and sleep, to the various activities, and to the environment’ (Ibid, 1988, p. 
100). In everyday life, it is expected to advise, in the form of regimen, a 
voluntary and rational structure of contact. It is often practiced to attain a 
degree of self-reliance, in matters concerning one’s own health. Celsus, 
Foucault suggests, was convinced of the high value of regimen medicine. He 
was even against subjecting oneself to a physician, if one was in good health 
(Ibid, 1988, p. 100). The way the physician at times takes control of the client 
in order to manage him and his life, in order to direct to health was often a 
concern of criticism. By dictating at every moment the correct regimen of life, 
the medical logos, thus, ensured self-reliance. It avoids too-frequent 
consultations, and equips oneself with a medical knowledge that one could 
always use. It is a form of logos one acquires from young and refines through 
practice, so that one is able to become, throughout one’s life and in every 
ordinary circumstances, one’s own health counsellor.  
Foucault quotes Athenaeus: 
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 “It is advisable, or rather, necessary, for everyone to 
learn, among the subjects that are taught, not only the 
other sciences but also medicine, and to hear the precepts 
of this art, so that we may often be our own accomplished 
counsellors in matters useful to health; for there is almost 
no moment of the night or the day when we have no need 
of medicine. Thus, whether we are walking or sitting, 
whether we are oiling our body or taking bath, whether 
we are eating, drinking – in a word, whatever we may do, 
during the whole course of life and in the midst of life’s 
diverse occupations, we have need of advice for an 
employment of this life that is worthwhile and free of 
inconvenience. Now, it is tiresome and impossible always 
to consult a physician concerning all these details” (Ibid, 
1988, pp. 100 – 01).  
The medical logos hence dictate, at every moment, the correct regimen of life, 
and this regimen of life, in its practice, decides the precise relation between 
season, environment, circumstances and the care that one needs to be given to 
oneself. Foucault cites, for instance, Antyllus’s analysis ‘of the different 
medical “variables” of a house, its architecture, its orientation, and its interior 
design;’ Athenaeus’s suggestions to confront the winter season; Celsus’s 
address to ‘that category of people considered to be especially fragile the city-
dwellers, and above all, those who devote themselves to study (litterarum 
cupidi)’ – all had positioned the body, in relation to its surroundings, as a 
fragile entity, and suggested a cultivated concern for oneself in relation to 
season, environment and circumstances.  
This regimen of life is based on the articulation of a permanent framework of 
everyday life that is built on the foundation of a historically developed 
practical reason, and that is, ‘a reasonable discourse could not unfold without 
a health practice’ (Ibid, 1988c, p. 101). This model is shaped by the play of 
understanding, and yet the relation to truth does not take the form of a 
hermeneutic relation (that is, it does not aim to uncover the truth behind the 
masks – it neither involves the decipherment of the self by itself nor the 
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hermeneutics of desires, aimed at their purification), but rather, the relation to 
truth is imagined as the necessary structural, instrumental and ontological 
condition for an aesthetics of existence. It rather revolves around a practical 
reason that insists upon the mastery of both soul (the principle of life) and 
body, through relentless practice, and thereby, the brightness of soul is 
reflected in the body. What is elegant, then, does not surface itself, in its best 
form, just at random, but rather it always involves active freedom, and 
therefore, is always given to sight along with the traces of the forces that 
created it. A true artist, from this standpoint, is always inclined toward 
himself – he is at once his own subject matter, and the material to work upon.            
The History of Sexuality Vol. II tries to outline some of the intricate features of 
this mode of existence that prevailed in antiquity. The classical Greek thought 
on ethics is built upon a fundamentally different assumption. For them, the 
play of forces, by its nature, is potentially excessive. Whereas, for the 
Christians, the pleasure and the forces of desire had their principle in the Fall 
and in the weakness that marked human nature since. In pain and soaked in 
the sweat of guilt, the Christians, through the decipherment of the hidden 
truth behind them, had aimed to purify themselves,. The Greeks, on the other 
hand, had encountered a different sort of ethical issue here; for them, to seek 
pleasure from, and to desire for, food, wines, and sexual encounters were 
essentially natural, and therefore, the question of cleansing themselves never 
took the form of a problem, rather the trouble that they faced was in, how to 
confront these forces. For that very reason, the sort of presumptive and 
pragmatic advices on the subject of conjugal pleasures that the Christian 
authors lavishly distributed would not have been a concern for Xenophon, 
Aristotle or later Plutarch, as they all thought them as indecent (Foucault, 
1988b, p. 39). For the Greeks, confronting the force of desire and pleasure 
actually means confronting themselves in an agonistic relation.  
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Pivotal to this was their conception of aphrodisia and the kind of questioning 
that they posed to them. The questioning that “was not oriented in the least 
toward the search for their profound nature, their canonical forms, or their 
secret potential” (Ibid, 1988b, pp. 39 – 40). The definition of aphrodisia that 
Suda has given, Foucault writes, repeated again by Hesychius: aphrodisia are 
‘the works, the acts of Aphrodite’ (erga Aphrodisia). They ‘are the acts, 
gestures, and contacts that produce a certain form of pleasure.’ While trying 
to determine what exactly “self-indulgence is, Aristotle in Nicomachean Ethics 
excluded from it the pleasures of sight, hearing, and smell, to him, self-
indulgence relates only to the pleasures of the body. Neither the delights of 
colour, shapes, or paintings nor of theatre and music, then, are related to self-
indulgence. Those that are related to self-indulgence must involve touch and 
contact: “contact with the mouth, the tongue, and the throat (for the pleasure 
of food and drink), or contact with other parts of the body (for the pleasure of 
sex)” (Ibid, 1988b, p. 40). Plato’s Laws, thus, ‘refers to the existence of three 
appetites, relating to food, drink, and reproduction’ (Ibid, 1988b, p. 49).  
The classical thought, however, considered them as not just natural, but also as 
necessary. Plato classed the desires that lead to the aphrodisia among the most 
natural and necessary, and, according to Aristotle, the pleasures gained from 
aphrodisia have their cause ‘in necessary things that concerned the body and the 
life of the body in general. In short, as Rufus of Ephesus was to point out, seeing 
that sexual activity was deeply and harmoniously grounded in nature, there 
was no way that it could be considered bad’ (Ibid, 1988b, p. 48). The exercise of 
suspicion (often demanded from the subjects in the Christian experience of the 
“flesh” and later in “sexuality”) that enables the subjects ‘to recognise from afar 
the manifestations of a stealthy, resourceful, and dreadful power’ of desires and 
pleasure seems, then, quite unknown to the Greeks, and their experience of 
aphrodisia. What, then, marked the distinction between self-restrain and self-
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indulgence is exaggeration, surplus and excess. Foucault writes: “Aristotle [in 
the third book of Nicomachean Ethics] explains that for the natural desires that 
are common to everyone, the only offenses that one can commit are quantitative 
in nature: they pertain to “the more” (to pleion); so that natural desire only 
consists in satisfying needs, “to eat or drink whatever offers itself till one is 
surfeited is to exceed the natural amount [toi plethei]”” (Ibid, 1988b, p. 45). Then, 
he who exceeds all the natural limits is a self-indulgent individual.  
Self-indulgence, or the play of the excess, surfaces in man, when he fails to 
use active freedom, and thereby, letting the forces of desire and pleasure to 
gain an absolute power over his soul. Though natural, these forces of desire 
and pleasure are, actually, conceived as inferior forces – forces that should be 
mastered to elevate oneself to the status of a ‘free man.’ Consequently, to 
work out the conditions and modalities of their ‘use,’ or in other words, to 
stylise one’s own life in accordance with a reasonable use of pleasures, 
Foucault suggests, takes form in relation to one’s need, timeliness, and status, 
and therefore, it did not, actually, follow any form of universal law, but rather 
varied from person to person.     
The problematisation of the forces of desire and of pleasure, thus, takes an 
entirely different direction. The Greeks neither fashioned their lives by 
referring to any list of possible acts, ‘such as one finds later in the penitential 
books, the manuals of confession, or in works on psychopathology’ nor had 
any table that ‘served to define what was licit, permitted, or normal, and to 
describe the vast family of prohibited gestures.’ The concern ‘for discovering 
the insidious presence of a power of undetermined limits and multiple masks 
beneath what appeared inoffensive or innocent’ that was a characteristic 
feature of the way Christianity conceived the problem of flesh and later of 
sexuality, was unknown to classical Greek thought. The Greeks of the antiquity 
neither aimed to classification nor to decipherment the truth beneath the forces 
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of desire and of pleasure (Ibid, 1988b, p. 38), they were rather concerned with 
the ontology of forces that linked together acts, pleasures, and desires. It ‘was 
this dynamic relationship that constituted what might be called the texture of 
the ethical experience of the aphrodisia’ (Ibid, 1988b, p. 43).  
In the experience of the aphrodisia, ‘act, desire, and pleasure formed an 
ensemble whose elements were distinguishable certainly, but closely bound to 
one another’ (Ibid, 1988b, p. 42), and within their close linkage between them, 
one’s acts take a definite form. The classical thought saw circularity between 
the performance of act, pleasure and desire – the performance of act (as nature 
intended) is always “associated with a pleasure, and it was this pleasure that 
gave rise to epithumia, to desire, in a movement that was naturally directed 
towards what “gives pleasure,” according to a principle that Aristotle cites: 
desire is always “desire for the agreeable thing” (he gar epithumia tou hedeos 
estin).’ It is true – Plato always comes back to the idea – that for the Greeks 
there could not be desire without privation, without the want of the thing 
desired and without a certain amount of suffering mixed in; but the appetite, 
Plato explains in the Philebus, can be aroused only by the representation, the 
image or the memory of the thing that gives pleasure; he concludes that there 
can be no desire except in the soul, for while the body is affected by privation, it 
is the soul and only the soul that can, through memory, make present the thing 
that is to be desired and thereby arouse the epithumia. Thus, what seems in fact 
to have formed the object of moral reflection for the Greeks in matters of sexual 
conduct was not exactly the act itself (considered in its different modalities), or 
desire (viewed from the standpoint of its origin or its aim), or even pleasure 
(evaluated according to the different objects or practices that can cause it); it 
was more the dynamics that joined all three in a circular fashion (desire that 
leads to the act, the act that is linked to pleasure, and the pleasure that 
occasions desire). The ethical question that was raised was not: which desires?, 
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which acts?, which pleasures? But rather: with what force is one transported 
“by the pleasures and desires?” (Ibid, 1988b, p. 43). 
The forces with which one is transported by the pleasures and desires, the 
classical thought suggests, are, in themselves, forces that are untamed, and 
therefore, if one does not take necessary precautions, they can invade the soul 
during its slumber. Diogenes, for instance, advocated training, at the same 
time, both the body and the soul. Foucault writes: “the relationship to desires 
and pleasures is conceived as a pugnacious one: a man must take the position 
and role of the adversary with respect to them, either according to the model 
of the fighting soldier or the model of the wrestler in a match...[consequently] 
the battle to be fought, the victory to be won, the defeat that one risked 
suffering – these were processes and events that took place between oneself 
and oneself. The adversaries the individual had to combat were not just 
within him or close by; they were part of him” (Ibid, 1988b, p. 67). Then, to 
combat the forces of desire and pleasure, Foucault’s reading of the classical 
Greek thought suggests, is not to fight an enemy, alien to oneself, but rather 
‘to cross swords with oneself.’  
Since it is forces that transport one by the pleasures and desire, to tame them 
is neither the task of an ego, nor a will, but rather it demands a different 
genesis of force – an active force. The forces that transport one by the 
pleasures and desires, however, are passive in relation to those pleasures and 
desires. The agonistic relation, the relation between oneself and oneself, is a 
relation between forces. It is the relation between forces that unfolds only in a 
living body, and therefore, it is the closest of all relationship – whether that is 
the relation between man and society, or between men and women, or 
between men, or else between man and nature. Still, this antagonistic 
relationship with oneself is only a repetition of those other relations. In Plato, 
the model is the team with its driver. Aristotle contemplated that since the 
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child should live according to the direction of the tutor, our desiring faculty 
ought to comply with the prescriptions of reason, and for that reason, he 
contemplated the model as that of the child with the adult.  
In all these models, it seems, Foucault has located an unfolding agonistic 
relation, and conceived it as an endless war of forces. But then ironically what 
this perpetual war of forces aims at is some sort of harmony. Since forces by 
their very nature cannot be harmonised, harmony is conceived in a brutal 
form as domination, and therefore, peace is always a deferred peace. Self, in 
Foucault’s work, is never in peace with itself, rather it is always distracted by 
itself, and therefore, always in conflict with itself; and what oversees this 
battle is the pure difference of forces. It is this distraction that introduces a 
temporal oscillation within the self between the interior and the exterior, 
between time and space. The distractions within the self that in effect becomes 
the temporal oscillation between the interior (the active thinking) and the 
exterior (the folded desires and pleasures) comes to effect because the origin (or 
the pure form) in this model of relation between oneself to oneself is that 
which repeats itself as a virtual presence (and in this manner, introduces the 
play of difference) - the “paradigm” of city is, actually, laid up in heaven, and 
so Plato acknowledges that the philosopher will have little chance of 
encountering a state so perfect in this world (Ibid, 1988b, p. 71). However, one 
can say with a certain confidence that the peace is not attained in a state of 
conflict, in a perpetual battle of forces. In relation to truth, peace, rather, is 
lucidity.20 Foucault writes:  
                                                          
20 The present reading of Foucault’s work so far suggests that the mode of being of human being in the 
world reflects a state of war: in The Order of Thing, man is compressed and withheld in a hollowed out 
space formed at the middle of the folds of life, labour and language, and yet it is in him that all these 
differentiated folds unfold themselves; in “Preface to Transgression” the being is conceived as pure 
moment transgressing the limit; in the “Theatrum Philosophicum” the repetition of an absolutely 
other series that sets the phantasm into motion and introduces the play of difference and establishes 
an order of things opens space for the event to surface – here man is constituted by his yet to be 
fulfilled possibility.  
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“it is made clear at the beginning of the Laws that this antagonism of 
oneself towards oneself is meant to structure the ethical attitude of 
the individual vis-a-vis desires and pleasures: the reason that is given 
for the need of a ruling authority and a legislative authority in every 
state is that even in peacetime all states are at war with one another; 
in the same way one must assume that if “all are enemies of all in 
public,” then “in private each is an enemy of himself;” and of all the 
victories it is possible to win, “the first and best” is the victory “of 
oneself over oneself,” whereas “being defeated by oneself is the most 
shameful and at the same time the worst of all defeats” (Ibid, 1988b, 
pp. 68 – 69).  
Virtue, then, is not a state of integrity; it is rather at once a relationship of 
domination and a relation of mastery. Logic behind this model of virtue is the 
subject, who is able to control the forces that give form to his desires and 
pleasures, will always restrain himself from giving up himself to violence. 
The ‘famous test of Socrates, in which he proves capable of resisting seduction 
by Alcibiades [Foucault writes], does not show him “purified” of all desire for 
boys: it reveals his ability to resist whenever and however he chooses” (Ibid, 
1988b, p. 69). Aristotle, in his analysis, presupposes the presence of desires, 
and defines enkrateia as mastery and victory – and sophrosyne, although 
defined by him as a state of virtue, does not imply the suppression of desires, 
but rather their control. In relation to Christian spirituality that is built in 
accordance with a relationship of ‘elucidation-renunciation,’ ‘decipherment-
purification,’ in the Greek model, to constitute oneself as a virtuous and 
moderate subject in the use he makes of pleasures,’ the individual has to 
construct a type of relationship with the self that is of the ‘domination-
submission,’ ‘command-obedience,’ ‘mastery-docility’ (Ibid, 1988b, p. 70). 
A model of civic life is often invoked to define the moderate attitude. Plato, 
for instance, compares desires to ‘a low-born populace that will grow agitated 
and rebellious unless it is kept in check; but the strict correlation between the 
individual and the city, which is the mainstay of Plato’s thinking in the 
Republic, enables him to elaborate on the “civic” model of moderation and its 
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opposite, page after page. There, the ethics of pleasure is of the same order of 
reality as the political structures: “If the individual is like the city, the same 
structure must prevail in him;” and he will be self-indulgent when he lacks 
the power structure, the arche, that would allow him to defeat, to rule over 
(kratein) the inferior powers; then “his soul must be full of servitude and lack 
freedom;” the soul’s “best parts” will be enslaved and “a small part, the most 
wicked and mad, is master” (Ibid, 1988b, p. 71). 
Self-mastery involves deploying an arrangement of active forces (through 
training, meditation, tests of thinking, examination of conscience, control of 
representation, etc.) to check and control the passive forces that give form to 
one’s desires and pleasures. It involves setting up of a structure of virility that 
relates oneself to oneself. Foucault writes: “self-mastery was a way of being a 
man with respect to oneself; that is, a way of commanding what needed 
commanding, of coercing what was not capable of self-direction, of imposing 
principles of reason on what was wanting reason, in short, it was a way of 
being active in relation to what was by nature passive and ought to remain 
so” (Ibid, 1988b, pp. 82 – 83).  
The Pythagorean tradition recognises exercises that include: “dietary 
regimens, reviewing of one’s misdeeds at the end of the day, or meditation 
practices that ought to precede sleep so as to ward off bad dreams and 
encourage the visions that might come from the gods.” Plato proposes, 
exposing young people to simulated dangers, as a test of their courage. 
Xenophon ‘praises Spartan education for teaching children to endure hunger 
by rationing their food, to endure cold by giving them only one garment, and 
to endure suffering by exposing them to physical punishments, just as they 
were taught to practice self-control by being made to show the strictest 
modesty in demeanour (walking in the streets in silence, with downcast eyes 
and with hands hidden beneath their cloaks)’ (Ibid, 1988b, pp. 74 – 75). 
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Besides the opposition between the body and the soul is vigorously 
reconstituted, when Diogenes and other thinkers demanded the subjugation 
of both the body and the soul to trainings that are organised around practical 
reason. These exercises were not distinct from their goals, rather, the Greeks 
regarded as the actual practice of what one needed to train for.  
The virtue of Sophrosyne (a general state that ensures that one will do “what is 
fitting as regards both gods and men”) is actually a state that one attains 
through the exercise of self-mastery (enkrateia) and through restraint in the 
practice of pleasure; it, then, for the Greeks is freedom. The Greek ethics is, 
essentially, one that men made for men – it is masculine in character. Foucault 
writes: ‘it is significant that Socrates, in Xenophon’s Oeconomicus, after hearing 
Ischomachus praise the merits of the wife he has himself educated, declares 
(not without first invoking the goddess of austere matrimony): “By Hera, 
Ischomachus, you display your wife’s masculine understanding [andrike 
dianoia]”’ (Ibid, 1988b, pp. 83 – 84). For the Greeks of the classical thought, the 
most dangerous of all danger that is associated with aphrodisia is not 
dishonour, but the bondage to them.  
The constitution of a virile structure of power against the passive forces of 
desires and pleasures assigns a different sort of function for the relation to 
truth. For the Greeks of the classical thought, moderation as a practice 
demands a certain form of knowledge as an essential condition. Foucault 
writes: ‘moderation, says Aristotle, desires only “what the rational principle 
[orthos logos] directs”’ (Ibid, 1988b, p. 86). In the Greek philosophy of the 
fourth century, the relationship to the logos in the practice of pleasures is 
described in terms of three principal forms. First, as a structural form, logos, in 
the case of moderation, is placed in a position of supremacy that means, it is 
logos that should subdue the forces of desire and pleasure, and regulate 
behaviour. Foucault writes:  
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“whereas in the immoderate individual, the force that desires usurps 
the highest place and rules tyrannically, in the individual who is 
sophron, it is reason that commands and prescribes, in consonance 
with the structure of the human being: “it is fitting that the reasonable 
part should rule,” Socrates says, “it being wise and exercising foresight 
on behalf of the whole soul;” and he proceeds to define the sophron as 
the man in whom the different parts of the soul are in agreement and 
harmony, when the part that commands and the part that obeys are at 
one in their recognition that it is proper for reason to rule and that they 
should not contend for its authority” (Ibid, 1988b, pp. 86 – 87).  
However, after considering the agonistic relationship that defines relation of 
oneself to oneself, and the ways it is described – for instance, Foucault write, 
“to struggle against “the desires and the pleasures” was to cross swords with 
oneself” – one can conclude that this harmony is an order imposed through 
force. The passive forces of desires and pleasure should always be controlled 
and subordinated to the order that the reasonable part of the soul imposed on 
itself. Still, it does not give undue importance to the form over force, when the 
play of forces is necessary in shaping and colouring the form of order. 
Foucault writes: “the elements of this domain – the “ethical substance” – were 
formed by the aphrodisia; that is, by acts intended by nature, associated by 
nature with an intense pleasure, and naturally motivated by a force that was 
always liable to excess and rebellion” (Ibid, 1988b, p. 91). In “Theatrum 
Philosophicum,” Foucault agrees with Deleuze on the role that Deleuze has 
given to the phantasm in shaping the topography of what which appears in 
sight. Consequently, the “mode of subjection” is ‘not defined by a universal 
legislation determining permitted and forbidden acts; but rather by a savior-
faire, an art that prescribed the modalities of a use that depended on different 
variables (need, time, status)’ (Ibid, 1988b, p. 91).     
Second, it is in its instrumental form. Since the domination of the pleasures 
ensures their ‘use that is adaptable to needs, times, and circumstances’ a 
practical reason is unavoidable. It is ‘to determine, as Aristotle says, “the things 
he ought, as he ought, and when he ought.” Plato emphasizes that it is 
important for the individual and for the city not to use the pleasures “without 
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knowledge [anepistemonos] and at the wrong time [ektos ton kairon]. And from a 
similar viewpoint, Xenophon shows that the man of moderation is also the man 
of dialectics – competent to command and discuss, capable of being the best – 
for, as Socrates explains in the Memorabilia, “only the self-controlled have 
power to consider things that matter most, and sorting them out after their 
kind, by word and deed alike to prefer the good and reject the evil” (Ibid, 
1988b, p. 87). Third, a relation to truth is essential in the ontological recognition 
of the self by the self. This is a Socratic theme. In order to practice virtue and 
subdue the desires, it then is necessary that one should know oneself. What the 
practice of aphrodisia ensures is active freedom in relation to forces of desire and 
pleasure. Foucault, for instance, cites Xenophon: “Tell me, Euthydemus, do you 
think freedom is a noble and splendid possession both for individuals and for 
the communities?” “Yes I think it is, in the highest degree.” “Then do you think 
that the man is free who is ruled by bodily pleasures and is unable to do what 
is best because of them?” “By no means” (Ibid, 1988b, p. 78).  
The relation to truth then does not take one back to a distant origin, or a 
perfect form. The ‘famous test of Socrates, in which he proves capable of 
resisting seduction by Alcibiades, does not show his “purified” of all desire 
for boys: it reveals his ability to resist whenever and however he chooses’ 
(Ibid, 1988b, p. 69). The original, or else the perfect form, ‘the “paradigm” of 
the city [the Greeks of the classical thought followed a civic model of 
moderation] is actually laid up in the heaven, and therefore, ‘the philosopher 
will have little chance of encountering a state so perfect in this world’ (Ibid, 
1988b, p. 71). What, then, is left unaffected is a ceaselessly unfolding drama: a 
struggle between more than one kind of forces – the struggle between the 
affirmative forces and the passive forces of desires and pleasure, regulated by 
the insights of a practical reason (in the case of the Greeks of the classical 
thought). Beauty, then, does not appear at random, but rather, it is what 
surfaces within the play of form and forces. Consequently the origin is not a 
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distant beginning, but rather, it is that which repeats itself at those hollowed 
out spaces that at once separates and differentiates each of the forces that are 
at play in a living body. In The Order of Things, Foucault writes, “It is no 
longer origin that gives rise to historicity; it is historicity that, in its very 
fabric, makes possible the necessity of an origin which must be both internal 
and foreign to it; like the virtual tip of a cone in which all differences, all 
dispersions, all discontinuities would be knitted together so as to form no 
more than a single point of identity, the impalpable figure of the Same, yet 
possessing the power, nevertheless, to burst open upon itself and become 
Other” (Foucault, 1994, pp. 329 – 30).           
Foucault writes: 
A task is thereby set for thought: that of contesting the origin of things, but 
of contesting it in order to give it a foundation, by rediscovering the mode 
upon which the possibility of time is constituted – that origin without 
origin or beginning, on the basis of which everything is able to come into 
being. Such a task implies the calling into question of everything that 
pertains to time, everything that has formed within it, everything that 
resides within its mobile element, in such a way as to make visible that 
rent, devoid of chronology and history, from which nevertheless cannot 
escape from it since it is never contemporaneous with the origin; but this 
suspension would have the power to revolve the reciprocal relation of 
origin and thought; as it pivoted upon itself, the origin, becoming what 
thought has yet to think, and always afresh, would be forever promised in 
an imminence always nearer yet never accomplished. In that case the 
origin is that which is returning, the repetition towards which thought is 
moving, the return of that which has already always begun, the proximity 
of a light that has been shining since the beginning of time. Thus, for the 
third time, the origin is visible through time; but this time it is the 
recession into the future, the injunction that thought receives and imposes 
upon itself to advance with dovelike steps towards that which has never 
ceased to render it possible, to keep watch in front of itself, on the ever-
receding line of its horizon, for the day from which it came and from 
which it is coming in such profusion (Ibid, 1994, p. 332).   
Nietzsche had to distance himself from Wagner, when Wagner, losing his 
avant-garde spirit, and introduced theatricality into music for the perfection 
and full realisation of his works, and institutionalised a compromised theatre 
at the Festspielhaus in Bayreuth. Foucault, Deleuze and Derrida experienced a 
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pure and non-choreographed dance in Nietzsche. Foucault and Deleuze 
(Deleuze, 1997, pp. 70 – 128) saw it as a pure form of performance – a force 
that sets into motion their respective philosophical endeavours. Derrida saw it 
to the very heard of textuality, as an all unsettling dance (Derrida, 2002, pp. 27 
– 73; Derrida, 1982, pp. 3 – 27). These two aspects, nonetheless, are only two 
different views of the same dance. It seems, they all have experienced the 
Dionysian excess, the pure music intrinsic to dance. Like physicians, they 
examined its body, pulse and heart beat, and like artists, they observed, 
wondered and speculated on its movement. 
Deleuze writes in Difference and Repetition, “Death has nothing to do with a 
material model. On the contrary, the death instinct may be understood in 
relation to masks and costumes. Repetition is truly that which disguises itself 
in constituting itself, that which constitutes only by disguising itself. It is not 
underneath the masks, but is formed from one mask to another, as though 
from one distinctive point to another, from one privileged instant to another, 
with and within the variations. The masks do not hide anything except other 
masks. There is no first term which is repeated, and even our childhood love 
for mother repeats other adult loves with regard to other women, rather like 
the way in which the hero of In Search of Lost Time replays with his mother 
Swann’s passion for Odette” (Deleuze, 1994, p. 17). These thinkers, then, have 
a shared passion to initiate in philosophy an equivalent of theatre.    
III 
I would really like to have slipped imperceptibly into this lecture, as into all the 
others I shall be delivering, perhaps over the years ahead. I would have 
preferred to be enveloped in words, borne way beyond all possible beginnings. 
At the moment of speaking, I would like to have perceived a nameless voice, 
long preceding me, leaving me merely to enmesh myself in it, taking up its 
cadence, and to lodge myself, when no one was looking, in its interstices as if it 
had paused as instant, in suspense, to beckon me. There would have been no 
beginnings: instead, speech would proceed from me, while I stood in its path – 
a slender gap – the point of its possible disappearance.  
Foucault, 1972, p. 215   
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Since the origin is unapproachable, it is the absolute alterity of thought itself. 
Body (pre-ontological matter), from the point of view of thought, is in fact 
more virtual, than anything real. Since thought in itself is virtual, it is 
incapable of containing anything real.21 In the reign of time (time as 
circularity), body is that very inapprehendable trace of the origin. It is the 
absolute alterity of thought; its absolute outside that (like the fools’ ship in 
Madness and Civilization) is yet the innermost of all insides. The time spins 
ceaselessly around this inapproachable origin;22 it is around the irreducible 
materiality of body (the origin that unsettle all presence through internal 
scission) thought, like the nomadic clouds around impenetrably solid, dark-
red Mount Fuji – Shower Below the Summit or Sanka Hakuu – from the Japanese 
master printmaker, Katsushika Hokusai’s Thirty-six Views of Mount-Fuji 1760 – 
1849 series, drifts and drizzle.23 What strikes out immediately in this 
particular print is that there is not a single representation of human figure 
and, it does not suggest anything about the life of the people (Clarence 
                                                          
21 See Appendix 3  
22 Nietzsche, for instance, writes: ‘An idea made this pale man pale’ (Nietzsche, 2012, p. 32), and he then 
continues, “What is this man? A mass of diseases that reach out into the world through the spirit; there 
they want to get their prey. What is this man? A coil of wild serpents that are seldom at peace among 
themselves – so they go forth apart and seek prey in the world. Look at that poor body! What it suffered 
and craved, the poor soul interpreted to itself – it interpreted it as murderous desire, and eagerness for 
the happiness of the knife” (Nietzsche, 2012, p. 33). There is, he suggests, one thing that is thought, 
another thing that is deed, and yet another thing that is the idea of the deed; and ‘the wheel of causality 
doth not roll between them’ (Nietzsche, 2012, p. 32). Here not just the conflict between our eternal, and 
therefore otherworldly, ideas and values (in Nietzsche’s own words: the coil of wild serpents) are brought to 
light, but also tempts us to see, for ourselves, our own bodies with a clear eye against history. To do so, 
one must purify oneself, one must free one from oneself, from one’s own history, that is, from its forms, 
logics, concepts, reasoning, understandings, impressions, memories, virtues, values (and more 
importantly from the already constituted modes of anxiety, of recollection and of search), which are constituted 
in a field of power, disciplines and pain, and affirm with love ‘what is’ – the earthly body and its great reservoir 
of reason. “To purify himself,” [he writes] “is still necessary for the freedman of the spirit. Much of the 
prison and the mould still remaineth in him: pure hath his eye still to become” (Nietzsche, 2012, p. 39).  
23 Sei Shonagon, from another time and another place has aimed her writing against vision, the freezing and 
sculpting of light into structures of permanence. Her prose, even in the midst of an overriding feeling of 
loss and melancholy, tenders us with hope. The very tangibility of her experience of seeing shows her 
adventure with force. The old Japanese poem, she quotes in her The Pillow Book, from a visitor to the 
Emperor’s palace, Korechika, who has slowly intoned – “The days and the months flow by; But Mount 
Mimoro lasts forever” (Shonagon, 1967, p. 35) – deeply impresses her, as she wishes: ‘all this,’ that is, this 
imperial order that she (as the lady-in-waiting at the Court of the Japanese Empress during the last decade 
of the tenth century) was part of, would “indeed continue for a thousand years” (Shonagon, 1967, p. 35).   
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Buckingham Collection, Art Institute of Chicago). It stands apart from most 
prints of that collection as the master’s abstraction on the very nature of life. 
The dark-red colour of Japan’s spiritual soil, it seems, is intended here to deny 
our access. Like the hovering clouds below its peak, our thought is destined to 
wonder without clue. What we could never encounter then is the pre-
ontological Mount Fuji, in other words, all that we have heard and seen till 
now are only echoes and reflections. Like music, reverberations always 
presence themselves as whole. Chris Marker, at the foot of Mount Fuji, for 
instance, has encountered voice more like King Lear’s ‘reverberating across 
the castle walls erected by Akira Kurosawa and the Mount Fuji’ for the film, 
Ran (Marker, 1985, 2:40 – 2:53). Transcendence is transcendence as a whole.24 
                                                          
24 From Chris Marker’s Sans Soleil (sunless): “This name Island of France sounds strangely on the Island of 
Sal. My memory superimposes two towers: the one at the ruined castle of Montpilloy that served as an 
encampment for Joan of Arc, and the lighthouse tower at the southern tip of Sal, probably one of the last 
lighthouses to use oil.  A lighthouse in the Sahel looks like a collage until you see the ocean at the edge of 
the sand and salt. Crews of transcontinental planes are rotated on Sal. Their club brings to this frontier of 
nothingness a small touch of the seaside resort which makes the rest still more unreal.  They feed the 
stray dogs that live on the beach. I found my dogs pretty nervous tonight; there were playing with the 
sea as I had never seen them before. Listening to Radio Hong Kong later I understood: today was the 
first day of the lunar new year, and for the first time in sixty years the sign of the dog met the sign of 
water...Out there, eleven thousand miles away, a single shadow remains immobile in the midst of the 
long moving shadows that the January light throws over the ground of Tokyo: the shadow of the 
Asakusa bonze. For also in Japan the year of the dog is beginning. Temples are filled with visitors who 
come to toss down their coins and to pray Japanese style a prayer which slips into life without 
interrupting it. Brooding at the end of the world on my island of Sal in the company of my prancing dogs 
I remember that month of January in Tokyo, or rather I remember the images I filmed of the month of 
January in Tokyo. They have substituted themselves for my memory. They are my memory. I wonder 
how people remember things who don’t film, don’t photograph, don’t tape. How has mankind managed 
to remember? I know: it wrote the Bible. The new Bible will be an eternal magnetic tape of a time that 
will have to reread itself constantly just to know it existed. As we await the year four thousand and one 
and its total recall, that’s what the oracles we take out of their long hexagonal boxes at New Year may 
offer us: a little more power over that memory that runs from camp to camp like Joan of Arc. That a short 
wave announcement from Hong Kong radio picked up on a Cape Verde island projects to Tokyo, and 
that the memory of a precise color in the street bounces back on another country, another distance, 
another music, endlessly” (Marker, 1983, CD 2, 27:49 – 32:42). The attention hence is directed towards 
our memory (or the current state of our memory), a memory that not just reduces the materiality of the 
matter to the mere status of an image, but also superimposes images, a memory that runs ‘from camp to 
camp like Joan of Arc;’ consequently, an attempt to trace (since all tracing involve four dimensional 
space-time) the very force that activates and spreads this memory into space-time will only further 
weaken our power over memory. It will only spread memory further into space-time. Yet can we really 
comprehend the matrix from which this memory materialises itself? Does this superhuman nature of 
human memory ultimately gain strength from our formal (for that very reason, rigorously cultural) 
relation with the present, our losing touch with the fleeting instants? With the fleeting instants splitting 
themselves internally under the sheer pressure of reverberating human history, with we finally losing 
touch with our present; what rain on us are images and memory of images.  
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What here fascinates thought, however, is not its own origin, but its very limit 
- its own limit. Caravaggio, the Italian master from the reformation, quite 
often plays with this absolute alterity of the material body. In The Incredulity of 
Saint Thomas (1601 – 02) the skepticism of the worldly mind, in an act of 
theatrics, finds its ultimate height, when Saint Thomas, before the resurrected 
body, leans towards it, as Christ guides his hand to feel the depth of the 
wound. Does this act aim the mitigation of a bottomless temptation – shared 
and, for that reason, firmly terrestrial?  
At least in Caravaggio, the son of God and his terrestrial followers, who give 
life to the scene; they all are (like infants swathed in swaddling clothes) 
swathed in the very force of temptation. Their whining nasal voice only 
whispers the looming fear in the air. Christ here seems as inquisitive as his 
worldly disciples that he himself has to guide Thomas’s hand as if he is also 
seeking for some evidence. Could they actually encounter the resurrected 
body? They couldn’t! Seem suggesting Caravaggio. Seems not even the Christ 
did? But what fascinates thought, besides all, is the earthliness of the scene; all 
divinity are heartlessly stripped away from that very act; the act itself has, 
consequently, become an ordinary scene, or else quite like a memory of an 
ordinary scene from Caravaggio’s Rome acted somewhere at one of its dark 
alleys, after a street-fight, in a wild drunken night. Christ here is rather 
presented wrapped up in flesh – human flesh. Caravaggio’s Christ hence is 
neither the Son of God nor a dogma, but rather is human, and a man of action – a 
great teacher of humanity, who wanted to change the world. The painting, by 
suggesting the earthliness of both the peoples depicted and their thought, warns us 
on: how body itself, in the utter mundanity of time, becomes an absolutely 
impenetrable other for thought, an absolute other of human history itself. Besides the 
absolute transcendence of the resurrected body infinitely eludes the order of 
time, and resists to become a mere signifier, or a signifier of a signifier (an 
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ego, or I). From the point of view of thought, the body, as an enigma, that 
transforms the painted-canvas to a space of theatrical action, apparently, evokes 
here the painter’s primary, or even primordial, relationship to himself.25 Faith, 
consequently, to Caravaggio, seems to be carnal in its very nature. 
 
Figure: Caravaggio - The Incredulity of Saint Thomas (1601 -02). 
 
                                                          
25 In “Thoughts on Caravaggio,” Michael Fried, while trying to make sense of one of the Caravaggio’s 
early canvases, Boy Bitten by a Lizard, traces two moments in its production using (what Foucault would 
call, a heterotopias) a mirror: first moment, Fried suggests, is an extended duration, in which the painter 
absorbs himself, over time, into ‘the protracted, repetitive, partly automatic act of painting,’ which he 
calls it as immersive; and the second, a ‘notionally instantaneous’ moment of separating or indeed 
recoiling from the painting itself’ [or else, a shock of seeing something unexpected in the painting 
itself], ‘which is to say of no longer being immersed in work on it but rather of seeing [author’s italics] 
it as if for the first time.’ Fried then suggests that it is the second moment that is ‘dramatized to the 
extent of largely eclipsing the first’ not just in the Boy Bitten by a Lizard but also elsewhere in his oeuvre 
(Fried, 1997, p. 22). Like a snapshot, Caravaggio, in this masterpiece, portrays the moment when the 
lizard, hidden beneath the leaves and fruits all on a sudden bits the boy, the moment when its teeth 
touched the boy’s finger, capturing the boy’s very immediate reaction. In a moment of pain, the boy 
recoils (his recoiling, at this moment, is only carnal, and has little to do with his thinking) out of shock. 
At this moment of reflexive response, though his eyes fall upon us, the spectators, he seems not seeing 
us. He is rather caught in the action, and, to a large extent, lacks the very sense of existence – not just of 
himself, but also of viewers. With the collapsing of the entire symbolic order, the boy at this moment is 
only about to recollect what has just happened to him. The flower at the back of his right ear here only 
suggests the mood before he is bitten by the lizard. What then Caravaggio aims to show here, and 
elsewhere in his oeuvre, through dramatisation, is the very carnal themes of his work.  
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Conclusion  
Foucault’s work is often differentiated internally from the perspective of 
discontinuities that it carries with it both at the theoretical and 
methodological levels, and is marked by three distinctive phases – the 
archeological, genealogical and the ethical. However, the present chapter 
takes a different approach. It opens a reading of his work, to locate a problem 
that persistently repeats throughout his philosophical endeavor, by 
examining his encounter with Kant, and that is the problem of “What is 
man?.” The problem that shapes his thought in the later works, the problem 
of “How should I live my life?,” actually, steams out of the problem of “what 
is man?” that has shaped the topography of his thought in his early works, 
especially, The Order of Things. The present chapter, therefore, sees his work as 
a coherent whole. The reading of Hamlet at the beginning has more than one 
function in this whole endeavor. Hamlet is identified here as someone, who is 
kept suspended at the threshold between the reality of the King and the time 
of revenge, and the peculiar relation he has kept with words, the present 
reading stresses, has always baffled the renaissance society in which his tragic 
life unfolded, and for that very reason, he is often considered as mad by other 
characters in the play. On the other hand, the strange play of fear and fury 
that shapes his subjectivity actually allows us to discuss different forms of 
relationships with time in the footnotes, and that, then, play as differences to 
the non-metaphysical traits of Foucault’s thought that has been carefully 
studied afterwards, and this, then, defers, in effect, the possibility of a closure. 
…………………………………………. 
 
    
 
 

















The two main problems – “what is man?” and “how should I live?” – that the 
present study tries to deal with essentially stem out of a single problematic. 
They surface at different stages of Foucault’s career, though, as the first of the 
two surfaces in his early works, “Introduction to Kant’s Anthropology” and 
The Order of Things, where he deals with Kant’s thought, and the second 
question surfaces in his later writing, when he deals with the Greek practice of 
the care of the self. However, a trace that at once connects and differentiates 
these problems can actually be retraced. In his reading of Kant’s Anthropology, 
Foucault, for instance, tries to connect the three questions that Kant poses in 
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the Critique. Foucault suggests: it is actually through the determination of the 
source of human knowledge that one gives meaning to the question: ‘what can 
I know?’ It is through determining the domain of the possible and natural use 
of knowledge that a response to the question ‘what shall I do?’ can, actually, 
be produced. It is only through determining the limits of reason that one gives 
meaning to ‘what is possible to hope?’. Hence for Foucault, a fourth question 
that is not fundamentally different is inevitable. He, thus, tries to link the three 
questions of the critique, by posing the question: “what is man?” 
By connecting the questions of the Critique with an essentially anthropological 
one, Foucault here introduces a deviation. Since all these questions materialise 
themselves in man from within the density of becoming, time that Kant conceived 
as apriori in the Critique becomes essentially temporal. It is actually within the 
density of temporal becoming that all these questions materialise themselves 
and gain significance. Consequently, the three questions that the Critique poses 
(questions that are directed towards a transcendental philosophy, an enquiry 
into the very condition of possibility of knowledge) along with the fourth one 
that Foucault has added have essentially become anthropological. Directed by 
considerations of practical reason, these questions surface in man rather from 
within the matrix of the everyday life. It is essentially in man, “Introduction to 
Kant’s Anthropology” indicates, that a synthesis between the world – known – 
and the God –unknown – can take place.        
Through his ‘ontology of the present,’ Foucault aims at the possibilities of a 
recession into a future, the possibilities of building a future less constrained by 
a past. His ontological project actually tries to explore the potentials within the 
living present to produce something radically new. His work on Kant’s 
critique of the enlightenment project, for instance, asks: “what difference 
today has brought in relation to yesterday?” Time, here, is not circular, it does 
not form itself as a circular ruse. It is neither a continuous flux. Language 
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Counter-memory, Practice, for instance, develops a theory of time. The present 
study, therefore, concludes by outlining the model of movement (that is, time 
itself) in Foucault’s work that the chapters tried to address either directly or 
indirectly.  
Foucault writes: “Chronos is the time of becoming and new beginnings. Piece 
by piece, Chronos swallows the things to which it gives birth and which it 
causes to be reborn in its own time” (Foucault, 1980, p. 193). It is monstrous 
and lawless becoming, ‘the endless devouring of each instant, the swallowing 
up of the totality of life, the scattering of its limbs,’ and is related to the 
exactitude of re-beginning. Then from the depths of this great internal labyrinth 
that is not different in nature from the monster it contains, from the depths of 
this convoluted and inverted architecture, Foucault suggests, ‘a solid thread 
allows us to retrace our steps and to rediscover the same light of day.’ He 
writes: “Dionysus with Ariadne: you have become my labyrinth” (Ibid, p. 
193). Chronos, consequently, “is the time of measure that situates things and 
persons, develops a form, and determines a subject” (Deleuze and Guattari, 
1987, p. 262).   
Aeon, Foucault suggests, is the straight line of time, it is recurrence itself. It is a 
splitting quicker than thought and narrower than any instant. It knows only 
speed. It is “the indefinite time of the event, the floating line that knows only 
speeds and continually divides that which transpires into an already-there 
that is at the same time not-yet-here, a simultaneous too-late and too-early, 
something that is both going to happen and has just happened” (Ibid, 1987, p. 
262). At its both sides, the splitting then causes the same present to arise as 
always existing, as indefinitely present, and as indefinite future. Still this is not 
“a succession of present instances that derive from a continuous flux and that, 
as a result of their plenitude, allow us to perceive the thickness of the past and 
the outline of a future in which they in turn become the past. Rather, it is the 
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straight line of the future that repeatedly cuts the smallest width of the present 
that indefinitely recuts it starting from itself [it is less than a cut than a constant 
fabrication]” (Foucault, 1980, pp. 193 – 4). This schism can actually be traced to 
its limits, “but we will never find the indivisible atom that ultimately serves as the 
minutely present unity of time” (Ibid, p. 194, italic mine). Time, consequently, is 
always an excess to thought.  
It is time that endlessly recurs itself here, that is when the present is endlessly 
split by the finely sharp arrow of future that carries it forward by always 
causing its swerving on both sides,’ it (the living present) recurs as singular 
difference, and avoids the return of the analogous, the similar, and the identical. 
Difference recurs endlessly, and being expressed itself in the same manner 
with respect to difference. Being is never the universal flux of becoming. Nor 
is a well-centered circle of identities. It is a return freed from the curvature of 
the circle. It is recurrence. What is universally affirmed in a single stroke is the 
eternal and dangerous fissure fully given in an instant, the repetitive 
fibrillation of the present. The present, then, is a throw of the dice, and it is so, 
not “because it forms part of a game in which it insinuates small contingencies 
or elements of uncertainty,” but due to the fact that “it is at once the chance 
within the game and the game itself as chance (Ibid, p. 194). In “A Preface to 
Transgression” Foucault develops a quite similar model of movement, when 
he suggests that being – as pure movement, and for that very reason, without 
existence outside movement – transgressing limits that is the mask of already 
consolidated forces at the presence of a central absence, an empty skull. Here, 
he writes: “the play of limits and transgression incessantly crosses and 
recrosses a line which closes up behind it in a wave of extremely short 
duration, and thus it is made to return once more right to the horizon of the 
uncrossable. But this relationship is considerably more complex: these 
elements are situated in an uncertain context, in certainties which are 
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immediately upset so that thought is ineffectual as soon as it attempts to seize 
them” (Ibid, p. 34).  
Whether, it is the future materialised into an arrow splitting the present or the 
being ceaselessly transgressing the limits, the mask of the already consolidated 
forces, time, as a purely ontological being that can nevertheless subsist only in 
man, differentiates itself independent of his consciousness. Consequently, his 
consciousness is only an effect of time’s internal differentiation. The Order of 
Things gives further insights into the causes of this internal differentiation. It 
hints to us on how time, the floating line, gained the needed consistency in 
itself to present itself as a line that is repeatedly fibrillated by itself, the arrow 
of the future. The Order of Things gives a spatial being to language. It is out 
there in the void that separates the subject and the object. Foucault, for 
instance, ask: “what is language, how can we find a way round it in order to 
make it appear in itself, in all its plenitude?.” It regained this spatial existence 
in modern age, when language regained its lost consistency that would 
thicken it into words that can be deciphered, when it regains its material 
density. 
The first chapter takes this argument bit further, using Goethe’s colour theory. 
According to Goethe, light forms a differential relation with darkness, when it 
falls upon something other than itself – matter, for instance. Then, reality 
unfolds within the play of refracted light and darkness. It becomes so, when 
pre-ontological matter becomes inaccessible either to vision or to thought. 
Consequently, when language recovers it material density, reality unfolds as a 
play of refolding of light and language (with each having its own history). 
Here light and language become apriori – the two ‘there is.’ They are always 
already out there, independent of both the subject and the object. It is so, 
because of the central absence of an unchangeable presence, a univocal one. 
Here when a breaching has always already occurred, when language, 
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independent of both the subject and the object, becomes spatiotemporal, time 
can never be pure and empty. The alien elements that have infested time, give 
it the necessary consistency to differentiate itself from within into past, present 
and future. Time becomes an ontological existence. It begins to endlessly split 
itself from within. 
When light and language are infinitely folded towards themselves and become 
reality independent of both the subject and the object, time in effect becomes 
an ontological being subsisting in man, giving form to both his thoughts and 
actions. The second and the third chapters further analyse the folds of light 
and language respectively. The Stoics folded light and language, in a culture 
of silence, listening and soul services through sending frequent missives to 
friends, and through them they intended to objectify the soul, the principle of 
life. When these folds of light and language are folded towards themselves 
they form an inside, the ‘I’ or the self that contemplates and an outside, a field 
of forces that can only be felt. It is, however, within the play of this field of 
forces that the topographies of these folds of light and language take shape.  
In the modern age, Foucault suggests, a new form of discourse the tension that 
separates the empirical and the transcendental becomes internal, while being 
directed at both. It is when the space of the body and the time of the culture 
form an internal tension within the form of a discourse that man begins to 
appear before himself as a reality with his own density. The Order of Things, 
however, sees this as an epistemic break at the level of discursive formation. 
Foucault’s analysis indicates actually the shift from the classical to the modern 
age. However, it should be seen as the condition under which the self affects 
itself, that is the auto-affection that lets man to follow himself, his thought and 
actions, or thought as actions. Foucault, for instance, suggests, when language 
recovered its material density and established a differential relationship 
between light (thought) and darkness (unthought), man appears to himself 
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compressed and withheld in a hollowed out space formed at the middle of the 
folds of life, labour and language. Thus he starts following himself in relation 
to these folds. When man starts following himself, the question of ‘what is 
man?’ becomes important for him, and since the folding of the outside itself is, 
or it involves auto-affection (the self affecting itself), the question of ‘how 
should I live my life?’ becomes internal to the same movement. The fourth 
chapter tries to link these questions that appear at different stages of his 
philosophic career. 
The question of “what is man?” becomes a concern for man, when a mutation 
within language transformed it to a reality with its own density, when language 
recovered its lost density to become words, words that can be deciphered. This 
is when man starts to follow himself again. The question of “how should I live 
my life?” concerns him, when he develops a certain relationship with truth 
about his own actions. The ancient Greek practice of the care of the self, Foucault 
suggests, revolves around practical reason. Even though, this ancient model is 
shaped by the play of understanding, its relationship to truth is of a different 
order, unlike the Christian experience of the flesh that revolves around 
deciphering the truth beneath one’s actions. The Greeks do not develop a 
hermeneutical relationship with the truth of one’s own actions, that is, they do 
not try to figure out ‘which desires?,’ ‘which acts?,’ and ‘which pleasures?’ one 
should follow. For them, there is no hidden truth that can be deciphered 
beneath the actions that one does in everyday life. 
The Greek ethics is modelled around an ontology of forces. Since forces by 
their very nature are excess, it stresses that it would rather be much more 
important to identify the forces that transport desire to act, act to pleasure, and 
pleasure back to desire than deciphering the hidden meaning beneath them. 
The regimen of life, therefore, is built upon the articulation of a framework of 
everyday life, based on the foundation of a practical reason. One of its 
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governing principles is: ‘a reasonable discourse could not unfold without a 
health practice’ (Foucault, 1988c, p. 101). The ancient Greeks, we have seen 
Foucault showing, sensed the differential relationship between the empirical 
and the transcendental aspects of thought, as they had observed the effects of 
food, wine, drugs, climate and the architecture of home on the body and the 
senses, their ramifications on thought and, vice versa. They, hence, developed 
techniques of life based on practical reason to train both the body and the soul, 
the principle of life. This practically demands a field of temporality, that is, an 
immanent field of uninterrupted movement that would initiate a play of 
interpretation and evaluation organised around a historically formed practical 
reason.  
The senses interpret and introduce the space of the body to the thought and 
the thought evaluates and introduces the time of the culture to the senses, and 
vice versa. Consequently, the becoming time of space and space of time, a rift 
faster than thought, is a more originary violence than any other that introduces 
thought. This originary oscillation sets itself into motion and gains intensity, 
when a central absence, an absolute Limit repeatedly signals the presence of 
an unapproachable other – an absolute other. It is the repetition of the central 
absence that differentiates and repeats both the empirical and the transcendental, 
and establishes links between them within a form of thought that is grounded 
in practice. The Greek ethics demands the freedom to train oneself by oneself, 
by building a counter-force (an active force, since only forces confront forces) 
that can check the passive forces that take one to desire and pleasure. The 
model of ethics that Foucault derives from the ancient Greeks also demands 
an agonistic relationship with oneself – a relationship that would repetitively 
reconstitute and refresh the inside, the self that contemplates, by folding the 
outside. It aims the spiritual transformation of oneself.   
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II 
Then, in the light of its own enquires, the present study reiterates that: all acts 
of signifying inevitably involve forces of fiction. Since we always begin from 
the centre, that is, since we have not got the power to actually begin; all acts 
are shaped by a play of force and form. They are, for that reason, not fully 
given even to the most inquest eye! For Foucault, the self itself is only a fold of 
the outside. It is nothing but the outside folded towards itself and, 
consequently, the self nourishes itself from outside, it subsists on the outside. 
The self that organises the gaze, then, is always already (that is, even before it 
becomes conscious of itself) organised in relation to its outside. If put 
differently, the self, in relation to the materiality of the body, is always already 
transcendence, and for that reason, is fictional. If philosophy is a human affair, 
its tone is then fictional. It is essentially the fictional that will fill and resonate 
in the void, building a spiritual ambience. It is in the ambience of its own 
reverberations that philosophy gains its spiritual force.  
..................................................................... 
 













Similar theatrical situation unfolds itself in Vyasa’s epic poem, The 
Mahabharata, when the son of Kunti slips into a subjective mode; as he has 
fallen prey to words, Arjuna has spoken words that brave (as he himself is) 
should not have spoken. As he arrives to ‘yonder open ground betwixt the 
armies,’ speaks he those words: “Krishna! as I behold, come here to shed their 
common blood, yon concourse of our kin, my members fail, my tongue dries 
in my mouth, a shudder thrills my body, and my hair bristles with horror; 
from my weak hand slips Gandiv, the goodly bow; a fever burns my skin to 
parching; hardly may I stand; the life within me seems to swim and faint; 
nothing do I foresee save woe and wail! It is not good, O Keshav!”(Arnold, 
1996, p. 97).  Krishna then speaks with lucidity, and advises Arjuna to 
overcome the delirium imposed on him by words and the thought that carry 
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them, and to “be thyself;” here the son of Kunti’s restlessness, as is suggested 
by Sankaracharya, in his Sanskrit commentary of Bhagavad Gita, is ingrained 
on false ideas – ideas that are fixed on differentiation; what Arjuna has done 
wrong, at least from Gita’s point of view, is that he has actually tried to 
differentiate, among the enemy line his friends, relatives and family (he tried 
to identify himself in them) and this has lead to the strengthening of the 
delusion within him, that he is nobody else, but one amongst them 
(Gambhirananda, 2000, p. 2); consequently, Arjuna, the Incinerator of the Foe, 
spoke those words with a sighing to Krishna, the Lord of Hearts, that “I will 
not fight” and then he has held silence (Arnold, 1996, p. 97); Krishna here 
advises his friend, Arjuna that the truly learned do not fall prey to words, 
they do not mourn, not even for the dead and the alive, he suggests: “The 
(truly) learned do not mourn” (Edgerton, 1996, p. 17). What Gita advocates 
here is to see the present (without the background of the past) or, in other 
words, to perceive the thing as presence without the mediation of language 
without the play of words; as words themselves differ and defer. It advises to 
see ourselves through a meticulous observation of the different levels of 
awareness of human experience, whether there is anything in it that is infinite 
and changeless by nature (Easwaran, 2007, p. 17); it stresses on seeing behind 
all the plays of cause and effect (that is, behind the play of difference and the 
linear understanding of time inherent to it – time as ceaselessly flowing from 
the past to the future) an absolute reality in a world of flux, it advises to one 
with the divine within; it advocates to enable ourselves to see the same thing 
“in a wise and disciplined Brahmin as in a cow or an elephant, or even in a 
dog or an outcast” (Johnson, 2008, p. 24). Gita hence locates its observation in 
a much deeper level, it aims to one with the underlining reality, the 
changeless infinite background in which the entire drama of difference stages 
itself. “He whose self is unaffected by outside contact finds his happiness in 
the self; united through yogic discipline with Brahman, he reaches 
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inextinguishable happiness” (Johnson, 2008, pp. 24 – 25) ...“For the supreme 
bliss comes to the yogin whose mind has grown calm, whose passion is 
stilled, who has become Brahman, without taint” (Johnson, 2008, p. 29). In 
Hindu metaphysics the morphogenetic field (Maya) that produces names and 
extensions actually unfolds itself through differentiation within an ultimate 
universal reality that is Brahma. Interestingly, both Arnold and Johnson, in 
their translations of Gita, have sensed in it the trace of Sankhya Theory. 
Sankhya Theory suggests the material nature of universe (including all 
physical and mental attitudes of human beings). Material nature, it suggests, 
‘is a continuous process [my italic] manifested in the dynamic interaction of 
three inextricably intertwined constituents’ – pure constituent represents the 
principle of knowledge and freedom, passionate for activity and greed, and the 
dark for inertia and ignorance (Johnson, 2008, p. 10). Life ‘subtended by the 
duration of the individual Will to Life,’ suggests Coomaraswami in The Dance 
of Siva, may be regarded as constituting a curve, an arc of time-experience, and it 
is since in man that the turning point of this curve is actually reached, both 
Brahmanical sociology and Buddhist mysticism gives the-birth-in-human-
form an immeasurable value. “The outward movement on this curve 
Evolution, the Path of Pursuit is characterized by self-assertion. [And] the 
inward movement Involution, the Path of Return characterized by increasing 
Self-realization. The religion of men on the outward path is the Religion of 
Time; the religion of those who return is the religion of Eternity. If we 
consider life as one whole, certainly Self-realization must be regarded as its 
essential purpose from the beginning” (Coomaraswami, 1918, p. 6/10). 
According to the spiritual age and the position of the seeker on the great 
curve, he suggests that there are three prominent types of men. First: the mob, 
who ‘are preoccupied with the thought of I and Mine, whose objective is self-
assertion, but are restrained on the one hand by fear of retaliation and of legal 
or after-death punishment;’ second, there is a smaller, yet quite large number 
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of thoughtful and good men ‘whose behaviour is largely determined by a 
sense of duty’ (who have began to taste freedom, but still are guided by rule); 
third, and finally, there is still a much smaller number of great men ‘who have 
definitely passed the period of greatest stress and have attained peace, or at 
least have attained to occasional and unmistakable vision of life as a whole’ 
(Coomaraswami, 1918, p. 8/10). They, he suggests, are “Prolific” of Blake and 
the “Masters” of Nietzsche, and ‘their activity is determined by their love and 
wisdom’ (Coomaraswami, 1918, p. 8/10). The difference that Gita, then, brings 
here, against the Pyrrhonians, is the stress for work (and a unity in purpose), a 
stress on action that is without either prejudice or justification, that is, if 
Pyrrhonians take scepticism to its extreme point, then Gita advocates 
engagement, as it does not totally rejects sensory-perceptions. To engage, and 
to engage for the good, it is (Gita says) necessary for each of us to dissolve the 
always contemplating I, the ego. It is, then, quite easy to suggest here that 
neither a Pyrrhonian nor anything similar to an ancient Indian ethics has 
guided any of Hamlet’s thought and actions. However, it is quite evident that 
the deferring of action in Hamlet’s case is not due to any delusion of emotional 
attachment with the enemy; but rather (it is) due to pure fear; does this fear 
that unsettles him from within, the fear of the king and the ruthlessness of his 
political apparatus, actually gain force also from ignorance? 
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Appendix 2 
Baudrillard, in his critique of Foucault’s power, has, actually, kept seduction 
outside production, and therefore, he has failed to see the tension within 
discourses that are rooted in actual experience. In discourses rooted in actual 
experience, their internal tension “would keep separate the empirical [that is 
rooted in the space of the body] and the transcendental [that which belongs to 
the time of culture], while being directed at both” (Foucault, 1994, pp. 320 – 
21). Baudrillard writes: “from one discourse to the other – since it really is a 
question of discourse – there runs the same ultimatum of pro-duction in the 
literal sense of the word. The original sense of “production” is not in fact that 
of material manufacture: rather, it means to render visible, to cause to appear 
and be made to appear: pro-ducere. Sex is produced as one produces a 
document, or as an actor is said to appear (se produire) on stage. To produce is 
to force what belongs to another order (that of secrecy and seduction) to 
materialize. Seduction is that which is everywhere and always opposed to 
pro-duction; seduction withdraws something from the visible order and so 
runs counter to production, whose project is to set everything up in clear 
view, whether it be an object, a number, or a concept. Let everything be 
produced, be read, become real, visible, marked with the sign of effectiveness; 
let everything be transcribed into force relations, into conceptual systems or 
into calculable energy; let everything be said, gathered, indexed and 
registered: this is how sex appears in pornography, but this is more generally 
the project of our whole culture, whose natural condition is “obscenity.”...Not 
a shadow of seduction can be detected in the universe of production, ruled by 
the transparency principle governing all forces in the order of visible and 
calculable phenomena: objects, machines, sexual acts, or gross national 
product” (Baudrillard, 2007, p. 37). What he then fails to see here is: all 
processes of production are organised ritually or, rather they actually involve 
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ritualised processes, that is, nothing can actually be rendered visible from 
vacuum, nor anything radically new can actually be produced by man and 
added to the whole. Besides, a ritually oriented production processes can 
have any sense of quality. That which renders visible, essentially, renders 
itself visible from within a field of seduction – that which renders visible 
always come along with the forces of secrecy. The numerous conscious and 
unconscious permutations that render discourses only indicate the fluidity 
and intensity of the field of forces. Foucault, for instance, writes: “the question 
I would like to pose is not, Why are we repressed? But rather, Why do we say, 
with so much passion and so much resentment against our most recent past, 
against our present, and against ourselves [italic added], that we are repressed? 
By what spiral did we come to affirm that sex is negated? What led us to 
show, ostentatiously, that sex is something we hide, to say it is something we 
silence? And we do all this by formulating the matter in the most explicit 
terms, by trying to reveal it in its most naked reality, by affirming it in the 
positivity of its power and its effects” (Foucault, 1998, pp. 8 – 9). “Hence...my 
main concern will be to locate the forms of power, the channels it takes, and 
the discourses it permeates in order to reach the most tenuous and individual 
modes of behaviour, the paths that give it access to the rare or scarcely 
perceivable forms of desire, how it penetrates and controls everyday pleasure 
– all this entailing effects that may be those of refusal, blockage, and 
invalidation, but also incitement and intensification: in short, the 
“polymorphous techniques of power. And finally, the essential aim will not 
be to determine whether these discursive productions and these effects of 
power lead one to formulate the truth about sex, or on the contrary falsehoods 
designed to conceal that truth but rather to bring out the “will to knowledge” 
that serves as both their support and their instrument” (Ibid, 1998, pp. 11 – 
12). Foucault, hence, ‘do not maintain that the prohibition of sex is a ruse,’ 
then it is, according to him, ‘a ruse to make prohibition into the basic and 
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constitutive element from which one would be able to write the history of 
what has been said concerning sex starting from the modern epoch.’ He 
writes: “in short, I would like to disengage my analysis from the privileges 
generally accorded the economy of scarcity and the principles of rarefaction, 
to search instead for instances of discursive production (which also 
administer silences, to be sure), of the production of power (which sometimes 
have the function of prohibiting), of the propagation of knowledge (which 
often cause mistaken beliefs or systematic misconceptions to circulate); I 
would like to write the history of these instances and their transformations” 
(Ibid, 1998, p. 12). In “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,” Foucault, for instance, 
writes: genealogy “operates on a field of entangled and confused parchments, 
on documents that have been scratched over and recopied many times” 
(Foucault, 1980, p. 139).  
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Appendix 3 
While acknowledging the considerable progress that Spinoza has made in his 
struggle against Cartesian theory of substance, Deleuze, in Difference and 
Repetition, writes: ‘against the Cartesian conception of distinctions that runs 
together the ontological, the formal and the numerical (substance, quality and 
quantity), Spinoza [rather] organises a remarkable division into substance, 
attributes and modes’ (Deleuze, 1994, p. 40). Extension, according to Spinoza, 
can be conceived as infinity only from a thing conceived through and in itself, 
only through a law of eternal nature, the univocal being, a sublime subject, 
that he calls, the Substance. Substance then is prior to all accidents (Spinoza, 
1955, pp. 282 – 83). That is, there cannot be another extension, for instance, a 
second one, if not there is a ‘Being’ with infinite attributes (Ibid, p. 277). 
Spinoza, for instance, writes: “With regard to what you say concerning my 
first proposition, I beg you, my friend, to bear in mind, that men are not 
created but born, and that their bodies already exist before birth, through 
under different forms” (Spinoza, 1955, pp. 283 – 4). He then reveals, in a 
correspondence to Oldenburg, a questioner whom he values a great deal, the 
secrets of the Spinozean world: “first, that in the universe there cannot exist 
two substances without their differing utterly in essence; secondly, that 
substances cannot be produced or created – existence pertains to its actual 
essence; thirdly, that all substances must be infinite or supremely perfect after 
its kind” (Ibid, p.277). Spinoza’s univocal being, Deleuze (after considering its 
attribution as a Being) suggests, is a truly expressive and affirmative 
proposition, as it ceases to be neutralised – as there remains a difference 
between the substance and the modes. “Spinoza’s substance appears 
independent of the modes, while the modes are dependent on substance, but 
as though on something other than themselves. Substance must itself be said 
of the modes and only of the modes. Such a condition can be satisfied only at 
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the price of a more general categorical reversal according to which being is 
said of becoming...” (Deleuze, 1994, p. 40). Nevertheless, can this difference 
that Spinoza traces between ‘substance that which is conceived through and 
in itself’ (the first stroke of time, before time – the first narrative, God’s 
narrative) and modes (the successive habits and coexistence memory central to 
human narrative, in the following-reading the naming of animals) actually 
hold weight? While reading Genesis, in “The Animal That Therefore I Am,” 
Derrida quotes: “Elohim created the husbandman as his replica; As a replica 
of Elohim he created him; Male and female he created them; Elohim blessed 
them. Elohim said to them: “Be fruitful, multiply, fill the earth, conquer it”” 
(Derrida, 2008, p. 16). Even after this mandate, after God’s mandate, they, 
husbandman and wife, still, perceive themselves to be naked, and yet naked 
without shame, until a certain serpent, the gaze of a non-brother fallen up on 
them; they, thereafter, ‘will perceive themselves naked, and not without 
shame’ (Ibid, p. 16). In ‘order to see the power of man, in order to see the power 
of man in action’ he, the Supreme Being, destines animals to experience 
power, man’s power. He lets Adam, his own replica, the man to call out 
names. ‘Adam is observed, within sight, he names under observation’ (Ibid, p. 
16). God “lets him, Ish, speak on his own, call out on his own, call out and 
nominate, call out and name, as if he were able to say “I name,” “I call.” God 
lets Ish call the other living things all on his own, give them their names in his 
own name, these animals that are older and younger than him, these living 
things that came into the world before him but were named after him” (Ibid, 
p. 17). Waiting around the corner, observing within sight, this man naming 
animals, God also observes himself turning all-powerful (as an infinite gaze) 
and at the same time finite, as he sees himself filled with a mixture of 
curiosity and authority. With the infinite right of naming invested on man, 
God himself encounters his first experience of finitude, as he himself does not 
know ‘what is going to happen to him with language’ (Ibid, p. 17). “God,” 
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writes Derrida, “doesn’t yet know what he really wants: this is the finitude of 
a God who doesn’t know what he wants with respect to the animal, that is to 
say, with respect to the life of the living as such, a God who sees something 
coming without seeing it coming, a God who will say “I am that I am” without 
knowing what he is going to see when a poet enters the scene to give his 
name to living things” (Ibid, p. 17).  
We began this reading, as a footnote to one of the original problems of 
philosophy, that is, the relation between extension and thought, and have 
already encountered two decisive direction that philosophy has taken on this 
issue. Spinoza, by attributing substance as univocal being, has drawn our 
attention to the difference between substance and modes, and Deleuze, on the 
other hand, by neutralizing time (instead of God, one should rather say time 
here) to a pure and empty form, categorically rejects any difference between 
time and its modes. Before we introduce a (re)reading of Derrida, I would like 
to introduce Lacan’s famous formula here: if ‘man’s desire is the desire of the 
Other,’ then ‘unconscious is [the] discourse of the Other’ (Lacan, 1977, p. 312). 
The following reading, however, does not stress the psychological or the 
textual; it rather only tries to open up a reading to comprehend the theatrical, 
the action itself. The play of the form and the formless that is force, like any 
play, is temporal by nature, therefore, it can only unfold within time. The 
following reading not just examines Derrida’s reading of Genesis and the 
origin of time, that is the first stroke of time, but it also investigates how time, 
with its origin, degrades itself and become that which is not itself, in other 
words, how the origin itself becomes inaccessible. Temporality is the mode of 
becoming. Temporality, or becoming movement, is the becoming succession 
of coexistence and the becoming coexistence of succession. In other words, it 
is the ceaseless modification of time into coexistence (memory), succession 
(habits) and permanence, at the very presence of a central absence, that is, 
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when present itself ceases to be presence, and is given only as virtual. When 
time becomes temporal, it ceaselessly flow from past to future. The present 
then is given as absence – in “A Preface to Transgression” Foucault, for 
instance, writes what the upturned eye discovers is that the ‘interior is an 
empty skull, a central absence’ (Foucault, 1980, p. 49). The present that 
presences itself as absence that is given only as virtual, consequently, is the 
very matrix that unfolds time as temporal. The ceaseless deferring of the 
presentation of the present then suggests that origin is nothing but the 
beginning of the end. Becoming (either through modification or substitution), 
in relation to the origin, involves degeneration, and therefore, rejoining with 
or return to the origin, in the case of the ancient Hindus, was of great 
importance. The Hindus, against theories of human nature, stress on 
impersonality and the rejoining with the eternal present. For them to become 
one with the eternal present is an attempt to return to the lucidity and the 
playfulness (that is the innocence) of what Derrida would call ‘the first stoke 
of time,’ that is, the God’s narrative. The return-to-the-eternal-present 
terminates the auto-distancing of the self from itself and ceases self-affection. 
For those ancients, the path of return in the arc of time-experience liberates 
them from the intricately related problems of temporality and difference and 
leads them to self-realisation and eternal bliss (Coomaraswami, 1918, p. 6/10). 
Let us go back to Derrida’s reading.   
Derrida writes “let me insist: it is only recorded thus in the second narrative. If 
one believes what is called the first narrative, God creates man in his image 
but he brings male and female into the world at the same time [my italic] in a 
single stroke. Naming will thus have been the fact of man as a couple, if it can 
be put that way. The original naming of the animal does not take place in the 
first version. It isn’t the man-woman of the first version but man alone and 
before woman who, in that second version, gives their names, his names, to the 
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animals. On the other hand, it is in the so-called first version that the 
husbandman, created as God’s replica, and created male-female, man-
woman, immediately receives the order to subject the animals to him” 
(Derrida, 2008, p. 15). Hence with a single stroke of time, before time, without 
a second thought, He, the Supreme Being, creates out of his image man and 
brings husbandman and wife, at the same time, into the world; which means, 
what had been done, had been done with the innocence of a child and had 
been done without any trace of ignorance or of a tinge of the play of 
unconscious. At a moment of perfect consciousness, at a moment of “I am that 
I am,” he creates man-woman. He creates man-woman, without letting him 
affecting himself – that is without auto-affection: an I affecting the ego 
(Deleuze, 1984, p. vii – ix) – in the certainty of his non-being, without an 
interiority. In other words, he makes the first stoke of time, before time, from 
himself. “Elohim: said: “Let us make man in our image, in our likeness! Let 
them [note the sudden move to the plural] have authority [Derrida’s italic] over 
the fish of the sea and birds of the heavens...” (Derrida, 2008, 15). Hence the 
first stroke of time, the man-woman, is created from pure thought, from what 
Deleuze calls in “Synthesis and Time,” a ‘genetic thought’ and since he 
created man out of his image, man’s thought, at the moment of his creation 
was also genetic by nature, with a similar statue of A is A (an analytic – a 
priori) – means, they, like God, live their lives in the present without any effort to 
make sense of either their past or their future. In other words, they have lived in 
an ideal world – they are their world, and the language they, the man-woman, 
have spoken is not human, but God’s language (for instance, Derrida in “The 
Essay on the Origin of Language” writes: “[i]n the beginning or in the ideal of 
the all-harmonious voice, the modification becomes one with the substance 
that it modifies” (Derrida, 2002, p. 198); in other words there is no much 
difference between the substance and its modes). Consequently, one must 
arrive through intuition, if he must grasp the true nature of this original time, 
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that god creates a genetic thought from himself, (blindly) believing (or in the 
very absence of believing) that they, his creation, the man-woman, will think and 
do exactly what he thinks. They will do, following (or without the knowledge of 
following what they are following) his (god’s) grand narration. Between this first 
narrative and the second narrative (that is, man’s naming of animal), an 
incident, which is precisely of the nature of an Event (and therefore, I must 
insist here that it cannot be part of the original text, god’s meta-narrative), takes 
place – the first true Event. Husbandman-woman’s encounter with the 
serpent and its ramifications on the second narrative – man’s naming of 
animals. Let us, therefore, examine the event! Like an unwanted adjunct to 
god’s grand narrative, an event, with unexpected ramifications, occurs, when 
the man-woman first encounters a non-brother, a serpent. They, before its gaze, 
encounter, for the first time, their nakedness; and after that, they ‘will 
perceive themselves to be naked and not without shame’ (Derrida, 2008, p. 15) 
The man-woman’s encounter with the serpent here establishes a new relation 
between them and the world; they, for the first time, start following themselves 
following the others; they start following themselves with an a priori 
knowledge that comes into effect at the very intersection of the gazes – their 
encounter with the serpent. Within a sudden flash of objectivity (the knowledge of 
not-knowing their shame), both the World and themselves present before them as 
phenomena. It is the moment when, on the one hand, both form and limit (that 
is, when I, for instance, ask: ‘how to learn’ a new thing – for example, a new 
skill or a new language – I am actually endeavouring, from a threshold, into a 
new terrain where language is limited to the uninflected form of the verb: ‘to learn,’ 
for example, means to learn through practicing. Therefore, one can say: the 
man-woman begins to pick, through their experience before the serpent, the 
knowledge of their shame. Their knowledge-of not-knowing-their-own-shame till 
now – which is different from the-knowledge-of-their-shame – besides suggests 
that shame has always been a content of language, but man-woman only 
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realised it after their experience before the serpent. This is actually the trouble 
with all knowledge. It is always born with its own alterity, that is, unknown, 
which is immediately added to the already accumulated undifferentiated 
swam. This undifferentiated swam, the blood-brother of knowledge, that 
appears along with the progression of history, that is, the accumulated 
knowledge in time, melts and dissolves deeper into time than knowledge) of 
language, alien to time, slips into, merges and becomes one (like milk into water 
– in this case, neither the milk becomes water nor water becomes milk, and 
yet our finite senses are incapable of detecting which is which) with or in time, 
detaching time from everything else, including the god as he himself 
experiences auto-affection, that is, as he experiences finitude. Here language, 
like god, must also experience finitude. It is then also the moment when god 
becomes God (with a capital letter), that is, God, from the point of view of 
knowledge, becomes an excess – Deleuze, however, argues in “Kant” that 
since Kant has given God ‘quite a different function, a moral, practical 
function,’ he has ‘subtracted God and the soul from knowledge (Deleuze, 
1978). ’Knowledge (in Derrida’s own words, they ‘will perceive themselves 
naked, and not without shame,’ which means with a sense and knowledge of 
shame) here, from the point of view of the man-woman, actually functions like 
an apparition to the senses, as it not only reveals its content, but also 
strengthens their deeper believe in a world of unkown (not in the sense of 
darkness, but a world of undifferentiated force which in no way can be 
reduced to the order of logic, reason or any binary coupling). Thus, on the 
other hand, man-woman’s encounter, with the serpent, initiated in them auto-
affection: an ego, immersed, till now, in itself comes (by splitting open its thick 
and hard outer-shell) into life, against a self-differentiating point, the I, that 
differentiates itself in relation to that very ego that starts to feed itself in the 
out. In this field of action, when non-time merges with or into time, the duration 
gets intensity and quality. Time consequently can never be pure and empty. It is 
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rather inscribed in or with the word, producing, at once (along with real 
effects) virtual effects – that is, not just producing apparitions, rather 
producing apparitions of very real effects (the Lacanian Real resists 
integration, transforming the Imaginary and the Symbolic, within the triode, 
to appear, through deploying fields of virtual, more real than they actually are: 
see, for further reading, Zizek’s lecture: The Reality of the Virtual). Deleuze, for 
instance, suggests the apparition for Kant “is what appears in so far as it 
appears” (Deleuze, 1978, p. 5). Kant calls it phenomenon. It is then the 
inscriptions in the very form of time that allows time to contain at once more 
than one mode (for instance, the successive habit and the coexistence of memory), 
and brings a difference between its form and modes. One experiences time 
only through its modes, and yet, as conceived by Spinoza, modes are not 
time. Since time here has the form of deception of deception, that is, the form 
of unconscious, turning everything, including God and his beloved creation, 
the man-woman, into puppets. The Husbandman and Wife’s encounter with 
the serpent hence is precisely an Event, as it opens up the Infinity, the God, to 
his own ignorance. It is the moment of the Infinity confronting his own finitude; 
God, for the first time, confronts his ignorance, his pride and his emotions. It 
is the moment of Infinity forced to contemplate Infinity, a higher source of power 
– here we encounter a hierarchy among forces. We are in Cantor’s territory: still 
I believe, (precisely due to my own finitude I insist that I believe – in any case, I 
can only believe what is not given to me as concrete) that it might be God, and 
not Cantor, who, for the first time, has taken up this question for intuition. How 
big is Infinity? However, God’s exposure, for the first time, to surprise here 
(Derrida’s reading of Genesis) only confirms the beingness of the Infinity. God 
at last becomes a Spinozean God – a being (or auto-affection). God, for the first 
time, experiences finitude, implies that he can even be extinguished. In Of 
Grammatology, Derrida writes, “Auto-affection is a universal structure of 
experience. All living things are capable of auto-affection. And only a being 
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capable of symbolizing, that is, to say of auto-affecting, may let itself be 
affected by the other in general” (Derrida, 2002, p. 165). Yet the divinity of the 
divine gains force only from the point of view of thought, only from the limits of 
his seeker. His divinity ascents with thought, that is, with thought’s own 
sense of its finitude.  
Are we sensing in the above-described logic, what Derrida calls an 
anthropocentric logic? An abyssal limit! Well it is then our finitude, and at the 
same time, it also opens up an ethical possibility. “This powerful yet deprived 
“in order to see” that is God’s, the first stroke of time, God’s exposure to 
surprise, to the event of what is going to occur between man and animal, this 
time before time has always made me dizzy [my italic]” (Derrida, 2008, p. 17).  
If seen from a different standpoint, that is from the very limit of human 
reason, it is a different scene (different from the one explained just above) 
unfolds itself; there he, the Supreme Being, along with his own creation, 
animals, become the first (silent) witnesses of man’s power in action. What we 
then see in them, in each of them, is an Other, a (silent) witness, ‘powerful yet 
deprived of power,’ contained totally in itself – an absolute Other, not even a 
brother (face-to-face in the case of Levinas), rather a non-brother that, by 
ceasing itself from becoming a concept, keeps itself as a silent witness to the 
becoming-identical of the becoming itself, the circularity of pure energy. They 
are consequently the witnesses of that play of an immanent field of form and 
force that gives form to the I.  
Since they, the husbandman and wife, have experienced their nakedness, and 
their shamelessness, only after the appearance of the serpent, before the gaze 
of a non-brother, their shame itself is a gift. It is then under the gaze of certain 
serpent that our early ancestors first received (or recognised) their 
unconscious; and therefore, our infinite right to name, our language, is only a 
received gift. If language is something that comes to our possession from 
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outside, something that we received as a gift, something that eventually 
colonised us, then we ourselves should be, among those other silent 
witnesses, a witness of our own linguistic violence. From this particular 
standpoint, the most intimate and the innermost in ourselves, (the most 
innermost, and therefore, like Heidegger’s Being, the most furthest of all, is 
also the most silent within us; a witness, a non-brother, that circulate the 
excess, the intensities that overflows any signifiers that designate us to or 
attach us permanently to an order) is beyond, and therefore unapproachable 
with, the specificities of the humanity defined and attached on us. Does the 
uninterrupted becoming-identical of the becoming, the becoming-identical of the 
ceaseless becoming-I of the I, in relation to a relative-ego, then unfolds itself in, 
what Deleuze calls, an immutable time? Time, he writes, ‘is the form of 
everything that changes and moves [my italic], but it is an immutable Form 
which does not change” (Deleuze, 1984, p. viii). This form of time, according 
to Deleuze, separates one from oneself (Deleuze, 1984, ix), separates ‘the I’ (the 
active I that synthesises time) from ‘the ego’ (the passivity) and establishes a 
differential relationship between them. In this differential relationship, time 
presences itself in its different modes – as permanence, succession, coexistitive. 
Yet to establish any differential relationship between an active I and a passive 
ego, time and language must (at once) be given as the a priori. Time, in itself 
(that is, time as immutable form), must lack the power of differentiation – yet 
Deleuze writes: “Having abjured its empirical content, having overturned its 
own ground, time is defined not only by a formal and empty order but also by 
a totality and a series [my italic] (Deleuze, 1994, p. 89). What then could be that 
difference (that which Deleuze preferred to call: ‘a fundamental difference’) that 
must have driven this differential relationship? Can the difference between 
thought and extension (thought and its absolute alterity, a potentiality that has 
never succumbed itself to the order of thought – the matter itself) be considered as 
this fundamental difference? Does Matter, as the perfect witness (or as a 
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detached-engagement) to the ‘Eternal Return,’ tempt it with sense that could 
stop the Eternal Return from bringing back ‘the same’? Wallace Stevens, for 
instance, writes: “What was the ointment sprinkled on my beard?; What were 
the hymns that buzzed beside my eyes?; What was the sea whose tide swept 
through me there? Out of my mind the golden ointment rained, And my ears 
made the blowing hymns they heard. I was myself the compass of that sea [my 
italic]: I was the world in which I walked, and what I saw; or heard or felt 
come not but from myself; And there I found myself more truly and more strange 
[my italic]” (Stevens, 1971, p. 77). If the I is another – Rimbaud’s formula 
(Deleuze, 1984, pp. viii – ix): that is, if the I indeed is distanced from itself by the 
line of time, by, what Borges would call, a true labyrinth (Borges, 1998, pp. 147 – 
56) – then the I must indeed be nothing but a force of intuition derived from a 
virtual field (a sequence of I-He) that has appeared in time and given before 
us in the coexistence of memory (hence coexistence, a characteristics of space, 
becomes a mode of time itself). Foucault, for instance, in “Different Spaces” 
has argued that the present age indeed is the age of space. “We are [he writes] 
in an era of the simultaneous, of juxtaposition, of the near and the far, of the 
side-by-side, of the scattered” (Foucault, 1998, p. 175). Our habit of asserting 
ourselves under the illusive singularity of the I, therefore, must not have gained 
force from the I, but rather from a singularity that is exterior to both time and 
language, an immediate presence that presences itself as a certain absence (a 
presence that, by resisting integration, baffles us all) that observes, in silence, 
the unfolding relationship between, on the one hand, the active I and the passive 
Ego and, on the other hand, the I with itself (auto-affection). If put differently, 
the differential relationship both between the I and the Ego, and I with itself 
unfolds when language confronts its exterior, within the very fundamental 
difference between the unfolding thought and the Matter (of its infinite 
potentials, extension is only one). Can the body (when that upturned eye 
closes upon the world, what it discovers is that, the interior is nothing but an 
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empty skull, a central absence (Foucault, 1980, p. 49); body as the never totally 
actualised potentiality) be then the ‘compass of that sea’ of rhythm, scent and 
imagination (the very directness and intimacy of that immanent field of 
sensuality, the poetic moment) that which Stevens talks about? The “Greek 
ethics,” Foucault, for instance, has suggested, “is centred on a problem of 
personal choice, of the aesthetics of existence’ [my italic] (Foucault, 1997, p. 260). 
It is in this context that the techniques of self (the very art of freeing oneself 
from oneself) become neither a hermeneutic relationship nor an attachment to 
a pre-given identity, it is rather an art of giving form to what is otherwise 
formless. Can we then suggest here that the subject is the very locus where all 
these different gazes of Otherness converge? A grand theatre, the very locus 
of not only action, but also deferring of action (if deferring as holding back is, 
at the same time, an opening up of possibility, a possibility for actualising 
another act – or else, holding back oneself, or freeing oneself from temptation, 
freeing oneself from oneself, in today’s world at a time when ‘time [itself] is 
out of joint,’ is the ultimate act, an act in its most purity, a real challenge)! Can 
we hence approach, with the light of this reading, Foucault’s shift from grand 
genealogical projects (searching for, who we really are?) to micro technologies 
of the self (focusing on, how should I live my life?)? The question of Freedom, 
for Foucault, is rather deeply entangled within one’s relationship with the 
time.  
Intuition, or one with the present, can never lead to absolute Truth, but it 
affirms life itself. Yet it is precisely this event (non-time merging into time) 
that made intuition (in a Kantian sense the willing to receive what is presented 
in time and space) possible. Intuition is not prior to word, rather it is born with or 
along with the word, along with the image of the terrain it scans (the question 
before us, therefore, is: under what condition an image, or a reflection on one’s 
own retina, gets coherence and sense? Or if put differently, the condition under 
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which meaning gets meaning, that is, the condition under which meaning 
materialises itself either as signification – that is through definition and interpretation 
– or as significance, and that is through relevance and explanation – Deleuze, for 
instance, talks about infinitive verbs – or else through a combination of both). 
The content and limit of language hence have to detach itself from the 
succession and progression of history, and deeply ingrained in time, or else 
vice verse: means, language too has to be given, before us, as ‘historical a 
priori.’ Intuition, consequently, is nothing but the very scanning of the 
topography of thought itself. It is at once the scanning, through detached 
engagement, of topography – as all theatrics, that is, all possible emotional 
theatrical behaviours, unfold within the established relationships between man-
made and natural features of the surface: the setting – and the grounding of 
oneself, with an effort of imagination, in that topography in order to sense the 
‘simple and indivisible feeling’ that one encounters through identifying oneself with 
the others, from within them (Bergson, for instance, in “An Introduction to 
Metaphysics” writes “[b]y intuition is meant the kind of intellectual sympathy 
[author’s italic] by which one places oneself within an object in order to 
coincide with what is unique in it and consequently inexpressible”). Since 
everything is presented in time, in the different modes of time, intuition is 
intuition of time itself. It is the eye (since an eye does not contemplate, rather 
reflects light – eye is spontaneous) of a bird over the valley – it seems, it is 
important to keep here in mind the distinction between an image and a word. 
Neither a (spoken) word can be an image nor can image (unless it is linked 
within a system) be a word. An Image rather is connected to measured light; 
it is only an effect of measured light. If considered the functioning of eye, it is 
quite clear that the measuring of light is neither psychological nor linguistic 
but biological. It is constituted by the very form, virility and force of the 
biological body, yet to constitute an image as an image, that is, to constitute an 
image with signification (for example, a personal facade), image must take shape 
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in the background of or fed by psychic and language environment. Image then 
couldn’t be prior to word. Intuition, therefore, can never be instinctual. 
Intuition has not just causes, but also purposes, and therefore, is born at once 
with or along with psychological and linguistic determinants. Much more 
than its spontaneity, it is essentially its very context and precision – Bergson’s 
philosophy, for instance, gains precision, when he develops intuition as a 
method. Deleuze, for instance, poses a question: how come intuition, which 
primarily denotes an immediate knowledge (connaissance) capable of forming a 
method, when method, for that matter any method, involves more than one 
meditation? But then, as a defence, he also writes “Bergson often presents 
intuition as a simple act. But, in his view, simplicity does not exclude a 
qualitative and virtual multiplicity” (Deleuze, 1991, p. 14). “[A]n absolute,” he 
writes in “An Introduction to Metaphysics,” ‘could only be given in an 
intuition’ – that differentiates intuition from imagination (which is actually a 
play of excess).            
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